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ABSTRACT
This study is an examination of the rhetorical
strategies utilized by Boris Yeltsin during his rise to
prominence and his role in the second Russian revolution.
By borrowing concepts from the study of revolutions in
science, the author contends that Yeltsin used three
distinct rhetorical personae, or modes of public
presentation, to forward his discourse between 1985 and
1991.

These personae include the revolutionary, the

conciliatory, and the conservative.

With this critical

vocabulary, the author argues that Yeltsin's successes and
failures hinged on his fitting use of rhetorical personae
in relation to four exigencies during the late-Soviet era:
the evolution of perestroika, the decline of progressive
perestroika, the emergence of the Russian presidency, and
the unfolding of the August coup of 1991.

This study

serves to supplement revolutionary theory which needs
further investigations concerning the ways radical
leadership negotiates the course of a revolutionary
movement.

v
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I
I

CHAPTER ONE
A RHETORICAL EXPLORATION OF THE SECOND
RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
INTRODUCTION
The second Russian revolution was a remarkable event.
For over seventy years, the fathers and descendants of the
Bolshevik uprising fought to establish the Soviet Union as
the spearhead of communism's march to global dominance.
This aspiration to build a distinct society apart from
capitalism's international influence created a myriad of
geo-political alliances which shaped the course of
twentieth-century history.

The advance of Marxism,

however, halted as the USSR failed to sustain itself.

Out

of the remains of this dead empire emerged an assortment of
newborn countries struggling to establish stable, sovereign
governments.

And for the world's eminent nations, the

Soviet challenge to liberal democracy and capitalism
quickly perished.

Thus, diplomats negotiated new

alliances, and corporate investors swarmed to stake their
claims.
Merrymaking over the Soviet Union's demise, however,
is still carefully measured.

As the fallout settles on the

international front, the rebuilding of a sovereign,
domestic Russia is in its early stages.
stability remain.

Threats to

For this nation, the transition to a

more representational form of government continues to
present an abundance of difficulties.

Within its borders,

1
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political organizations, social structure, economic
control, and the once pervasive myths of state-supervised
social order are still being torn down and reconstructed.
Russia's transition represents an unparalleled and unique
case.

No other emerging, democratic state possesses such

an unpromising legacy.

Historically, Russia boasts limited

experience with capitalism and democracy.

Moreover, the

heritage of Soviet domination is still smoldering as
evidenced by the rekindled embers of communist political
activity in the 1996 presidential elections.
Despite obstacles, the tenuous conversion advanced
under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin.

More than any one

single person, he symbolized the revolution of 1991 and the
collapse of the Soviet Union's communist regime.

Prior to

the revolution, as an aspiring leader working his way up
through the party ranks, he demonstrated a flair for action
when the party and state system were ineffective.

While

others moved cautiously or were limited in vision by
ideological blinders, Yeltsin took bold risks which paid
dividends after the fall of communism.

As Mikhail

Gorbachev became disgraced and discredited, Yeltsin emerged
as the democratic movement's foremost captain.
Yeltsin's influence during the transition, however,
was a mixed blessing.

Following the coup of 1991,

political disorientation erupted as Gorbachev became
ineffectual and the plotters floundered in the coup's
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aftermath without a decisive plan of action.

Yeltsin,

however, gathered up the fallen reins and, without inciting
violence, took control of the situation.

Regarding

Yeltsin's acquisition of power, Sakwa (1993) notes, "Seldom
before had the world seen the destruction of an old
political order and the attempt to create a new one being
achieved with so little physical violence" (14).
light, Yeltsin might be seen as a savior.

In this

Ironically, he

was also a potential threat to the democratic movement
which he led.

Giorgi Satarov, a member of the presidential

council, once noted Yeltsin's penchant for authoritarian
tactics.

After Russia rose from the ashes of the USSR,

Satarov once remarked:
Like Gorbachev's perestroika, everything now in the
development of democracy is being guided from
above....It is very easy to slip into dictatorship.
There are no checks. Monopolistic rule is responsible
for checking itself, and this self-restriction has to
hold somehow before there sure real checks and balances
(in Remnick 1994, 536).
Questions remain regarding Yeltsin's methods as an
established institutional leader as do questions regarding
his rise to revolutionary power and his ascent to
institutional authority.
Given that the revolution was relatively bloodless and
Yeltsin's post-Soviet, presidential authority works
independently of many clearly-defined regulations, one
might conclude that Yeltsin's rise to power was a triumph
of his use of rhetorical strategies.

That is, Yeltsin's
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success depended on his ability to negotiate and persuade,
to acquire allies and appease rivals.

In light of

Yeltsin's accomplishments during the late-Soviet era, a
provocative question emerges:

what is the relationship

between rhetoric and revolution?

It is to this question

that I now turn.
RHETORIC AND REVOLUTION
The theoretical focus of this study, the relationship
between rhetoric and revolution, is infrequently explored.
Paramount issues in the study of revolution tend to focus
not on persuasion and leadership during times of political
change, but on antecedent conditions which precede conflict
and revolutionary outcomes.

For instance, in anticipating

the underlying causes of conflict, Karl Marx emphasizes
incessant class struggle and competition for modes of
production (in Tucker 1978, 164-165).

Vilfredo Pareto

underscores Darwinistic conflict between elites for
positions of power, status, and wealth (in Hagopian 1974,
52).

And Hannah Arendt (1963) sees revolution in terms of

a crusade for freedom by masses seeking liberation from
oppressive circumstances (l ).
other theorists look for general similarities which
characterize revolutionary outcomes.

Leon Trotsky defines

revolution as a political movement striving to supplant one
dominant group for another thus shifting the balance of
power.

For Louis Gattschalk, revolution is a popular
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movement which attempts to initiate radical change in the
governing structure of a given nation.

And Sigmund Neumann

defines revolution as an essential transformation in
"political organization, social structure, economic
property control and the dominant myth of a social order,
thus indicating a major break in the continuity of a
development" (in Blackey and Paynton 1976, 6-7).

These

definitions demonstrate significant utility, but, like all
conceptualizations, bear weaknesses.
One such weakness is the tendency to use the above
mentioned theories to create scientific, causal models of
revolution.

About this issue, Mark Hagopian (1974) claims

that social scientists and historians may not invoke "laws"
with the same certainty as scholars investigating natural
sciences.

He writes, "Historical situations present a

multitude of interrelated factors whose relevance or
irrelevance to the events we wish to explain is difficult
to determine" (124).
obvious.

The implication of this claim is

Universal, many covering-laws, and even multi-

causal approaches to the study of revolution can be
reductionistic.

Further, they do not always account well

for the chaotic transition period at the time of and
shortly following a revolutionary crisis.

This is a void

that a rhetorical perspective on revolution aspires to
fill.
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Rhetoric is, in its traditional sense, the art of
persuasion.

Rhetoric deals not only with pure reason, but

with subjective inodes of influence as well.

In the

classical, Aristotelian conception of rhetoric, the
persuasion of a given audience also deals with three
interrelated factors:

logos, appeals to logic; pathos,

appeals to emotions; and ethos, appeals based on a rhetor's
character.

Given that this formulation includes logic, a

rhetorical approach to revolution does not preclude or
ignore the "facts" of history and the variables that
constitute the building blocks of conflict.

A rhetorical

approach does, however, encourage and include the study and
understanding of the extra-rational factors that contribute
to revolutionary movements.
Expanding on Aristotle's conception of rhetoric,
Farrell explains that rhetoric helps manage emerging
situations in history.

He writes, "urgent circumstances

require that we act, even though we lack complete, reliable
grounds for determining what the best action might be"
(Farrell 1993, 278).

A rhetorical culture, therefore, is

one in which people recognize the responsibility of civic
leaders to issue discourse aimed at conflict resolution.
Here, Farrell seemingly echoes Vico's humanist position
which asserts that humans are indeed born out of nature,
but shape it.

That is, humans are not entirely bound to

strict behavioral laws.

They can make active, and not
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necessarily instinctual, choices concerning action and can
ascribe meaning symbolically to sense data; thus, they can
interpret their world in an assortment of ways (Foss, Foss,
and Trapp 1985, 133).

Consequently, a rhetorical

perspective assumes that humans are active agents who make
meaningful, strategic choices about how to manage problems.
The rhetorical choices which manage crisis situations
may take a variety of forms.

For instance, following the

American revolution's Boston Massacre, Kirt Ritter and
James Andrews (1978) note the importance of illustrated
handbills, sermons, newspaper essays, and broadsides (6).
David Bezayiff (1976) even includes the courtroom oratory
of John Adams as instrumental discourse aimed at
challenging British authority.

These forms of discourse

are rather conventional artifacts for examination, but
rhetoric has recently expanded its range of investigation.
After the American civil rights movement in the 1960s,
popular music, protest marches, and confrontation itself
have all been studied as rhetorical forms.
Whatever shape rhetoric takes, it should be
underscored that rhetors have the ability to influence
people's attitudes toward seemingly "objective" events in
history, including a variety of social, economic, and
political conditions.

For instance, in relation to the

American revolution's Boston Massacre, Ritter and Andrews
write, "The Massacre was, of course, a symbolic event in
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patriotic rhetoric.

It was tactically necessary to enlarge

upon it to make clear the real, and sinister, significance
of the event" (7).

In short, spokesmen of the revolution

actively interpreted the event that their audiences might
be reminded of the "oppressive” British government's "evil"
designs.
While newspaper essays, speeches, and like modes of
discourse can be used rhetorically, they do not necessarily
stand on their own.

Often, the author's identity is a

contributing factor in the success or failure of a message.
Two rhetorical terms describe this thought, ethos and
persona.

As noted previously, ethos concerns a rhetor's

perceived character.

According to Aristotle, the concept

involves a rhetorical appeal which functions at the time of
a rhetorical act.

While ethos deals with the

representation of one's personality, persona concerns
itself with a constructed role that a person plays.

Often,

these roles develop in certain rhetorical conditions which
demand that a rhetor assume a certain set of
characteristics for audience acceptance.

For instance,

Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1990)
contend that presidential discourse in the United States is
role governed (5).

That is, genres of presidential address

are associated with specific expectations, both public and
institutional, which guide what can and cannot be said.
course, a president's distinctive, personal style of
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presentation is always present.

Nevertheless, for a chief

executive to deviate too far from a genre's standards may
dash audience expectations and, consequently, deunage his or
her credibility.
The construction of perceived credibility for a
leader's image is important in that it conveys an
impression to an audience of a rhetor's potential for
action.

In The Rhetoric of Religion. Kenneth Burke writes

that action "involves character, which involves choice— and
the form of choice attains perfection in the distinction
between Yes and No ....action implies the ethical, the human
personality" (in Lee and Andrews 1991, 25).

Given this

association between action and perceived character, an
audience's belief in a message hinges, in part, upon the
integrity of the source.

Consequently, the success of a

movement's ability to mobilize the masses depends on its
leadership.

This thought is not new in history.

Robert

Tucker (1973) once observed that the Bolshevik revolution
might not have occurred without Vladimir Lenin's leadership
(45).

To support this hypothetical notion, Tucker cites

Trotsky who, in his diary, writes that only he and Lenin
possessed the leadership skills to drive the overthrow of
the post-tsarist, provisional government (45-6).

Without

Lenin or Trotsky, therefore, the Bolsheviks may not have
assumed control in 1917.

If revolutionary leadership is

important to the initiation and resolution of conflict.
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rhetorical studies may prove useful in explaining the
phenomenon of revolutions by pointing out what particular
rhetorical strategies or tactics make revolutionaries like
Lenin or Trotsky successful.
A definition of revolution that recognizes humans as
active agents is forwarded by historian of science I.
Bernard Cohen.

In the scientific context, he contends that

revolution "implies a break in continuity, the
establishment of a new order that has severed its links
with the past, a sharply defined plane of cleavage between
what is old and familiar and what is new and different”
(Cohen 1985, 6).

This break in continuity is characterized

by two essential elements, newness and conversion.

To

explain the newness that revolutions provoke, Cohen employs
Arendt's words to describe newness as, "an entirely new
story, a story never known or told before" (8).

Further,

Cohen's notion of conversion recognizes that it is not
enough that change is simply advocated or fought for, but
it must be routinized and practiced— only then will the
revolutionary process be complete.

For change to become

routinized and practiced, however, it must be argued for by
leaders and accepted by a given audience.

This entails the

use of rhetoric.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
With Cohen's rhetorically-oriented definition of
revolution as a critical perspective, this dissertation
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seeks to further unite the concepts of rhetoric and
revolution.

More specifically, it examines Boris Yeltsin's

rise to revolutionary leadership and his appropriation of
power as post-Soviet Russia's first president.

In doing

so, I will explore how he constructed various rhetorical
personae which empowered him to become the chief commandant
of Russia's second revolution.

To explore this area of

inquiry, I will address the following research questions:
1)

What were the personae utilized by Yeltsin for the

establishment of himself as an influential leader?; and 2)
How was Yeltsin's strategic use of personae essential to
the revolutionary process?

In the process of answering

these questions, I contend that:

1) Rhetoric is an

essential and influential element in the revolutionary
process; and 2) There are certain rhetorical personae
revolutionaries tend to adopt to fuel revolutionary
movements.
JUSTIFICATION OF STUDY
As a topic for the exploration of the relationship
between rhetoric and revolution, Yeltsin provides an
excellent case study for several reasons.

First, his rise

to power symbolizes a remarkable moment in Russian history
which presented a number of curious exigencies.

Boris

Yeltsin's emergence as a leader came during an
unprecedented juncture in Russian history.

For the first

time, government was to be accountable to a voting public.
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Previously, Russia's citizenship followed the lead of
autocratic authority.

In his work titled Political

Culture and Soviet Politics, political scientist Steven
White (1979) argued that autocracy is the defining
principle in Russia's political history.

In light of this

tsarist-based heritage, White asserted that Russians
developed a view of citizenship not as a legal expression
of public interests, but as submission to a kind of
patrimonial rule (White 1979, 22).

Thus, despite being

autocratic, tsarism was seen by many Russians as a
legitimate form of government.
Even after the reign of tsars ended, Bolshevism
perpetuated Russia's tradition of oppressive rule.
Throughout its more them seventy-year life span during the
Soviet era, the communist party operated as a self-centered
entity despite claims that it represented the well-being of
the proletariate and peasantry.

Many of the party's elite

indulged in heavy-handed measures to ensure the party's
fortitude.

Lenin himself believed in terrorist tactics, if

necessary, to convince the masses of communism's
"inevitability."

In addition to terrorizing the Soviet

Union, Stalin corrupted the nation's bureaucracy.

This

corruption, under Brezhnev's administration, blossomed into
blatant forms of misconduct which served the interests of
party members including, to name just a few, housing and
traveling privileges.

As this progression of unofficial,
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yet state-recognized debauchery unfolded, much of the
public grew distant, indifferent, and cynical.

In this

difficult environment for constructive change, Yeltsin
braved several demanding tasks.
First, under Yeltsin's leadership, post-Soviet
government faced the task of building credibility in a
political culture long guided by patriarchical dominance.
This dilemma presented a weighty theoretical problem.

The

aggregate effect of centuries of autocracy was a
disjunction between state allegiance and agreement with the
practices of a reigning government or acceptance of that
government as desirable (Tucker 1987, 202-203).

This

situation placed Russia in a condition that impedes the
development of an aspiring democracy.

In On Liberty. John

Stuart Mill advocated individual rights but denounced that
which keeps citizens from recognizing themselves as an
active part of a greater whole;

citizens must function as

willing participants of a governed body.
Second, in addition to the theoretical, a practical
problem also arose in the creation of Russia's civil
society.

The nation had no historical or cultural basis

for democratic, participatory functioning in government.
Therefore, encouraging the public to take part earnestly in
civic affairs proved difficult.

After the fall of the

communist party, a vast number of avaricious political
parties emerged.

This development of partisan communities

i
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found itself poorly united with Russia's broad social
interests and new political institutions (Sakwa 1993, 392).
Further complicating the integration of public interest and
government is the problem of economic reform.

On this

issue, Sztompka (1991) observed that a sturdy and equitable
system of free trade demonstrates a link between individual
interests and the public good (309).

Thus, the unfinished

construction of stable economic institutions weakens the
opportunity for a coherent political party system's success
(Weigle 1994, 267).

with these ideas in mind, it is not

difficult to hypothesize that a comprehensive democratic
conversion is not yet complete or assured.
A second justification for this study is the
opportunity for a close, contemporary examination of the
role of leadership in revolution as it unfolds.

In

studying the relationship between rhetoric and revolution,
the Yeltsin phenomenon demonstrates how one can use
rhetorical actions to underscore social and political
conditions, interpret them for a public, and construct a
public sense of exigency.

Put differently, the

revolutionary leadership concerns the ability to create the
precipitants of revolution.

Hagopian (1974) defines the

idea of precipitants by making an analogy to the field of
chemistry.

He explains that,

"[A] precipitant is a

substance which introduced in minute quantities causes
another substance (the precipitate) which is in solution to
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leave that state" (Hagopian 1974, 166).

That is, a

precipitant provokes a drastic reaction among relatively
stable ingredients.

Thus, a revolutionary precipitant is,

in Lyford Edwards' (1970) words, "some act, insignificant
in itself, which precipitates a separation of the
repressors and their followers from the repressed and their
followers" (27).

Leadership is the fundamental feature in

the creation of precipitants, but one cannot create
precipitants out of thin air.

Precipitants must work in

conjunction with precipates, "long-term" causes of
revolution.

These constitute the power keg which

precipitants, like burning fuses, ignite.

About

precipitates, Marx writes that increasing misery drives the
working class to uprising (in Tucker 1978, 165).

Put

differently, as the standard of living falls, chances for
revolution increase.
During the late 1980s, with standards of living
diminishing, conditions were such that the Soviet Union was
ripe for revolutionary change.

Perestroika had faltered.

Gorbachev's "revolution within a revolution" sought to save
the principal features of the Soviet system and retain the
party's leading role in national affairs.

However, even

with democratization, glasnost, and the introduction of a
limited market economy, perestroika failed to alleviate
many of the Soviet Union's problems.

In fact, the

ambitious reform of communism only exacerbated a system
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already in a dire situation.

Sakwa (1993) labels most of

the development— political, social, economic— following the
1917 revolution "misdevelopment" (16).

Although great

gains were made in the realm of industry, the empire's
citizens' quality of life suffered.

Empty shops, idle

workers, and squalid housing— these circumstances
characterized the lives of every-day people.

All glasnost

accomplished was to provide a means of expressing
frustration, not solving problems.

For many people, the

only apparent solution seemed to be radical change.
To encourage such radical change during the 1980s,
Yeltsin played the role of agitator with enthusiasm.

As

the Soviet system continued to crumble, Yeltsin's
celebrated tirades became increasingly revolutionary.

In

his campaign for the Russian presidency, he became the
first Soviet official to decry the national impulse to
idealize and idolize Lenin and to commend Solzhenitsyn for
his role in de-Stalinization.

At this point, Yeltsin's

intention became clearly obvious.

He was not as much

concerned with promoting the Soviet Union as he was
concerned with the return of Russia as it was before the
Bolshevik revolt.

According to Petro (1995), "Like the

nineteenth century Slavophile reformers Y. Samarin and D.
Shipove, Yeltsin embraced change not for his own sake, but
for the sake of restoring Russian greatness" (158-9).
While Yeltsin saw no future for the communist party, he
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believed in the reconstruction of a sovereign Russia's
statehood.
Because Yeltsin is an influential revolutionary leader
whose presence in office influenced Russia's future, it
profits scholars to understand him.

In Russia, according

to Sestanovich (1990), Yeltsin helped make the difference
between a relatively smooth transition and wide spread
violence (3).

During the Soviet Union's final days,

Yeltsin was seen as a threat to stability.

But as a

spearhead of the revolution, he set the tone for the
establishment of a new Russia.

His legacy will be an

integral component of continued advancement toward some
form of democratic management.

To understand Yeltsin, his

rise to power, and Russia's prelude to political
transformation, an examination of his discourse should
prove beneficial.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
To understand the guiding objectives and assumptions
underpinning this rhetorical study of Yeltsin, it is
necessary to review literature concerning the relationship
between leadership and revolution.

In this area of study,

a number of different academic disciplines have done work
including rhetoric, political science, psychology, and
sociology.

The forthcoming review will examine major

concepts used in these fields and strengths and weaknesses
of each respective approach.
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Social Movements
In the field of rhetoric, few contemporary studies
have associated ideas concerning leadership and political
revolution.

The study of social movements, however, may

provide useful insights.

Social movements are mass

crusades of advocates seeking improvement in institutions
or social practices that change slowly.

In defining social

movements, Stewart, Smith, and Denton (1994) write,
A social movement...is an organized,
uninstitutionalized, and large collective activity
that emerges to bring about or to resist a program of
change in societal norms or values, operates primarily
through persuasive strategies, and encounters
opposition in a moral struggle (17).
These movements function outside of settled, legitimate
institutions.

Rather them overturn institutions, movements

seek to reform the practices of those in power like
legislators, governors, ministers, and industrialists.
Thus, social movements and political revolutions differ in
that the latter seeks the upheaval of institutions while
the former seeks only reform.

Nevertheless, there are

ideas concerning rhetoric and leadership in social
movements one can appropriate that might serve scholars
well in the arena of revolutions.
Just as revolutions have a moral tone, so do social
movements.

For a movement to justify its standing as a

significant and substantial enterprise, it must warrant
itself with what Oberschall calls an "elaboration of
systems of beliefs and moral ideas" (in Stewart, Smith, and
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Denton 1994, 11).

Put differently, a social movement must

demonstrate that it is seeking to better a public's
welfare.

Given that moral struggle is involved, Griffin

argues that all movements are political and concern a
conflictual drama which aims for a society's salvation (in
Rueckert 1969, 456).

Here, the idea of conflict is

important in that one group alone does not produce a
movement; movements involve a rhetorical struggle between
an old and new over what practices and principles are
beneficial.
In light of such moral conflict, leaders of social
movements have meaningful responsibilities.

The tasks of

leaders are many, including organizer, administrator, and
decision maker.

Nevertheless, there is one function of

leadership of particular importance to rhetoric, the
leader's role as a symbol of a movement which represents
its values.

Certainly, leaders in social movements do not

possess the same kind of mandate claimed by institutional
leaders.

Leaders in social movements command because they

become identified with the group's cause.

That is, the

identities of the leaders and the movements merge (Stewart,
Smith, and Denton 1994, 95).

For instance, Martin Luther

King became synonymous with the civil rights movement,
Caesar Chavez came to represent the fight for migrant
workers' rights, and Andrei Sakharov represented an
archetype for Soviet nonconformists.

For a leader to
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develop the kind of influence possessed by individuals like
these, Herbert Simons (1970) suggests that leadership
potential resides in his or her "capacity to fulfill the
requirements of his [her] movement by resolving or reducing
rhetorical problems" (2-3).
To solve the dilemmas faced by a movement and to be a
symbolic leader, one must be a kind of prophet.

Or, in

Lessl's (1989) words, a leader must project either a
"bardic" or "priestly" voice.

In comparing the two, Lessl

claims that "bardic and priestly communication share many
features but are differentiated by virtue of the rolerelations speakers and listeners manifest in each
rhetorical type" (188).

More specifically, bardic

communication is nostalgic and may well suit the rhetorical
needs of conservative or reactionary movements.

It reminds

people of their traditional values, aspirations, and
convictions.

Priestly communication, however, is

transcendent in nature.

It suggests to people that they

might become something different and better.

Lessl claims

that using this vocabulary can aid a critic in drawing out
some of the "posturing" involved in some kinds of rhetoric
(188).

And more importantly, this vocabulary helps explain

the moral appeal of rhetors associated with progressive
social movements.
Lessl suggests that with the use of the "priestly"
voice comes authority which is largely divorced from the
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mainstream marketplace of ideas.

That is, the priestly

voice forwards ideas that are idealistic and untested.
This poses a risk in terms of seeking rhetorical success in
that one might become estranged from their constituency.
Gregg helps illustrate this possibility in his discussion
of the "ego function" of protest rhetoric.

He claims that

protest rhetoric has a limited audience; those in power may
refuse to listen.

From this assumption, he argues that the

provocateur may choose to address him or her self "and that
regardless of his reasons for such behavior, this primary
transaction of self may be properly designated rhetorical"
(Gregg 1969, 71).

In a typical rhetorical transaction, one

assumes that the rhetor has a particular aim, like inducing
action in or shifting attitudes of an audience.

In Gregg's

words, "The speaker is successful insofar as he can
maneuver his listeners to assent the point of view, claims,
or actions proposed by the speaker" (72).

For the

protestor, however, protest rhetoric may function simply to
psycho-logically construct and affirm an individual's or a
group's own position (74).
If protest rhetoric is, to some degree, ego driven,
the line between the success and failure- of a movement may
be thin.

In other words, a subtle distinction exists

between satisfying one's own needs and pragmatically
satisfying the needs of a constituency.

For instance,

Eugene Debs was successful because his rhetoric made a
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difference for the constituency he represented.

Debs was,

in a sense, a marginal leader in that his supporters were
few and his unattained goals were many— he did not, in four
attempts, become president of the United States, and "he
did not even see the creation of a vertically integrated
industrial union in his lifetime" (Darsey 1988, 434).
Debs' efforts did, however, provide a moral foundation for
reforms resulting in better treatment of workers who were
once seen as mere cogs in the American manufacturing
machine.
Debs.

Emma Goldman, however, was not as successful as

Solomon (1988) argued that the anarchist firebrand

of early 20th century America used rhetorical techniques
that were self defeating (185).

"Red Emma" Goldman was a

better agitator than practical reformer.

Therefore, while

she pointed out social ills, she forwarded no feasible
plans for reform and could not rally a coherent core of
supporters.

Thus, her consequence as a pragmatic activist

was nominal.
How leaders like Debs come to the forefront of
movements is uncertain.

John Wilson writes that "the

typical pattern of domination in the typical social
movement is subsumed under neither the concept of power nor
that of authority" (in Stewart, Smith, and Denton 1994,
92).

The pathways to control are not well defined and the

movement's support of a commander may be fickle at best.
In describing this precarious situation, Simons (1970)
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writes that a leader may manage am organized nucleus, but
wields little control over those at the periphery of the
movement (4).

Without assured support from the movement's

fringes, Stewart, Denton, and Smith (1994) speculate that
leaders gain legitimacy through performing specific skills
like organizing or decision making "through costly trial
and error as the social movement unfolds" (92).
While conjectures exist about how leaders acquire
power in social movements, the importance of leadership is
clean:.

Leadership is essential because the leader's

characteristics often shape the movement's activities.

As

Sidney Hook (1967) once noted,
We cam tell that it [revolution] is coming, we cam
predict its approach though not what particular event
will set it off. We cam predict...the advent of a
revolution or a war but not always what its upshot
will be. That upshot may sometimes depend upon the
characters of the leading personalities (154).
To understamd the kind of and importance of occurrence to
which Hook is referring, one must question the adequacy of
claiming that leaders arise through "trial and error.”
More research must be done to more fully understand the
strategies and tactics used by leaders to justify efforts
aimed at reform and revolt.

Charisma
Charisma has been a useful tool in the examination of
revolutionary leadership in a wide variety of disciplines.
The influential and foundational conception of the term was
developed by Max Weber.

He claims:
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The term 'charisma' will be applied to a certain
quality of an individual personality by virtue of
which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as
endowed with supernatural, super human, or at least
specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These
are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person
but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary,
and on the basis of them the individual concerned is
treated as a leader (in Toth 1981, 19).
With this definition as a cornerstone in research
literature, charisma refers to a personality with magnetic
appeal, sense of timing, and the rhetorical skills
necessary to articulate what "others can as yet only feel,
strive towards, and imagine but cannot put into words or
translate explicitly into action" (Stewart, Smith, and
Denton 1994, 96-7).

What makes some charismatic and others

not is sometimes difficult to discern as charisma is a
"gift of grace."

Nevertheless, there appear to be two

elementary kinds of charisma, pure and manufactured.
Pure charisma deals directly with, to use the term
loosely, one's "actual" personality.

It refers to an

innate charm, or magnetism, which moves people around the
charismatic individual to action.
claim to obedience is personal.

Thus, pure charisma's
Its impact occurs in

conjunction with the leader's ability to evoke the sense of
conviction, devotion, and allegiance (Bensman and Givant
1986, 32).

In its earliest conceptions, charismatic

ability is associated with divine gifts.

In fact, the

plural of the term, "charismata," blossomed out of the
Judeo-Christian tradition where it was associated with
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talents bestowed by the Holy Spirit (Boss 1976, 302).

As

charisma stemmed from divine influence, the charismatic
individual operated outside of the bounds of formal
legitimacy.
Because charisma operates without institutional mores,
it is often viewed as revolutionary and is associated with
the role of agitator.

Eric Hoffer scoffingly comments that

"chaos is his [the agitator's] element.

When the old order

begins to crack, he wades in with all his might and
recklessness to blow the whole hated present to high
heaven" (in Hagopian 1974, 331).

According to Weber, pure

charisma tends to arise during times of crisis when
traditional power and institutional structures have broken
down (Bensman and Givant 1986, 29).

In this situation,

Lasswell claims that audiences are vulnerable to agitation
at the hand of one who places emphasis on emotional
responses from the masses (Lasswell 1960, 78).

While it is

difficult to speculate about the exact personality
attributes of charismatic leaders who can manipulate the
passions of a public, one thing seems certain.

During

times of crisis, some provisional form of authority is
needed as an alternative to sheer chaos.

That provisional

form might be characterized by pure charismatic leadership.
While pure charisma concerns "innate" abilities,
manufactured charisma relies less on personality, and more
on institutional legitimacy;

it is part of what Weber
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calls rational-legal authority.

According to Weber, once a

charismatic leader comes to hold am official and secure
office, a period of routinization follows in which a more
lasting authority arrangement solidifies (Glassman 1986,
181).

In short, manufactured charisma is a component of

the legitimization process in which a constituency consents
to be led (118).

Thus, the leader appropriates the

trappings of office to add to his or her influence.
Manufactured charisma is a fixture in the modern,
mass-mediated world.

Especially in America, leadership

elites often utilize advertising techniques to package and
sell an image.

Leaders are promoted strategically.

At

pre-arranged, special events including news conferences,
rallies, and parades, the "charismatic" are surrounded by
impassioned symbols— flags, swastikas, red stars, or
whatever is contextually appropriate.

Within this carnival

atmosphere, the leader finds him- or herself well prepared
to play a scripted part.

Speech instructors, speech

writers, and special consultants all contribute to the
creating of a formulated persona, a carefully crafted image
which appears larger than life (Glassman 1986, 122).
Lighting, camera angle, makeup, distance, stagecraft— all
of these factors contribute to the production of modern,
manufactured charisma (Bensman and Givant 1986, 50).
The study of charisma, both pure and manufactured, has
been a fruitful endeavor.

Given that charisma is driven,
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in part, by creative, or extra-rational modes of proof, it
is a concept ripe for rhetorical examination.

Many

scholars, like sociologist Talcott Parsons, believe that
charisma, when astutely used, can identify key
characteristics of influential leaders.

He notes,

"Charisma is not a metaphysical construct, but an
observable quality of men and things in relation to human
acts and activities" (in Boss 1976, 313).

As Weber

originally envisioned the term, charisma has several key
determinants.

First, the charismatic leader must be

recognized by a constituency.

Second, the leader's

followers must have an emotional stake in a communal
relationship.

Third, for the leader to lose charismatic

power, his or her "god" or "heroic" power must also fail.
Fourth, economic considerations have no bearing on
charisma.

And, fifth, charisma is a revolutionary force

(in Boss 1976, 301).

In a summary of research literature,

Boss claims that from Weber's conception, three dimensions
of charisma have emerged:

1) qualities or traits

characterizing the person him- or herself; 2) the
observable influence on the "listener-followers"; and 3)
the exigencies indicated in the specific socio-political
situation (301).
While the critical use of charisma as a critical term
has been productive, its study has its limits.

Charisma,

as studied currently, has become increasingly difficult to
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use as a productive concept.

Charisma is a popular term

and is, thus, diluted in meaning.

Of course, the term

carries its foundational meaning.

Nevertheless, McCrosky

and Young (1981) warn that the core meaning has been
obscured with continued study (24).

Also, Boss claims that

the concept's overuse has promoted a thinning of the idea.
He writes, "So vague indeed is the referent for 'charisma'
that scholars in the field of rhetoric have had only
minimal interest in the concept, content to allow the term
to be subsumed under the general rubric of 'ethos,' or
ethical proof” (Boss 1976, 300).

Perhaps the time is ripe

for scholarly vocabulary concerning rhetoric and revolution
to venture beyond charisma and to include additional,
complementary concepts.
The Psvcho-Analvtic Approach
Freud's influence is pervasive in academia, and the
study of revolution is no exception.

Appropriating Freud's

insights, a number of scholars have suggested that
revolutionary leadership is fueled by personality.

That

is, certain psychological dispositions motivate potential
leaders to action during times of political activity and
conflict.

In addition to Freud's own works, the efforts of

Harold D. Lasswell and Erik Erikson, to name a few, have
been influential in applying and explaining Freud's
theories in relation to revolutionaries.
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To appreciate the psycho-analytic approach to
leadership, one must start with a look at Freud and his
landmark psycho-biography of Woodrow Wilson.

In it, one

finds the main tenets of the Freudian approach to political
activity as expressed by three axioms.

Freud's first axiom

holds that, from birth, all men possess libido, an energy
derived from Eros.

The second axiom maintains that all

human beings are bisexual, and this results in mental
conflict.

Accordingly, the degree of masculinity obtained

by adult men corresponds to their childhood experience and
conditioning.

And axiom three claims that an inherent

"Death Instinct" clashes with one's Eros.

The result is a

smoldering, internal aggression which either waits for
provocation, or is the drive behind personal motivations
(in Hagopian 1974, 321).
This Freudian troika of postulates may also be
described in terms of Ego, Superego, and Id.

Representing

one's "common sense," the Ego may come into conflict with
one's Id, a reservoir of primal, libidinal urges.

Between

the Ego and Id is the Superego which is the realm of
consciousness and conflict, the root of which is the
Oedipus complex.

As a male child matures, Freud claims

that he develops love impulses toward his mother.

The

child's father, however, presents an obstacle to love
impulses and, therefore, becomes the aim of aggression.
Ironically, the father is also an object of affection.
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the child settles this paradox heavily influences his
subsequent psychic development (Freud and Bullitt 1967,
42).

Assuming that people suffer inner turmoil over their

repressed urges and find no resolution, Freud suggests that
political behavior is frequently an externalization of
sexually-oriented difficulties troubling a leader during
his youth.
Surveying literature grounded in the Freudian
perspective, Lasswell suggests that all psychoanalytic
approaches to politics have three basic steps.

First,

researchers attempt to understand a leader's private
motives for his or her political endeavors.

Second,

researchers examine how one's private motives are manifest
in public life.

That is, they see how private motives

influence public decision making.

And third, researchers

attempt to discern how leaders rationalize their decisions
in terms of the public interest.

In light of this

procedure, Lasswell concludes that many scholars view the
"political personality" as enthralled with the accumulation
and use of authority.

This urge stems from the Oedipal

complex and functions to overcome feelings of inadequacy
and loss (in Hagopian 1974, 320).
The psycho-analytic perspective has been applied to a
number of political leaders and revolutionaries.

Examining

Julius Caesar, Cromwell, Robespierre, Hitler, and Stalin,
Bychowski's (1969) Dictators and Disciples represents an
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orthodox, Freudian analysis.

In this work, Bychowski

concludes that "the leader's fanaticism, will-to-power, and
paranoic suspiciousness stem from his failure to cope with
the traumas of childhood and adolescence" (245).
Wolfenstein's (1971) The Revolutionary Personality is more
innovative in that it is not limited to an analysis of
childhood experiences.

Rather, as he studies Lenin,

Trotsky and Ghandi, Wolfenstein also explores personality
in relation to historical circumstances.

For instance, he

claims that the manifestation of a revolutionary
personality is contingent upon historical factors including
"an established revolutionary tradition" (Wolfenstein 1971,
21).

In alternative settings, the would-be leader of a

revolution might assume the role of criminal, outcast, or
social deviant as a surrogate for political activity (23).
In examining the findings of Wolfenstein and
Bychowski, Hagopian (1974) summarizes several
characteristics of the "revolutionary personality.”

First,

the leader tends to suffer from the trauma associated with
the Oedipal complex, but more strongly than average for his
social group or culture.

Second, the leader endures the

mental conflict by sublimating instinctive yearnings and
aggressive drives though laboring for a cause or
revolutionary movement. Through this substitution a
rationalization occurs which justifies behavior in terms of
a revolutionary ideology.

Third, as the revolutionary
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process blossoms, the emerging leader unleashes animosity
against leading members of the old regime.

This action

gains ideological sanction which appeases his superego.
And, fourth, the leader, following the appropriation of
power, often displays fanaticism and acute suspicions that
suggest neurotic tendencies with deep-seated origins in his
character (Hagopian 1974, 327).
The psycho-analytic approach to revolutionary
leadership is productive, but limiting.

Bychowski,

Wolfenstein, and Freud take an individually-oriented
perspective to the study of revolution.

Indeed, the

private dispositions of any influential human being
inevitably affect behavior and, consequently, decisions
which impel others.

In this light, as Wolfenstein notes,

it is difficult to distinguish between the psychological
and sociological.

Nevertheless, the rhetorical perspective

is concerned not with one's thought process.
emphasis is on public performance.

Rather, its

Thus, while psycho

analytic study of a leader's thoughts invite speculation
about that which is ethereal and psychological, the
rhetorical study of a leader's discourse invites
consideration of the creation of a publicly-viewed image.
CONCLUSION
Little research concerning leadership exists that
explores the relationship between rhetoric and revolution.
Certainly, there are some genres of investigation that
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provide a framework for the study of leadership in the
revolutionary setting.

Nevertheless, these studies have

shortcomings concerning the persuasive strategies of
revolutionaries:

social movement investigations could be

more exacting; charisma studies may be losing potency; and,
with regard to a rhetorical perspective, the psycho
analytic approach overemphasizes tacit, personal aspects of
leaders.

In this labyrinth of knowledge, a need exists to

develop theories which more clearly examine rhetorical
strategies utilized by leaders in the revolutionary
context.

Toward this end, the present study seeks to

provide a bridge over the research gap through the
utilization and modification of theory concerning
rhetorical personae.
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CHAPTER TWO
METHOD
RHETORICAL PERSONAE
To broaden our understanding of rhetoric in a
revolutionary setting, this study investigates Yeltsin's
personae.

Put simply, a persona is a "role" one plays, a

publicly-constructed impression of one's self.
self in the psychological sense.

It is not a

Rather, an advocate's use

of a persona reveals only a strategic facet of his or her
character for the sake of advancing a persuasive message in
a community.

From the study of revolutions in science,

Keith and Zagacki (1992) suggest three different, ethical
opportunities for the rhetor-scientist seeking to promote
innovation— the revolutionary, the conciliatory, and the
conservative personae— which may prove serviceable in the
political realm.
First, Keith and Zagacki describe the revolutionary
persona which, of the three, is the most dauntless.

In

announcing revolutionary findings, some scientists
unabashedly declare the significance of their work.

Keith

and Zagacki claim that this posture may assume one of two
forms.

In the first approach, the researcher is

inadvertently compelled to seek revolution (Keith and
Zagacki 1992, 64).

Here, the scientist claims to be merely

doing his or her job— conducting research, recording
findings, and, when necessary, determining that data can
34
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not be explained with conventional inodes of
interpretation.1
The alternative approach, the "scientist seeking
revolution," is more blatantly radical.

This kind of

revolutionary stance emphasizes the need to actively seek
out alternative means of inquiry.

Even though a current

paradigm may be sufficient to answer many research
questions adequately, the scientist seeking revolution sees
danger in contentment.

Not to question underpinning

assumptions regarding scientific methods is to dogmatically
accept theories which might not be able to explain
anomalies in research findings (65-6).

The scientist

seeking revolution plays the role of agitator and savors
provocative confrontation.*
Second, Keith and Zagacki discuss the conciliatory
persona..

Occasionally, a lengthy delay occurs between the

time revolutionary ideas are presented and the time these
ideas are seen in practice.

During this postponement,

lTo explain this kind of "reluctant revolutionary,"
Keith and Zagacki use the example of chaos theorist Ralph
Abraham who, like many chaos scientists, confronted stern
opposition to his ideas. Yet, in the name of innovation and
creativity in science, he brooked disagreement and continued
to advance his theories (64-5).
In short, he did not
necessarily want to be revolutionary, but did so in the name
of scientific idealism.
2For instance, paleontologists Niles Eldridge and Steven
Gould aggressively attacked Darwinism's reliance on induction
and in a 1972 paper advancing the theory of punctuated
equilibria (66). When challenged with new interpretations,
Darwinists dogmatically invoked conventional explanations
(66 ).
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obstacles hinder revolutionary progress including
skepticism in the scientific community and testing
procedures for the new theories.

Delays like these present

weighty rhetorical repercussions for the scientists
involved.

The point here is that uncharitable responses to

revolutionary ideas prompt the innovator to switch from a
radical stance to one more conciliatory which appeases a
scientific community's requirements of acceptability.3
Third, the conservative persona serves to guard the
status quo of science.

Revolutionary progress can be

deterred by disbelief and animosity.

When these conditions

are present, eminent members of the established order are
afforded significant influence.

These scientists often

adopt a conservative persona which upholds the scientific
community's prevailing methods and theories (67).
According to Cohen, new ideas in science tend to face
resistance because every successful researcher and teacher
has a discernable interest— intellectual, social, or
economic— in maintaining theoretical stability.

Further,

Cohen writes, "If every revolutionary idea were
welcomed...utter chaos would result" (in Keith and Zagacki
3For instance, initially, Newton faced stern resistance
to his Qpticks.
Consequently, he had to reframe his
assertions in terms more agreeable to his colleagues.
As
Gross explains, Newton "employed a Euclidean arrangement to
create an impression of historical continuity and logical
inevitability" (in Keith and Zagacki 1992, 67).
In the
spirit of conventionality, Newton conducted an extensive
number of experiments, piling detail on detail, to create a
sense of need for innovation.
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1992, 67—8).

When theories fail to demonstrate the

validity necessary for acceptance, the conservative persona
is employed to promote rigor and defend the reigning
paradigm.4
Keith and Zagacki's concepts explain rhetorical
personae well conceptually, but require further operational
description.

While no one has outlined in detail the forms

these personae might take, a sound approximation may be
produced by drawing further thoughts from political theory.
On the use of a revolutionary persona, one might speculate
that a radical uses idealistic reasoning and harsh
commentary to debunk the status quo.

Robespierre

recognizes that revolutionaries seek to dethrone a
prevailing, constitutional government and install a new
administration.

In this process, radicals appeal to public

liberty rather than to traditional dogma (in Palmer 1970,
267).

That is, they base their arguments for

transformation in utopian principles and optimistic visions
of the future.

To encourage such visions and to instigate

rapid advancement, Hagopian (1974) claims that
revolutionaries demean an established order's current
4A helpful illustration of the conservative persona, as
pointed out by Keith and Zagacki, involves the case of
Velikovsky's radical cosmological physics and the stern
critiques it faced.
At an American Association for the
Advancement of Science meeting in 1973, Velikovsky's system
was mercilessly assailed.
Six years after the meeting,
astrophysicist Robert Jastrow commented that only three of
Velikovsky's ten predictions were corroborated, the others
were contradicted (68).
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condition.

Hagopian states that revolutionary ideology and

conduct is "hostile" to aspects of an antiquated regime and
"willing to invoke the maxim that the end justifies the
means" (201).
While the revolutionary seeks brisk transformation,
those using a moderate, conciliatory persona, promote
measured reform and demonstrate some degree of deference
for the status quo.

Thus, we might speculate that a

conciliator uses appeals to an existing rule of law and
invites predominant leaders of a reigning paradigm to join
in a reform movement.

According to the Edwards-Brinton

model of revolution, moderates want to change fewer things
than radicals and are satisfied with modifications grounded
in an established political system (in Hagopian 1974, 195).
Apparently, moderates wish to avoid the turmoil associated
with revolution.

However, they do act recklessly in some

cases to coax change, as evidenced by the stifling of the
Paris Commune in 1871.

All perspectives considered, a

moderate revolution might be best described as, in Pettee's
(1938) words, "anarchy thinly covered by legal continuity"
(106).

Thus, the use of a conciliatory persona may entail

extra-legal appeals to an existing system of legality; to a
need to embrace change; and to a need for certain, unified
progress.
Finally, the conservative avoids revolution and reform
by appealing to the need for constancy.

Thus, the style of
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reasoning associated with a conservative persona is likely
marked by a lack of inferential leaps.

Conservatives serve

as guardians of a status quo's ruling class.

As defined by

Dorso, a ruling class is composed of the "organized power
that has the political, intellectual, and material
leadership of society" which seeks to maintain order (in
Hagopian 1974, 93).

Upholding this order is an eminent

concern, as inventive, hasty change is almost unthinkable
without some kind of coercive or authoritarian reaction
from the state.
The intermingling of theories from science and
politics seems, at first, dubious, but it is reasonable.
In Revolutions in Science. Cohen (1985) relates the two.
He notes that political and scientific revolutions differ
conspicuously in that the goals of political revolution are
more well defined than those of scientific revolutions.
science, the aim of revolution is to perpetuate further
revolutions in a quest for empirical truths.

Political

revolutions, however, seek a goal which is more limited—
the establishment of an innovative institutional order
(Cohen 1985, 14-16).

Despite this important distinction,

the two possess similar characteristics.

Cohen writes:

Political theories and events that involve rapid
change in the social structure have had a pervasive
influence on concepts of scientific revolution since
the seventeenth century. Therefore we might
profitably ask which specific features of political
revolutions (and theories about them) have been
incorporated into the concept of scientific
revolution....A comparison of the two types of
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revolution reveals a closer degree of concordance than
might at first be imagined (Cohen 1985, 7).
This parallel between kinds of revolution is evident in
Cohen's definition of revolution.

As noted previously,

revolution is characterized by newness and conversion.
Newness refers to the elements of change inherent in a
paradigm shift and conversion refers to the change involved
in practice.

Conversion is am intricate process.

Cohen

notes that in the scientific community, the publication
standards, the educational order, and the positions of
power must all be affected for conversion to prevail (11).
Put succinctly, the successful revolution must eventually
become institutionalized.
To explain the end goal of revolution, a consideration
of rhetoric is required as both newness and conversion
require persuasion.

People must be convinced not only to

abandon the familiar, but to embrace a future as conceived
by revolutionary leadership.

In terms of how innovative

research is presented to an established, scientific
community, a strong link connects the ideas of personae and
of research breakthroughs.

New discoveries often leave

scientists facing technical uncertainties and questions
concerning how unprecedented findings might be reconciled
in light of previous, guiding studies.

When this

apprehension occurs, the innovator must decide what his or
her stance will be in relation to unprecedented facts.

In

other words, scientists must summon and ethically promote
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particular topoi which confirm or deny the significance of
their discovery.

If Cohen's analogy is fruitful, Keith and

Zagacki's personae may be productive in exploring the realm
of political revolution.

To more fully develop this

contention, a more complete understanding of persona is
necessary.
PERSONA
In the rhetorical context, persona deals with one's
creation of a credible public image and draws a distinction
between the speaker as a person and the speaker as a
perceived source of persuasion.

Harrell, Ware, and

Linkugel (1974) describe persona as "not the person, but
father [it] is the auditor's symbolic construction (and
implied assessment) of the person" (251).

This symbolic

construction of the rhetor's image is a convergence of
personal, ideological, and structural legitimacy variables
which lend persuasive impact to the perceived credibility
of a speaker.
The idea of the persona is typically familiar to
students of literature and theater,

in these contexts,

dramatis personae refer to an implied voice or a fictive
being suggested in a text (Campbell 1975, 391).

Finding

this textually embedded expression characteristically
requires a careful reading of the given work in conjunction
with knowledge regarding the author's intent or
circumstances.

in drama, actors who represent characters
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replace the playwrite's direct representation of persona
with performative interpretation.

As it is mediated to an

audience, persona becomes self interpreting.

Regardless of

whether an author masks him- or herself with persona in
lines on stage or words on the page, the auditor sees the
narrativity.

That is, the listener is aware that the words

of the story belong to an identifiable author telling a
story (Lyons 1985, 1).
Until several decades ago, Campbell (1975) claimed,
the concept of persona was used sparingly by rhetorical
scholars.

In developing this claim, Campbell wrote,

"...perhaps it is so easy to assume that an essay or
article or speech reflects an actual human being" (Campbell
1975, 391).

Such a position holds precedent in rhetoric's

classical tradition.

In ancient Greece, many pre-

Aristotelian scholars and teachers of rhetoric assumed that
the character of a speaker directly reflected his private
character.

Isocrates, for instance, claimed that "the

power to speak well is taken as the surest index of a sound
understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and
just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul" (in
Baumlim 1994, xv).

Also, ancient Roman theorists promoted

the importance of a "good and faithful soul."

Quintilian

believed that the noteworthy orator is the "good man
skilled in speaking well."

According to Quintilian, a

speaker's image was a product of rhetorical competence and
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the cultivation of an observable "essence" or "inner self"
which was formed prior to a speech.

Aristotle, however,

challenged the notion of representational ethos.
Aristotle avoids placing ethos in the realm of
representing actuality, as he emphasizes the importance of
influencing audience perception.

He argues that the speech

itself is the only source of ethos because very few
speakers would be well known enough prior to a speech to
provide any basis for antecedent ethos.

Thus, credibility

must be negotiated at the time of a speech.

In his

Rhetoric. Aristotle claims that "trust [in a speaker's
credibility] should be created by the speech itself and not
left to depend upon an antecedent impression that the
speaker is this or that kind of man" (1356a).

Put

differently, Aristotle believes that ethos should not be
left to chance, assuming that the audience will be able to
discern one "essential" self of a speaker.

Instead, it

should be negotiated at the time of the speech to optimize
persuasive impact of a message.

Thus, in Aristotle's

words, "it helps a speaker to convince us, if we believe
that he has certain qualities himself, namely, goodness, or
good will towards us, or both together" (1366b).

For

rhetorical purposes, Aristotle might say it is not
necessarily important for a speaker to be a good person.
Instead, he might say the appearance as a good person is
persuasive.
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This Aristotelian distinction between the public and
private image of a speaker provides the foundation of
persona, but with important differences.
rest with assumptions about audience.

These differences

On this subject,

Aristotle's suppositions were based on ideas concerning
Athenian citizenship.

As noted by Sproule (1988), the

Athenian audience was an elite group with typically
homogenous interests— its own well being.

He writes in

that Athens, the most democratic city state in ancient
Greece,

"the relevant political audience comprised only

native, freebom males, approximately fifteen percent of
the adult population" (Sproule 1988, 470-1).

In such a

limited venue, it is difficult to hypothesize that
Aristotle's notions of rhetoric might be aimed at
influencing a heterogeneous social mass.
The idea of persona makes the transition from focus on
the classical, elite audience to the heterogeneity of the
contemporary crowd.

While classical rhetoric was idea

centered, contemporary rhetoric in the mass-mediated age
concerns itself more with conveying pre-packaged ideology—
an "image" orientation.

Again, Sproule notes that along

with this image orientation, the importance of
interpersonal attraction and social influence increases.
Consequently, the contemporary audience expects "pseudo
intimacy" from spokespeople wielding institutional
sanction.

Concerns regarding competence, character, and
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motive have been replaced by standards which appraise
entertainment value (473).

In light of this condition,

Black (1970) remarks that the idealism of Aristotelian
discourse is supplanted.

Therefore,

"We are more

skeptical about the veracity of representation; we are more
conscious that there may be disparity between the man and
his image" (Black 1970, 111).
Persona accounts for this disparity and is concerned
with the idea of a rhetor playing a rhetorical role.

This

idea of rhetorical role playing is appealing to the likes
of Hart (1990) who sees the limitations of attempting to
discern a speaker's "true" character.

He writes that too

often "critics become amateur psychoanalysts, searching for
a speaker's psyche within the metaphors he or she uses.
This is a hazardous and unproductive game" (Hart 1990,
274).

That is, Hart would question the benefit of

understanding the soul of the speaker.

The soul of the

speaker does not have an impact on an audience.
the representation of that soul persuades.

Rather,

Thus, Hart

advocates understanding the verbal strategies that aid the
construction of a "distinctive personal image" (272).
Discerning this image might best be seen in Hillbrunner's
(1974) definition of persona as the intersection of
"signature"-*>the empirical characteristics of a speaker,
and "archetype"— the deeply embedded worldview of a
speaker.
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Signature concerns the choices made by and observable
characteristics of a rhetor.

Fielder describes signature

as "the sum total of individuating factors in a work, the
sign of Persona or Personality through which an archetype
is rendered" (in Hillbrnner 1974, 171).

This summation

includes both personality as well as strategy.

According

to Hart (1990), everyone has a "personal rhetorical
history" which includes, for example, a learned speech
style and life experiences (273-4)

Further, Burrchart

(1985) claims discourse bears one's personal "rhetorical
imprint," conscious choices made about the formation of
rhetoric.

Such choices include the invention of

"arguments, ideas, themes, techniques, metaphors, images,
stylistic devices, adaptation, ethos-building tactics, and
so forth" (Burchardt 1985, 442).

Certainly, a speaker is

not free from restraints on what can be said, including
social conventions and audience expectations, but in so far
as free choice is possible, signature persists.
Archetype, however, seems to deal not with the
observable, but rather with the tacit characteristics of a
speaker which guide rhetorical decisions.

According to

Fielder, archetypes go "down through the personality of the
poet, past his foibles and eccentricities to his
unconscious core, where he becomes one with us all....In
fantasy and terror we can return to our common source" (in
Hillbrunner 1974, 172).

With Fielder's thoughts in mind,
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it: might: be said that: archetype deals with a speaker's
values or worldview.

This position seems to make the

assumption that there is some kind of "a priori place"
which is an issue more philosophical than rhetorical.

But,

in dealing with this issue, Edwin Black implicitly
disregards the philosophical in favor of the rhetorical.
In his noteworthy article, "The Second Persona," he argues:
The critic can see in the auditor implied by a
discourse a model of what the rhetor would have his
real auditor become. What the critic can find
projected by the discourse is the image of a man, and
though that man may never find actual embodiment, it
is still a mem that the image is of (Black 1970, 113).
Thus, a critic can only speculate about an "inner" man in
relation to what is said as based in public discourse.
In short, performing persona is like playing a
dramatic role.

A script is given which includes a social

"director's" expectations— ideology, culture, role
constraints and the like.

At the same time, the rhetor's

character and personal choice inevitably shine through.

In

part, persona concerns the relationship between human
character and discourse as it meets with audience
expectation.

It is "the complex of verbal features that

makes one person sound different from smother" (Hart 1990,
272-3).

Hart claims that persona rests between one's

personality and social expectations, maintaining social
obligations influence discourse, and one's individualized
image also helps to create rhetorical limitations and
possibilities (273).
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APPLICATION
Given the preceding commentary about the relationship
between science and personae, one can see the importance of
rhetoric in the "doing" of science.
behavior.

Paradigms guide

They influence the way scientists conduct

research, they influence what is seen as conventional
research findings, and they influence how findings are
presented.

If science is rule governed, one must be able

to perform and behave in socially allowable ways to be
accepted as a member of the given scientific community.
Bronowski claims that science depends on ethics and on
"mutual trust on the work of other scientists..." (in
Campbell 1975, 393).

This is the case because research

extends previous research.

Thus, science is rhetorical in

that it explicitly encourages practitioners to exercise
specific behaviors and attitudes so that everyone might
work in conjunction to preserve a given scientific
community.

Violations of these norms, including

revolutionary activity, is seen as unethical.
The same is true in the political realm.

As

dramatized in Machiavelli's The Prince, certain behaviors
become acceptable according to customs, and violations of
these customs is seen as unethical.

In this work,

Machiavelli separates the difficulties associated with
acquiring a state from difficulties associated with
preserving one (Garver 1990, 191).

This distinction
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connects the preservation of a state, the established
paradigm, with standardized politics and ethics.

The rise

of a new prince seeking to claim the state for his own
would most likely be seen as unethical, self interested,
and fraudulent as he operates outside of accepted modes of
behavior (190).

Thus, the prince, much like the

revolutionary scientist, must be strategic in forwarding
his ideas to the "old" order.
In both revolutionary contexts, the political and the
scientific, a rhetor may cloak his or her genuine
orientations with a persona for the sake of influencing an
audience.

For instance, a legislator desires revolutionary

change, but her peers in parliament and her constituency
are nervous about radical reforms.

Therefore, the

legislator assumes the guise of a moderate.

By utilizing a

conciliatory persona, she seeks to avoid estranging her
peers and to gradually build the public support necessary
to effectively legislate change.

That is, the legislator

in this hypothetical example is politically radical but
rhetorically conciliatory.

The point here is that one's

ultimate political goals and rhetorical strategies may
appear, at times, disparate.
Similarly, Boris Yeltsin pursued radical change in the
face of conservative opposition from communists.

However,

despite his revolutionary aspirations, Yeltsin occasionally
utilized conservative and conciliatory personae.
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To address this seemingly paradoxical condition, one
must consider the rhetorical predicaments in which he
functioned because personae respond to circumstance.
differently, rhetoric is situational.

Put

According to Bitzer

(1968), discourse depends upon recognizing the "context of
meaning in which the speech is located" (3).

From this

perspective, Bitzer develops his notion of the "rhetorical
situation."

In defining this concept, Bitzer writes:

Let us regard the rhetorical situation as a natural
context of persons, events, objects, relations, and an
exigence which strongly invites utterance; this
invited utterance participates naturally in the
situation, is in many instances necessary to the
completion of situational activity, and by means of
its participation with situation obtains its meaning
and rhetorical character (5).
In light of Bitzer's view, to claim that rhetoric is
situational means that discourse emerges in response to an
exigence which demands resolution.

Therefore, to

understand the personae utilized by Yeltsin in his
revolutionary endeavor, an examination of the major
exigencies he faced is required.

During his rise to and

routinization of power, Yeltsin managed four major
situations.
The first exigence examined by the present study is
perestroika.

In a sense, perestroika marked the beginning

of the end for the Soviet Union and the communist party.
As originally conceived by the Kremlin's inner circle,
perestroika was meant to be a return to a kind of Leninism
which promoted empowerment of the people.

"Democratic"
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reforms emerged that limited the authority of state and
communist officials (Hoses 1989, 236).

Replacing control

by state-sanctioned officials included an increase in the
power of local soviets.

Rather than promote solidarity in

the Soviet Union, however, the seeds of fragmentation were
planted.

G1asnost-induced criticisms became more manifest.

Thus, the regime was being discredited, giving Yeltsin an
opportunity to assert his influence.

As a member of the

party machine, how did he accomplish this without getting
thrown into jail or worse?

What kind of persona (e ) allowed

him to succeed during the revolution's incubation?
The second exigency examined concerns the end of
progressive perestroika.

In 1989, Gorbachev's reform

effort became increasingly difficult to maintain.

Because

of economic disorientation, labor strikes, and ethnic
unrest in the republics, the General Secretary could not
permit the continuance of decentralization without risking
loss of the party's prominence in the Soviet system.
However, the newly-formed Congress of Peoples' Deputies
gave voice to dissent.

In this popularly-elected

parliament, Yeltsin expressed his disapproval of
Gorbachev's lethargic policy making and called for reform.
How could he do this without reproach?
In the summer of 1991, a third exigence developed, as
the Russian presidential elections were held.

After the

massacre in Vilnius, Lithuania earlier in 1991, Yeltsin
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determined that he could no longer work with Gorbachev.
Thus, in the election race and during his first months in
the presidential post, Yeltsin pushed for change.

He

openly advocated taking political power away from the
Soviet government and transferring it to the republics'
governments.
and savvy.

Championing such an innovation took courage
Can the application of rhetorical theory help

explain Yeltsin's strategy?
The fourth exigence examined concerns the demise of
the communist party following the coup of 1991.

During

August of that year, reactionary elements of the party
launched an inept conspiracy against Gorbachev.

Kryuchkov,

Pugo, Yazov, Pavlov, Shenin, Baklanov, Boldin— all of these
men believed that Gorbachev was incapable of leading the
Soviet Union from the brink of collapse, so they forcibly
relieved him of duty (Remnick 1994, 450).

Importantly, the

end of Gorbachev was intertwined with the end of communism.
In the wake of Gorbachev's absence, no one in the communist
party picked up the reins of leadership.

Chaos might have

surely erupted, but Yeltsin, reigning president of the
Russian Federation, took charge.

On August 23, at a

boisterous session of the Russian parliament, Yeltsin
issued a fateful decree:

the communist party's activities

in Russia were suspended.
To examine these exigencies and forward this study's
contentions, I scrutinize a number a rhetorical artifacts.
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Yeltsin's own books including The Struggle for Russia and
Against the Grain, while personal and reflective, will
contribute insight into the dilemmas he faced in his rise
to power.

And, more importantly, internet resources and

international news monitoring agencies provide a wealth of
public speech texts from which evidence can be drawn.

With

these resources, I examine each exigence mentioned above in
chapters three, four, five, and six.

In chapter seven, the

conclusion, I hope to fuse together results from preceding
chapters and successfully support my argument that the
creation and use of personae is an influential factor
during revolutionary crises.
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CHAPTER 3
YELTSIN AND EARLY PERESTROIKA
INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines Yeltsin's early career in Moscow
in relation to the exigence presented by perestroika
between 1985 and 1989.

These were foundational years for

Yeltsin upon which the stability of his future political
career in post-Soviet Russia would be built.

During this

time, Yeltsin employed a revolutionary persona, but was
forced to adjust and adopt a more conservative one.

When

Yeltsin first arrived in Moscow, he was a proverbial bull
in a china shop.

Reckless, blunt, confrontational— he

dared to assault the conventions of political conduct of
Moscow's political culture.

In 1986, as the novice leader

of Moscow city's party apparatus, he gave several key
speeches which unabashedly violated the conventional
sensibilities of public address in the Soviet Union.1 His
brashness reached its apex in 1987 when he accused the
party of indulging in self-appeasing, cult-like reverence
of its leadership.

Simultaneously, he threatened to resign

from his position as a candidate member of the Politburo.
Because of this effrontery, Yeltsin was banished from the
party's top council and lost his position as party leader
1Rhetoric
in
Soviet
government
was
remarkably
ceremonial. For example, in a special to the New York Times.
Schmemann (1986) noted that deliberation at the Twentyseventh Party Congress in 1986 was marked by characteristic
"ritualized unanimity" and caution.
54

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in Moscow.

Yeltsin might have fallen to the depths of

political obscurity if he was banned from the party and,
importantly, if he had not adopted a new rhetorically
conservative stance toward General Secretary Gorbachev.
This stance was necessary until Yeltsin could attain a new
power base outside of the party, a feat accomplished at the
first Congress of People's Deputies of 1989.

At the

Congress of People's Deputies, he won the popular mandate
of the voting public.
In the first section of this chapter, I examine
Yeltsin's speeches during his first two years in Moscow as
he assumed a revolutionary persona.

Also, the first

section frames Yeltsin's rhetoric in the context of Soviet
political culture.

In the second section, I examine the

party's backlash against Yeltsin's revolutionary stance
after his unprecedented speech to the 1987 Plenum of the
CPSU Central Committee.

Finally, in the third section, I

explore how Yeltsin maintained his reformist intentions,
but with a different mode of presentation, a more
conservative persona.
A POLITICIAN WITHOUT TACT
Soon after Gorbachev became general secretary of the
party in 1985, he initiated his bold and controversial
reform program, perestroika.

Calling it a "revolution

within a revolution," perestroika was designed to add
greater responsiveness to a failing Soviet economy and
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political system through glasnost, democratization, and
limited marketization (Sakwa 1993, 1).

At the same time,

however, Gorbachev resolved to preserve the party's central
role in the Soviet political machine.

Initially, the plan

appeared promising, but it was faced with influential
resistance.

Behind the Soviet Union's curtain of Marxist

idealism, the levers of power were pulled by members of a
social class referred to as the nomenklatura. Understanding
this influential group in the USSR is essential for
appreciating the defiance Yeltsin would confront in Moscow.
The term nomenklatura refers to a privileged class in
Soviet society which tacitly ruled the nation without
direct accountability to the public or to state sanction.
The nomenklatura was a strata of society which sought its
own perpetuation, and, before glasnost, its de facto power
was never fully, officially recognized by the Soviet state.
In a book on the subject, Nomenklatura. Voslensky (1984)
points out that the term is noted in official Soviet
literature, but only in benign ways.

Prior to 1984, the

term is not referred to by The Soviet Historical
Encyclopedia or the Soviet Political Dictionary.

One of

the last editions of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia does
define the word as a list, an index of names:

"1. System

(totality) of technical terms and phrases used in a
particular field of science, technology, etc.; 2.

System

of conventional signs that constitute power the most
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convenient way of designating certain things" (in voslensky
1984, 1 ).

Indeed, the denotative usage of nomenklatura

relates to the idea of classification.

However, the manner

in which nomenklatura is officially defined fails to reveal
its political nature and the stratification of the party's
echelons.

Though the general population knew the term

well, the official lack of recognition appears strategic;
it camouflaged the system of favoritism which controlled
political appointments and other crucial civic functions in
Soviet life.
In the USSR, the roots of the nomenklatura ran deep.
Sakharov wrote that as early as the 1920s or 1930s, a
distinguishable, party-bureaucratic stratum developed (in
Voslensky 1984, 2).

This class sought to maintain its

status and the way of living which developed through an
intricate system of patronage.

Even before the 1920s, the

nomenklatura's way of life was discernable during the age
of tsars.

Kennan (1986), in his article "Muscovite

Political Folkways," suggests that the nomenklatura's sense
of status quo, its protectionistic orientation, stems from
old political traditions associated with the Muscovite
principality.

In this tradition, decision making was

centralized in an oligarchical structure and was based on
minimizing risks.

For instance, if improvements in the

group's way of life increased the risk of disaster, they
were refused.

In Kennan's (1986) words, "when faced with
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danger, the village [Moscow] would hunker down— or pick up
and move on~rather than change time-tested ways" (125).
In Gorbachev's day, perestroika represented potential
improvements.

But, for the nomenklatura, perestroika stood

as a threat to "time-tested ways" and their monopoly on
power.
Gorbachev, however, wanted Russia's legacy of
conservative self-interest expunged, and Yeltsin had a
fitting resume for the job.

Yeltsin's reputation for

fighting corruption in his previous position was
impressive.

When he became party boss in the city of

Sverdlovsk in the Urals, fighting perks and privileges was
at the core of his reformist policy.

According to Solovyov

and Klepikova, Yeltsin perceived inequity in a socialist
society in acute, personal terms.

That is, Yeltsin

believed that for a party leader to accept or insist on
special privileges was an unpardonable disgrace,

with this

orientation toward exclusive benefits, Yeltsin once closed
all specialty stores for party members in Sverdlovsk,
though he did leave a special hospital alone for a time.
Nonetheless, he insisted that the medical facility admit
retirees and elderly citizens requiring special care
(Solovyov and Klepikova 1992, 152).

In short, many people

in his region were impressed by the fact that a party boss
could function so independently of ideological concerns;
Yeltsin placed the interests of people above dogma.
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Given his attitude toward party privileges, the
results of Yeltsin's move to Moscow were not entirely
surprising.

The party leadership sought security and

insulation from social conditions.

Yeltsin, however,

sought reform in spite of "official" interests.

Therefore,

Gorbachev's recruitment of Yeltsin to Moscow was a
dangerous proposition.
resistance.

Yeltsin was bound to face

His self-proclaimed reputation as a fighter

for "social justice" boasted a lust for "doing the right
thing" rather than protecting the well-being of the
politically and economically powerful.

Thus, those opposed

to Yeltsin saw him as irreverent and politically immature,
labels not surprising as he imported his provincial
leadership style from the Urals to the capital city of
Moscow.

A major part of his provocation of the party

machine can be found in his reform policies and,
importantly for my purposes here, the speeches he
delivered.
Soon after his arrival in Moscow, Yeltsin began a
campaign against waste and corruption that enraged orthodox
party members and many leading citizens.

For instance,

Yeltsin initiated "Sanitary Fridays" which took idle whitecollar workers from behind their desks and placed them,
broom in hand, on the streets one day a week.

Despite

howling criticism, he insisted on meeting civic needs,
citing a serious shortage of street sweepers and an
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abundance of managers and paper pushers (Solovyov and
Klepikova 1992, 56).

By initiating this program and others

like it, Yeltsin rejected Moscow's traditional rules of
social hierarchy.

In place of these rules, he borrowed

principles learned in the Urals.

There, as opposed to

Moscow, ideals were more pragmatic than dogmatic and the
gulf between rulers and the people was less wide.
His policy of "Sanitary Fridays" is representative of
Yeltsin's administrative style and hints at the nature of
his revolutionary persona.

During his first year of tenure

as Moscow city boss, Yeltsin made two major speeches that
would demarcate his rhetorical stance.

Given only three

months after taking office in Moscow, the first was an
address to Moscow propaganda employees in the spring of
1986.

The second was given later in the year to the

Seventeenth Party Congress, a bold speech that nearly led
to the end of his political career.
In his first major speech of 1986, Yeltsin spoke about
two themes, the practice of Moscow party officials down
playing widespread problems and the interests of common
people in the USSR.

On the matter of whitewashing, Yeltsin

frankly accused the city's leadership of valuing Moscow's
image above solving problems.

Rather than engaging in

"window dressing," Yeltsin argued that they should more
openly admit the city's difficulties and actively seek
solutions.

To support his contentions, Yeltsin
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categorically addressed Moscow's woes.

For instance,

Yeltsin marveled at the fact that in a city of 8.7 million
people, 2.5 million lacked adequate housing.

On the issue

of historical sites, Yeltsin quoted figures showing that
since 1935, 2,200 architectural monuments were destroyed
and many others required restoration.

And speaking about

city transit, Yeltsin noted that, "Sixty kilometers of
subway lines need to be built [and]....[I]n 1985 for the
first time the subway operated in the red” (in Solovyov and
Klepikova 1992, 37-8).
Capsulating his points, Yeltsin spotlighted the heart
of his contention.

He claimed that city officials

intentionally overlooked Moscow's evident problems:
We're getting too conservative here, city authorities
were pulling the wool over people's eyes:
'everything's fine, we're the best in the world, let's
not advertise our dirty laundry to the world.'
Whoever still feels this way should clear out his desk
and leave. The City Council is nothing but red tape
(in Solovyov and Klepikova 1992, 38).
Yeltsin's persona here, while stern, was measured.

That

is, he declined to advocate the overthrow of whole
institutions as a pure, radical revolutionary might.
However, he fully advocated comprehensive change in the way
institutions carried out their business.
After taking his jabs at the party elite, Yeltsin
engaged in something characteristic of many of his public
presentations— he participated in a question and answer
session.

Following his speech, Yeltsin replied to most of
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the 300 unedited, written questions presented by the
audience.

These notes were of two sorts.

concerned practical matters.

One kind

For instance, one message

addressed the issue of Moscow party officials' privileges
and asked if Yeltsin understood the needs of common
citizens.

Yeltsin's reply included an account of a recent

conversation he had with a young, female shop clerk.

This

woman, Yeltsin explained, told him of the system of
kickbacks for the benefit of Moscow's privileged class
operating in the trade network.

Summarizing his view of

corruption in Moscow, Yeltsin declared, "He dig and dig,
and the bottom of the filthy well is still not visible..."
(in Tucker 1987, 162-3).
The other kind of note concerned Yeltsin's personal
ambitions and desire for change.

One note read, "You have

Napoleonic plans; what do you think you're up to?
Gorbachev simply needed his own man [to implement
controversial reforms].
too late!"

Go back to Sverdlovsk before it's

Another stated, "Khrushchev already tried to

make ordinary laborers out of us.
won't either.
the future."

He won't succeed and you

He've stolen in the past and we'll steal in
To such statements, Yeltsin replied calmly

and with words to inspire betterment through cooperation:
"Comrades, we can only break this circle by our common
efforts” (in Tucker 1987, 162).

Evidently, the voice of

the nomenklatura, set and comfortable in its ways, spoke
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through these nemos to discourage Yeltsin's efforts.
Yeltsin, however, would not be easily dissuaded.
The tone of Yeltsin's speech and accompanying question
and answer session represents the use of a revolutionary
persona..

More concerned with reform and breaking with the

past than protocol, Yeltsin dared to address issues
traditionally hushed by party and state officials.

For

instance, the question and answer format, a favorite of
Yeltsin's, made him seem more accessible and genuine to the
"ordinary" citizen.

While this approach increased

identification with the general populace, it chagrined
party officials who were eager to maintain their status
quo.

Further, Yeltsin's demand that party and city

officials disclose and openly discuss the state of affairs
in the USSR was truly revolutionary.

Publicly, Yeltsin's

forthrightness earned him the reputation as a populist.

In

influential communist circles, however, he became known as
a maverick.
In his address at the Seventeenth Party Congress,
Yeltsin also assumed a revolutionary stance to combat the
practices of the CPSU and Soviet government.

This speech

occurred against the backdrop of a stunning Pravda article.
Its title boldly revealed the copy's nature:
Cleansing.

The Candor Talk."

"The

In this article, the party

bureaucracy was attacked, a feat unimaginable during the
Brezhnev era.

The author accused the party of many
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cardinal sins including engaging in illegal activities,
negotiating unofficial pardons from judicial officers, and
enjoying undue social privileges (Shlapentokh 1988, 10-11).
This article was, a few days later at the seventeenth
congress, a central topic of debate (Tucker 1987, 160).
Prompted by this article, Yeltsin addressed similar issues.
In the speech, Yeltsin was blunt in his accusations
against apathy in the party.

He implored the audience to

consider the repercussions of indifference in the realm of
social concerns:
Why has the obviously alien word 'stagnation' appeared
in our party lexicon? Why for so many years have we
failed to extirpate bureaucratism, social injustice
and abuses from our life. Why even now does the
demand for radical changes sink into an inert stratum
of time-servers with party cards? in my view, a main
reason is that some party leaders lack the courage to
assess the situation and their own role objectively
and in good time, to speak the truth, even if bitter,
but the truth, to view each issue or action, their
own, a work colleague's or higher leaders, not in
terms of one's interest at the moment but politically
(in Tucker 1987, 160)?
From members of his audience, murmurs arose which expressed
surprise and, from hard-line party members, outward
hostility.

"Extirpate," "demand," "radical change," "lack

the courage"— these were words of revolutionary
transformation.

In this speech, Yeltsin's persona was

obviously indifferent to the conventions of silence
concerning the inner workings of the party.

To criticize

the party of "stagnation" was tantamount to
indicting its members of negligence and incompetence.

I
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Clearly, Yeltsin spoke as if he desired dramatic change for
the party and the Soviet system of government.
Paralleling the Pravda article, Yeltsin echoed the
newspaper's concerns, he but went further.

Both the paper

and the speech accused the party of stagnation, but Yeltsin
did something never done before by a major player in the
party.

He denounced the party for its indulgence in the

"cult of leadership," the party's excessive deference for
its commanders.

To add further insult to the party, he

continued by attacking the social favoritism propagated by
the privileges offered to party elites.

Yeltsin demanded

the elimination of all unjustified advantages of communist
party leaders at all levels of government (Shlapentokh
1988, 14).
To understand the reaction to Yeltsin's persona at
this time, one must know about the political culture of the
USSR.

In the context of Soviet political culture, a myriad

of tacit rules guided discourse and conduct.

This

conformity is well capsulated by an anecdote about two
beggars gathering on street corner.

As they sit, a third

beggar arrives and begins playing a harmonica for alms.
Aggravated, one of the beggars walks over to the third and
begins hitting him on the head saying, "You can't do that,
you have to beg the same way the rest of us do!"

The

would-be musician puts his harmonica away, apologizing
excessively (in Rancour-Laferriere 1995, 207).
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This story embodies a typical pattern in Soviet
politics, conformity over progress and efficiency, which
has deep roots in Russo-Soviet political culture.

Tucker

(1987) defines political culture as everything in a
society's way of life germane to government and politics
(viii).

This way of life, he argues, has deep roots in a

nation's traditions, and Russia is no exception.

Tucker

writes that communism, in some ways, perpetuated Russia's
pre-existing cultural ethos.

This ethos, according to

Kennan (1986), included a silent yet influential ruling
oligarchy.

The implication of Tucker's and Kennan's

contentions is that the Soviet Union borrowed, in some
form, the unique, oligarchical form of politics that
influenced imperial Russia's governance.
The result of such leadership was a special kind of
informal conformity which placed restrictions on political
behavior and discourse.

Gill (1985) claimed that four

types of rules were observed in Soviet political culture:
formal rules that served to produce a perception of
legitimacy rather them to organization political
proceedings; formal rules that were inflexible principles,
always followed regardless of the situation; formal rules
that were followed in some situations; and conventions, or
informal principles, which were "only weakly reflected in
formal rules, but which gain their real force through
constant application" (214).

The aggregate of explicit and
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implicit rules in the Soviet Union produced a unique system
of political rationality.
Knowledge of the conventions of the Soviet system was
essential for promoting outcomes acceptable to the party
elites.

Put differently, only those who played by the

"rules of the game" survived in Soviet politics.

The

routinized practice of political conventions in the Soviet
Union created an environment in which party sanction was
essential for one's political career.

Even in remote ends

of republics, Moscow sent special appointees to represent
the party's interests in the affairs of local governments.
Thus, many political figures were under the watchful eye of
the CPSU (Gill 1985, 217).

In fact, all nomenklatura

positions were controlled by the appropriate party
committee.

Because the central apparatus had so much

authority, conformity stood above the need to be
forthright, innovative, and outspoken.

Thus,

traditionally, those who spoke out were frequently
disciplined.
For example, Khrushchev once tried to initiate change
by bypassing the conventions of the Soviet decision making
process.

Once in command of the state, Khrushchev's style

of leadership frequently pre-empted the "rules of the
game."

Occasionally, he announced policy decisions

directly to the public or the Central Committee without
first consulting the party's senior leaders.

By inviting
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popular participation, Khrushchev effectively undermined
the significance and competence of assorted institutional
parts, both formal and informal, of the system.

Further,

without consideration of institutional sensitivities, he
sought advice outside of the normal channels of
consultation with favored advisors.

For a time, Khrushchev

engaged in this method unopposed because he had adequate
support in the party machine to emancipate himself from the
requirements of cooperative leadership (Gill 1985, 221).
Nevertheless, Khrushchev's independence from Soviet
conventions and rules eventually worked against him.

When

his reforms and policies fell apart, no institutional
protection, formal or informal, stood to shield him from
his detractors.

This, too, would be the case for Yeltsin.

For a time, the party endured Gorbachev's apprentice.
However, in 1987, the party, as well as Gorbachev himself,
decided to stand firm against Yeltsin, the political
maverick.
YELTSIN'S FALL
October 21, 1987 emerged as a pivotal moment in
Yeltsin's career and the course of Soviet history.

On this

day, Yeltsin presented an ill-prepared, four-minute speech
that would elicit the party's wrath.

In Stalin's era,

Yeltsin's discourse on this day would have resulted in his
death.

Instead, he faced a kind of civic execution in

which he was humiliated by the party, stripped of
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privileges, and suffered a significant loss of official
authority.

From the perspective of conservatives, perhaps

the party should have arranged his execution.

Out of the

compost of his decline, Yeltsin's influence among Russia's
citizens grew stronger than ever.
Yeltsin's 1987 speech marks the same kind of unabashed
revolutionary persona witnessed throughout 1986.

In his

address, he attacks the practices of the party.
Specifically, he criticizes the slow pace of perestroika
and its impact on public sentiment.

Further, Yeltsin makes

the dangerous decision to attack the tacit system by which
the inner workings of the party operate.

Put differently,

he bemoans the party's concentration of power in its upper
echelons and its inability to discuss new and innovative
ideas.
But what makes this speech different than any of his
previous discourse during 1986?

In this speech, he asks

the party to accept his criticism or accept his resignation
as Moscow party chief and Politburo candidate.

This bold

demand represents an unprecedented and dangerous move in
that right-wing forces in the party were looking for any
excuse to be rid of this bothersome reformer.

This speech

provides conservatives with such an opportunity.

Further,

it would eventually mark Yeltsin's retreat from a
revolutionary to a conservative persona.

To develop this
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contention, let us examine the speech itself and the
details of its aftermath.
To describe the context in which Yeltsin's speech was
made, it should be noted that he was not officially
scheduled to speak.

The keynote concern of the Plenum of

the Central Committee on October 21 was a review of
Gorbachev's commemoration speech of the seventieth
anniversary of the revolution.

In it, Gorbachev planned a

delicate foray into the reappraisal of Soviet history and
perestroika's standing in that history.

Before his

presentation, Gorbachev distributed a 15-page outline of
his speech for the audience's consideration.

After

speaking for nearly two hours, Gorbachev faced no comments
or questions, apparently by advanced agreement.

Then, with

the session drawing to a close, Yeltsin demanded to make a
statement.
but yielded

Gorbachev hesitated at this unexpected request,
the floor (Bialer 1988, 30).

As Yeltsin took the podium,

he was tense.

By some

accounts of the event, Yeltsin was not certain if he was
going to speak until the moment he stepped up to face the
crowd.

Further, as Yeltsin would admit later, he felt ill

at the time of the presentation.

Nevertheless, he forged

ahead, presenting a personal speech which was, at times,
disheveled and bitter.

In his oration, he addressed two

general themes: the pace of perestroika and the party's
failure to debate crucial issues in an open, constructive

i

i
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manner.

In conclusion, the topics addressed were

underscored by Yeltsin's stunning and unexpected
resignation announcement.
On the first theme, Yeltsin openly criticized the pace
of perestroika in terms of its effect on the public.

He

claimed that at its current rate, reform would lead to
change too late.

Yeltsin clearly blamed Gorbachev's

conservative rival, Yegor Ligachev, for this shortcoming.
Despite gains in perestroika during the past two or three
years, Yeltsin laments that, "now we're talking about
smother two to three years— all of this befuddles the
people and the party" (in Solovoyov and Klepikova 1992, 723).

That is, his concern was for the people with high

hopes who repeatedly faced disappointment.

Yeltsin warned

that a lack of morale would "run the risk of finding
ourselves [the party], shall we say, with the party's
reputation lowered considerably" (73).

Thus, Yeltsin

recommended that "we [the party] should be more careful
when we announce the time frame and the actual results of
perestroika in the next two years" (73).
After wondering aloud about the merit of the party's
ineffectual resolutions about perestroika, Yeltsin
addressed the issue of power in the party.

Speaking in

cautious tones, he stated:
Another question. It's a hard one, but this is a
plenum. I must say that in the last seventy years we
have learned some hard lessons. We have had
victories...but we also had to draw lessons from bad,
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heavy defeats. These defeats formed gradually; they
happened because we had no collegiality, because we
had different groups, because the party's power was
concentrated in one hand, and because he— this mem—
was isolated from all criticism (Solovoyov and
Klepikova 1992, 73).
In short, Yeltsin was worried about placing too much power
in the hands of one mem— the general secretary.

Without

checks and balances on power, Yeltsin claimed that
decision-making bodies lack rigor in deliberation.
In Yeltsin's comments were thinly-veiled attacks
against Gorbachev and his followers in the party.

Yeltsin,

however, proceeded to make his indictments more explicit,
stating:
Something else concerns me. It's too bad here in the
Politburo, one thing has grown— what I'd call paeans
that some Politburo members— permanent members— sing
to the General Secretary. I don't think this is
permissible now (Solovoyov and Klepikova 1992, 73).
Justifying this contention about the Politburo, Yeltsin
argued that in the age of Soviet democratization, undue
genuflecting could not continue.

Unlike the "old days,"

Yeltsin announced that confrontation must be accepted, not
shunned, as a part of the deliberation required for
beneficial reforms (73).
After a brief pause, Yeltsin concluded with an
unexpected twist, a bombshell that stunned his listeners:
I don't think I'm doing well in my Politburo job. For
various reasons. Could be my inexperience, could be
other things. Could be a lack of support from certain
parties, especially, I would like to stress, from
Comrade Ligachev— all this had led me to decide to ask
you to relieve me from the duties of Candidate Member
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of the Politburo. I have already submitted an
official request in writing; as for my duties of the
First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee— well, it
is for the Plenum of the City Committee to decide
(Solovoyov and Klepikova 1992, 74).
In short, this announcement accomplished more them simply
to request his removal from the Politburo.
fact, an ultimatum:

It was, in

accept my criticism or relieve me of

my duties in the party.
The immediate reaction to Yeltsin's speech was stunned
silence.

Gathering his wits, Gorbachev invited remarks and

questions.
invitation.

Silence ensued.

Gorbachev repeated his

After a conspicuous pause, Ligachev rose and

took the podium.

He refused to accept Yeltsin's

indictments against the party.

Ligachev argued caustically

that if shortcomings did exist in the Moscow
administration, they were attributable to Yeltsin.

As for

Yeltsin's harangue against excessive praise for Gorbachev,
Ligachev, often critical of the general secretary, labeled
these allegations as "disgusting" and "politically harmful"
(Bailer 1988, 30-1).

Rather than blame, Ligachev claimed,

praise was due to Gorbachev for his efforts to unify the
party during trying times.

After Ligachev's deluge of

comments, Yeltsin was relentlessly barraged with
denouncements from others at the podium for nearly three
hours (Bailer 1989, 95).
While comments directly after Yeltsin's presentation
were piercing, the worst was yet to come.

The subsequent
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public humiliation of Yeltsin was delayed but brutal.

The

party announced the outcome of the Yeltsin debacle only
after careful, strategic contemplation.

News reports

published the following day, October 22, revealed no signs
of tension within the party's upper ranks.

Pravda and

Izvestia reported only the names of speakers, the theme of
the plenum, and that Politburo and CPSU Central Committee
member Aliyev announced his retirement.

Concluding, the

article stated, "The plenary session approved the basic
propositions and conclusions set forth in M. S. Gorbachev's
report and adopted an appropriate resolution on this
question" fPravda and Izvestia 22 October 1987, 1).
After biding time to consider Yeltsin's fate, the
Moscow city party committee announced his punishment.

On

November 11, by decree of the Politburo, this assembly
officially met to deliberate the details of Yeltsin's
punishment.

About 250 full and candidate members of the

committee attended.

The meeting commenced with a one-hour

report by Gorbachev which addressed three themes.

First,

the general secretary critiqued Yeltsin's expressed views
and his performance as First Party Secretary of Moscow.
Second, Gorbachev rejected Yeltsin's "baseless" claims that
party factions, led by Ligachev, fought to derail efforts
to improve economic conditions in Moscow.

Third, Gorbachev

attacked Yeltsin more personally, claiming that he lacked
the organizational skills and the interpersonal ability to
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deal with his colleagues in a "comradely” manner (Bialer
1989, 105).
Following Gorbachev's address, other condemnations
ensued, some of which were published in major Soviet
newspapers.

For instance, Nikolai Ryzhkov, the Soviet

prime minister, criticized Yeltsin for "developing an
oversized ambition.”

Vitalii Vorotnikov, Russia's prime

minister stated, "it's like you [Yeltsin] had on some kind
of mask... .Not happy about anything...everybody or
anything."

Viktor Chebrikov, KGB chairman, accused Yeltsin

of demagoguery and dividing the party when unity was
required to "march on bravely toward our objective that we
set at the last party congress" (in Solovyov and Klepikova,
1992, 64—5).

Only Georgi Arbatov, head of an important

government think tank, bothered to defend Yeltsin.
However, Arbatov's commentary was cursed immediately by the
next speaker (67).
Yeltsin did get the opportunity to justify himself
during the same meeting.

In his personal defense, Yeltsin

engaged in the time-honored. Stalinist ritual of selfcriticism.

Simultaneously, he attempted to reassert his

commitment to the party's mission of restructuring
(Tismaneanu 1988, 283).

Belittling himself and addressing

his alleged Napoleonic tendencies, he stated, "I give you
my sincere party word that of course I had no ulterior
motives and there was no political orientation in my

I
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action."

Further, he claimed, "I agree with the criticism

which has been voiced" (283).

In short, he admitted that

his personal ambitions may have clouded his judgment.
On the issue of continued support of perestroika, he
gave his encouragement to the party for its further
efforts:
The main thing for me now as a Communist of the Moscow
organization is, of course, what decision to take to
minimize the deunage [resulting from my
actions].... [I]t will be very difficult for the new
gorkom first secretary, for the bureau, and for the
party gorkom to ensure...that work is done to heal it
[the "wound"] as rapidly as possible (Tismaneanu 1988,
284).
Me concluded his presentation with support for the party's
efforts at restructuring.

Yeltsin declared, "As a

communist I am sure that the Moscow organization is united
with the party Central Committee and that it has marched
and will march very confidently behind the party Central
Committee" (285).

Whatever his true intentions or thoughts

might have been, Yeltsin unequivocally endorsed unity with
hope that perestroika would continue, even without him.
In this speech, Yeltsin shifts his persona.
Obviously, he could not continue to use his revolutionary
persona without risking further reprimands.

To save what

was left of his political career, he shifted to a
conservative persona.

By supporting the efforts of the

party, Yeltsin salvaged some semblance of a continuing
political career.
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Yeltsin's apologies, however, meant little as complete
protection against the consequences of his actions.

He

stood accused of grandstanding, panic mongering, and
annulling the accomplishments of perestroika.

Agreeing

with these assessments, Gorbachev summarized the
proceedings for Yeltsin by stating, "...Comrade Yeltsin,
you got what you deserved" (Solovyov and Klepikova 1992,
67).

Yeltsin's discipline included removal from the Moscow

Party Committee; he was replaced by Lev Zaykov.

Further,

according to the decision of a February 1988 Central
Committee plenum, Yeltsin was removed from the Politburo.
The fall of Yeltsin marked a crucial moment in the
progress of Gorbachev's perestroika.

For conservatives in

the Party, members of the orthodox nomenklatura, a major
victory was won.

Yeltsin's ouster sent an unmistakable

signal to all of those thinking reforms were irreversible.
Further, the situation may have frightened other reformers
who sympathized with Gorbachev.

Even liberal members of

the Party, including Eduard Shevardnadze and Aleksandr
Yakovlev, distanced themselves from Yeltsin.

As he was

linked with cutting-edge reforms, Yeltsin's demise might
have been an irreparable setback for perestroika, but all
was not lost.

Because Yeltsin's replacement, Zaykov, was

an ally of Gorbachev, the outcome of the Yeltsin situation
did not necessarily mean a complete victory for
conservative forces in the party.

With Yeltsin gone,
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however, Gorbachev was faced with the prospect of
confronting resistance in the party directly.
YELTSIN'S REBIRTH
After his fall from the party's top ranks in 1987,
Yeltsin would return to prominence within two years.

This

section traces Yeltsin's remarkable rebound from the brink
of obscurity back in to the foray of perestroika politics.
In the process of returning, Yeltsin employed a special
kind of rhetorically conservative persona.

That is, rather

than outwardly attacking politically orthodox forces in the
party, he was more strategic in his approach.

He carefully

limited his political activities by allying himself with
Gorbachev.

That is not to say that Yeltsin became the

General Secretary's servile lackey.

In fact, the two still

disagreed vehemently on a number of specific issues.

On

principles of democratization, however, Yeltsin supported
Gorbachev and maintained an obvious degree of tact when
talking about Gorbachev publicly.

By employing this

strategy, Yeltsin shielded himself from the ire of rightwing party members, letting hopes of reform continue.

The

Lazarus of Soviet politics found rebirth in, primarily, two
important events: the Nineteenth Party Conference in June
of 1988 and the first session of the first Congress of
Peoples' Deputies in 1989.
The Nineteenth Party Conference, held in June of 1988,
provided Yeltsin with a valuable opportunity to reassert
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his political clout.

Prior to this event, Yeltsin failed

to gain significant public exposure as he was bound by a
domestic gag order.

Thus, the Soviet press avoided

publishing the interviews occasionally given to members of
foreign press agencies.

To return to the political fray,

however, Yeltsin realized he needed some kind of press
coverage.

The conference in 1988 provided him with such a

rhetorical opportunity.
At the conference, Yeltsin's very appearance caused a
stir.

Originally, he was not supposed to be at the event

or to speak.

His surprise showing at the proceedings was

the result of an eleventh-hour nomination from the Karelian
Automonous Republic on the Finnish boarder.

His admission,

however, did not assure him a speaking opportunity.

During

the first few days of the conference, Yeltsin pleaded for
the podium with no avail.

Without success via conventional

requests, Yeltsin, on the final day of the conference,
decided to storm the podium (Solovyov and Kleipkova 1992,
93).

Yeltsin's unannounced and daring advance at the

assembly created a commotion.

Astonished by Yeltsin's bold

walk to the front of the assembly, Gorbachev hesitated, but
he eventually allowed Yeltsin's imposition.
With control of the podium, Yeltsin bandaged his
tattered political image.

He began his speech by

explaining the circumstances surrounding his address at the
1987 plenum.

Claiming that he was bedridden prior to the
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plenum, Yeltsin announced that he was forced to attend
despite being heavily medicated.

In fact, he claimed that

party doctors, under order, administered liberal doses of
medication.

Therefore, Yeltsin was "incoherent" and not

thinking wisely when giving his unprecedented speech.

In

giving this explication, Yeltsin did not condemn Gorbachev,
though he would later blame the general secretary for
forcing the doctors to drug him.

Rather than accosting

Gorbachev in his speech, Yeltsin turned Yegor Ligachev into
a scapegoat with a number of criticisms (Solovyov and
Klepikova 1992, 95).
After his introductory remarks and a brief assault
against Ligachev, Yeltsin went on to his main points which
concerned the progress of perestroika.

Yeltsin credited

the party for its initiation of perestroika, but he also
criticized CPSU for failure to maintain the movement it
started.

In conjunction with this theme of inadequate

effort, he spoke out against party privileges, the lack of
elections for legislative positions, and term limits on
party politicians.

For instance, he placed particular

emphasis on the fact that representatives for party
conferences were still nominated by the party elites rather
than through a democratic nomination process.

Without

mentioning Gorbachev by name, he placed the blame for this
situation of political appointment on the party's general
leadership (Solovyov and Klepikova 1992, 95).

I
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In addition to addressing the party's political
monopoly, Yeltsin spoke on the issue of terms limits.
Thus, Yeltsin stabbed at party incumbents and argued,
In a number of countries, when the leader steps down,
he takes the rest of the leadership with him. In our
country today, we're used to accusing only the dead,
who cannot respond. Today we are told that Brezhnev
alone was guilty of stagnation. Where does that leave
those who spent ten, fifteen, or twenty years in the
Politburo— and are still there (Solovyov and Klepikova
1992, 95)?
Yeltsin's claim was that career politicians— self-serving
and conservative— hampered progress, dragging their feet to
preserve their status.
suffered.

By doing so, Soviet citizens

Yeltsin remarked,

In the last three years, we have failed to solve a
number of tangible problems pertaining to the well
being of our people, to say nothing of initiating and
revolutionary transformations....We should set
ourselves goals for every two or three years— a goal
or two— and reach them for the people's benefit. We
should not disperse our efforts in all directions, but
focus on one, and commit everything— resources,
research, manpower (96-7).
Finished with his main points, Yeltsin might have
concluded.

As a master of high drama and surprise,

however, he abruptly introduced a stunning interjection:
"Comrade delegates!

I have a delicate question...regarding

my personal political rehabilitation following the Central
Committee's October Plenum" (Solovyov and Klepikova 1992,
96).

Again, commotion swept through the audience.

Alertly, Gorbachev interrupted him to announce that his
time expired; all delegates at the conference were limited
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to 15-minute presentations.

Nevertheless, the audience

began heckling, demanding that Yeltsin receive more time.
In response, Gorbachev, well renown for his ability to make
a bad situation appear the better, allowed Yeltsin to
proceed.

Yeltsin continued, "We're now used to

rehabilitation after fifty years; it has had a positive
effect on our society.

But I would like to ask for

political rehabilitation in my lifetime" (97).
speech, Yeltsin's request was denied.

After the

Further, he was

verbally assaulted by the same pack of accusers who
censured him for the 1987 oration.

However, Yeltsin got

what he wanted, a chance to appeal not just to the party,
but to the public listening to the broadcast proceedings.
How did Yeltsin manage to invade the conference
without reproach?

His conservative management of the

rhetorical situation was vital for his success.

Yeltsin

demonstrated deference for Gorbachev by furthering his
goals of the conference.

Nowhere in his major speech did

Yeltsin blame the General Secretary for any of
perestroika's shortcomings; direct criticism was reserved
for Ligachev, Gorbachev's conservative adversary.
Certainly, indirect stabs were taken at Gorbachev, as he
was a member of the "party elite."

Nevertheless, Yeltsin's

commentary was cloaked in the grammar of Gorbachev's own
reform agenda.
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The agenda of the conference was controlled by
Gorbachev, who saw the event as a watershed moment in
Soviet history.

To ensure the success of the meeting,

Gorbachev would take no risks with his agenda.

He slated

himself as the opening and closing speaker of the
conference and he limited all speakers to no more the
fifteen minutes at the podium (Bialer 1989, 215).

To

further protect his vision of the conference from
conservative opposition, the event centered around the
deliberation of ten "theses."

Approved by the Central

Committee and publicly published prior to the conference,
these assertions called for significant changes.

For

example, recommendations included term limits on office
holders like the general secretary himself.
resolutions also called for:

These

the public elections of

legislative officials from a pool of candidates; the strict
separation of state and party interests; "the granting of
greater responsibilities and rights to trade unions; a
speedy change in the legal system and in Soviet law"
(Bialer, 1989 213).2
Such changes were important in that they safeguarded
the progress of perestroika.

In discussing the proposals

at the conference, Roy Medvedev said that the changes
proposed were not revolutionary, but they constituted one

2For a complete list of Gorbachev's proposals, see Barry
1991, pp. 75—77 or Izvestia. November 30, 1988, p. 2.
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of the most important moments during Gorbachev's tenure as
general secretary.

As Medvedev puts it, "There was

'socialist pluralism'; and a new law was introduced to
establish the rotation of leaders.

In other words, for the

first time a mechanism was provided for the succession to
positions of command" (Medvedev and Giuietto 1989, 238).
What is more, the proceedings were broadcast live to the
public, meaning the Politburo's hands were tied.

With live

broadcasts, the interest of the public was piqued,
participation in government encouraged, and the Politburo
faced public accountability.

In short, Gorbachev took

precautions to make sure that his reforms would not
backslide.
In light of Gorbachev's strategy, Yeltsin's rhetoric
fit the situation.

While somewhat contentious, Yeltsin

supported the theses of the conference and, therefore,
General Secretary Gorbachev.

Even Yeltsin's indirect stab

at Gorbachev, by including him in the "unchanging" party
elite, was appropriate.

After all, Gorbachev's proposals

recommended term limits even for his own office.

In short,

Yeltsin's return was facilitated by his risk taking, but
also by his "playing by the rules" of Gorbachev's "game" as
well.
Yeltsin's conservative persona also aided him at the
first session of the 1989 Congress of People's Deputies.
At this inaugural meeting of the congress, Yeltsin strongly
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advocated pluralism in the Soviet political system, while
Gorbachev was more conservative.
clashed on a number of issues.

Mot surprisingly, they
Nevertheless, Yeltsin

continued his conservative stance.

He advocated the

principle, if not the practice, of Gorbachev's ideas and
even supported the General Secretary's bid for the
presidency of the Supreme Soviet.

Evidenced by his major

speech at the congress and his statements to the press,
Yeltsin's conservative persona aided his quest for
political rehabi1itation.

To more fully appreciate

Yeltsin's discourse, one must know more about the congress
itself.
The establishment of the Congress of People's Deputies
was a major step in Gorbachev's endeavor to restructure
Soviet government.

As a result of proposals at the

Nineteenth Party conference and constitutional amendments
in 1988, the CPD represented a significant attempt at
democratization.

Exclusive functions of the congress, to

name a few, included:

adopting the USSR Constitution and

related amendments; selecting the USSR Supreme Soviet and
its chair and first deputy; and electing the USSR
Constitutional Oversight Committee (Theen 1991, xiv-xv).
For the first time in Soviet history, government— at least
a small part of it— would be accountable to the public.
While Gorbachev wanted his reforms to root out
lethargic elements of the nomenklatura, he also wanted the
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party to retain its eminence.
stacked the elections.

To ensure this outcome, he

Of the 2,250 representatives at the

CPD, two-thirds were elected popularly on the basis of
territorial and national criteria.

However, the remaining

750 seats were reserved for party-sanctioned organizations.
For example, 100 seats automatically went to the Communist
Party, 100 to the trade unions, and 100 to cooperative
organizations (Barry 1991, 90).

To worsen this ratio, some

observers suspected corruption among party-influenced
officials counting the ballots.

Yeltsin, a popularly-

elected candidate, saw Gorbachev's scheme as nearsighted
and spoke out.
On May 31, Yeltsin presented his major speech to the
Congress which forwarded a guiding theme of pluralism in
the CPD and other facets of Soviet political life.

To

underscore his thesis, he began by stressing the importance
of the congress.

He stated,

"This congress is solving the

main problems which will determine the future of our
society.

It is the question of power which must

justifiably belong to the people represented by its
legislative authority, i.e., the Congress of People's
Deputies" (in Theen 1991, 230).
Given his assumption about the role of the congress in
Soviet government, Yeltsin continued by criticizing the
contradictory nature of the proceedings.

Scolding
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Gorbachev indirectly, Yeltsin called for a "real transfer"
of power:
Paradoxical though it night be, this congress, which
must assume the power and responsibility for
restructuring and the reorganization of society, has
turned out to be hostage of the laws and resolutions
passed by the preceding Supreme Soviet... .The most
important problems of state power and management
which, by the logic of the laws should be considered
by the congress itself, were predetermined before the
congress yet we are asked to vote for them (in Theen
1991, 231).
Plainly, his main concern stemmed from the fear of
conservative forces in the party conspiring to keep control
of power.
As the party clings to power, Yeltsin argued,
conditions for the USSR's people worsened and must be
solved.

He claimed:

Meanwhile, the situation in the country remains
extremely alarming. Anti-restructuring forces have
become stronger and more consolidated; the second
economy and corruption are developing; crime is
rising; the moral foundations of society are being
eroded; the problems of young people, who need the
political confidence of our entire society for the
future belongs to them, are becoming aggravated (in
Theen 1991, 231).
Here, he avers that for change to happen, people must be
encouraged to participate in civic affairs.

If decisions

continue to be made from above, the gulf between government
and people will continue to worsen.
Yeltsin's recommendations for change were many.
suggestions included:

His

dismantling the Soviet command-

administrative system; allowing peasants in the countryside
to make decisions concerning farm management; providing
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increased freedoms for print and broadcast media;
permitting alternative candidates to run for new, elected
offices; and yielding more political rights to the
republics of the Soviet Union (Theen 1991, 232).

Then,

Yeltsin concluded with his most radical call:
I believed that within the framework of building a
rule of law state the present congress must create
corresponding collectively operating mechanisms. I
suggest...that we pass a law on an annual referendum
on the subject of a vote of confidence for the
chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet (233).
Here, Yeltsin demonstrates his distrust of Gorbachev to
ensure comprehensive reform.
At Yeltsin's criticisms, Gorbachev might have taken
offense.

However, Yeltsin's conservative persona gives him

some leeway.
mind.

On this issue, two distinct points come to

First, in interviews with the press, Yeltsin openly

supported Gorbachev and the principles of his reform
efforts.

Before attending the congress, Yeltsin said that

he would help Gorbachev's mission to battle conservative
elements in the party, and promote restructuring.

And of

his relationship with Gorbachev, Yeltsin told reporters,
We have always had good, normal relations, maybe with
the exception of a year ago when some members of the
leadership helped relations grow colder....I think
there is a warming between us, without a doubt. I
always supported the strategic line of Gorbachev, and
moreover I fought for it (Cornwell 1989).
And, during the congress, Yeltsin passed up the opportunity
to run against Gorbachev for the position of Supreme Soviet
president.

Further, Yeltsin endorsed Gorbachev's race for
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the post, but not without stipulation.

Yeltsin added that,

for the sake of principle, alternative candidates should be
permitted to run against him (Theen 1991, 724).

In all,

while Yeltsin didn't like everything Gorbachev was doing,
he was willing to let the general secretary proceed.

To

attack Gorbachev would aid the conservative reaction to
perestroika..
The results of the first session of the Congress of
People's Deputies were a mixed blessing.

On the negative

side, despite Yeltsin's objections, Party prominence
endured.

Gorbachev intended to unsettle the complacency of

the nomenklatura, but he wanted to ensure the party's
continued dominance.

Thus, the general secretary's attempt

at democratization merely combined the party's
institutional power and authority with a new variable—
electoral accountability (McAuley 1992, 96).

This

situation presented a troubling question that would soon
torment Gorbachev:

What happens when the voting public

does not want to support party candidates and proposals?
Without alternatives at the ballot boxes, Gorbachev
preserved the party's status but fueled future protests.
Despite the negative, some good emerged from the
congreiss.

For instance, the Soviet Union's news media

became invigorated and, occasionally, was willing to report
infractions of the letter and spirit of the law's
innovative arrangements.

New political organizations
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including popular fronts and nationality movements
discovered a voice in the Congress of People's Deputies.
Indeed, Gorbachev's USSR in 1989 was still dominated by the
party.

However, it no longer possessed the unequivocal

ability to cloak its labors behind the veil of secrecy
(Barry 1991, 91).

Many spectators regarded the 1989

elections to the CPD a referendum on the CPSU.

In these

elections, party members failed in four out of five
elections where they encountered non-party-member opponents
(Kiernan and Aistrup 1991, 1054).

In short, because of

Gorbachev's reforms and the Congress of People's Deputies,
the party became accountable to a voting public. Yeltsin's
conservative persona allowed him to place himself in a
position where he eventually found power in public opinion.
CONCLUSION
Yeltsin's first five years in Moscow were a time of
adjustment.

Initially, with a revolutionary persona, he

advocated sweeping change.

Yeltsin spoke out against party

members' misuse of power and privilege, and he championed
government's accountability to Soviet citizens.

Despite

his principled efforts, conditions were inappropriate for
his brazen, reformist stance.

The party stood firmly

behind the levers of control, refusing to relinquish
dominance.

In 1987, the CPSU demonstrated its brawn and

desire for a continued monopoly on authority by casting him
out of the Politburo.

Yeltsin then labored in political
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obscurity as head of the construction ministry with a
dubious political future.
When Yeltsin made his daring return to the forefront
of politics in 1988, he used a new rhetorical approach.

He

utilized a rhetorically conservative persona to ally
himself with Gorbachev and to shield himself from the
disapproval of politically conservative communists.

Thus,

Yeltsin was strategically "conservative” in his public
presentation but not in his political orientation.

By

adhering to the dictates of Gorbachev's perestroika,
Yeltsin maintained his standing in the ranks of government.
Consequently, Yeltsin stood ready to run for office in the
Congress of People's Deputies.

Yeltsin's popular support

became the substructure upon which he face the next major
challenge of his career.
During the closing months of 1989, Yeltsin would again
shift to different persona.

The next chapter examines

Yeltsin's rhetorical strategy in relation to Gorbachev's
growing conservativism.

Commenting on Gorbachev's

backsliding following the first Congress of People's
Deputies, Yeltsin claimed, "Right now it's not Ligachev on
the right wing— it's the general secretary himself.

I get

the impression that he led our society in to a political
maze— but I don't know if he himself knows the way out"
(Solovyov and Klepikova 1992, 103).

To maintain the

progress of reforms and to preserve his political career,

i
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Yeltsin utilized a conciliatory persona which was an
important strategy in his race for the Russian presidency
in 1991.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE END OF PROGRESSIVE PERESTROIKA
INTRODUCTION
After the first session of the first Congress of
People's Deputies in the early summer of 1989, a new
chapter in Soviet politics began.

It was marked by the

death of progressive perestroika and the birth of the
party's struggle to retake lost political ground. McAuley
(1990) writes that "Perestroika is best understood as a
combination of policies put forward by the Gorbachev
leadership during the period from the Seventeenth Party
Congress in 1986 until the end of 1989" (90).

But why does

not McAuley include the period immediately after 1989?

The

answer is that the reform effort became unmanageable for
Gorbachev.

By 1989, the general secretary failed to match

the pace of democratization and reforms of superministries
with the pace of marketization and increased outputs of
consumer goods.

Further, Gorbachev became disheartened by

perestroika, as he realized continued reform jeopardized
the livelihood of the party.

Thus, Gorbachev began

backsliding.
As political conditions changed, so did Yeltsin's
rhetorical persona.

By 1990, Yeltsin pressed for

unprecedented, liberal policies in his role as chairman of
the Russian Supreme Soviet.

Yeltsin sought greater

autonomy for Russia apart from the Soviet Union so that the
93
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republic could stimulate reform.

However, Yeltsin still

demonstrated some deference for Gorbachev and a willingness
to work with some party members if they supported the
peaceful transformation of the Soviet Union into a more
decentralized and economically progressive nation.

To

promote his vision of revitalized Soviet politics, Yeltsin
employed a conciliatory persona.
This chapter traces the development of Yeltsin's shift
in rhetorical strategies in relation to the exigence of
perestroika's degeneration which occurred, approximately,
between late 1989 and early 1991.

The first section of

this chapter examines the changing nature of the rhetorical
situation in 1989.

The second section examines the party's

conspiracy to neutralize Yeltsin's growing political
influence.

Finally, the third section explores Yeltsin's

reaction to the government conspiracy and the development
of his conciliatory persona.
A YEAR OF STRAIN:

1989

After the first session of the Congress of People's
Deputies, the rhetorical situation became urgent.

While

perestroika was characterized by a certain degree of
optimism and progress during the mid-to-late 1980s, 1989
marked the beginning of renewed pessimism.

The economy,

labor strikes, and the issue of the republics' autonomy
were all exigencies that prompted Yeltsin's modified
rhetorical strategy.

To appreciate Yeltsin's conciliatory
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persona, one must: first recognize three features of the
situation in which his rhetoric functioned.
The Economy
When Gorbachev assumed the role of general secretary
in 1985, his foremost concern was economic reform.

The

fundamental impetus behind perestroika was to maintain the
Soviet Union's status as a super power and to make it a
well-developed, socially attractive state.

In the early

1980s, economic backwardness plagued the USSR.

While most

of the world's economic giants were well into the age of
micro-technology, ninety-eight percent of the Soviet
Union's engineering output produced iron and steel.

Also,

ten percent of the population's calorie consumption came
from agricultural goods imported from non-socialist nations
(Hanson 1991, 50).

These figures alarmed leaders of the

USSR, a nation struggling to compete with the world's
superpowers for global supremacy.

Thus, top Soviet

officials insisted on constructing the appearance of
financial well-being. Officially, the nation's foremost
economists claimed that the Soviet union accounted for
about twenty percent of the world's industrial production
(49).

This preposterous statistic, and other half-truths

like it, would soon fail to mask the actual state of the
Soviet Union's economic condition.
During the late 1980s, the Soviet veil of economic
secrecy became translucent.

By mid-1989, a number of
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Western companies and nations noticed that the USSR was
failing to pay debts in a timely manner.

For instance, the

Soviets owed Hew Zealand $53 million, West Germany $600
million, and Japanese companies $200 million (Goldman 1992,
159).

In addition to financial shortcomings on the

international front, the Soviet Union struggled internally
as its official shroud of confidentiality was no longer
corroborated domestically.

On March 30, 1989, Izvestia

reported that the nation's acknowledged, real deficit was
100 billion rubles (Barry 1991, 185).

While this figure

was low, it was much more realistic than anything
previously disclosed.

Prior to 1989, Soviet leadership

maintained that deficit financing was never practiced.
Allegedly, the budget was always balanced.

As the 1990s

approached, however, the Soviet economy finally stumbled to
the brink of collapse and the myth of self-sufficient
prosperity became palpably tattered.
To improve the USSR's economic conditions, Gorbachev
attempted a number of reforms, but they only exacerbated
difficulties.

During perestroika, the centerpiece of his

strategy for economic correction was the 1987 law on state
enterprises.

To make the Soviet economic system more

responsive to consumer demands and to encourage
productivity, the law allowed individualistic initiative at
the micro-level of the economy.

In other words,

Gorbachev's reform program reduced the role of central
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supervision in production planning.

Soviet businesses

still had to fill state orders according to this
legislation.

However, a certain amount of production

resources could be set aside for shipments to profitable
foreign markets.

The advantage of this increased

independence was that successful businesses would grow and
reward their workers (Barry 1991, 182).
Unfortunately, Gorbachev's law on state enterprises
worked poorly.

Economic decentralization entailed a ripple

effect that the general secretary did not anticipate or
want.

More independence for business meant self financing,

marketing, and finding new sources for supplies.

Under old

arrangements, many enterprises were heavily subsidized by
the state.

Thus, the law on state enterprises created an

abundance of dilemmas including decreased job security and
increased strain on the economy in terms of supplies
meeting demands (Barry 1991, 182).

Pummeled by such

unexpected effects of reform, Gorbachev became increasingly
reactionary.
Gorbachev's retreat from progressive reform was
clearly noticeable in 1989.

In October, leading economic

advisor Leonid Abalkin suggested a comprehensive, long-term
schedule for moving the Soviet economy toward market
principles.

Despite this recommendation, General Secretary

Gorbachev opted for recentralization.

He followed

Ryzhkov's lead which insisted that financial and
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legislative retrenchment were necessary before additional
reforms could be advanced.

Thus, the early 1990s were

characterized by attempts at recentralization of economic
control.

The fallout of Gorbachev's vacillating economic

reform included an escalated budget deficit, runaway
inflation, and confused pricing methods (Sakwa 1993, 2034).

In short, during the disarray of economic

restructuring, Gorbachev panicked and backslid to familiar
principles.

Thus, he did not take his reforms far enough

to ensure comprehensive change.

The result was public

dissatisfaction which contributed to a number of paralyzing
labor strikes.
Labor Unrest
Labor protests ravaged the Soviet Union during 1988
and 1989.

Because of the fallout created by Gorbachev's

economic decentralization, many strikers protested the
noticeable change in the quality of life.

Shortages of

consumer goods, food, and supplies for industry were
conspicuous.

According to Goldman (1992), "...as it became

clear in 1989 that the stagnation or zastox of the Brezhnev
era had become eclipsed by the zastox II of Gorbachev, the
workers began to stir in an effort to prevent deterioration
in their living conditions" (149).

Certainly, ethnic

conflict was an important impetus for many strikes.
However, economic well-being figured heavily into workers'
decisions to instigate organized protests.
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In conjunction with deteriorating economic conditions,
the first Congress of People's Deputies stimulated labor
protests.

In this legislature, representatives from

industrial centers, including prominent coal-mining
regions, spoke with unprecedented candor.

Seeing frank

dissent uttered by representatives at the congress, many
miners concluded they could speak out themselves.

The

result of the miners' inference was a drastic increase in
strikes.

During the first half of 1989, an average of

15,000 Soviet workers struck per day.

After the Congress

of People's Deputies, this figure rose to 50,000 workers
per day in the second half of 1989 and 130,000 per day
during the first five months of 1990 (Goldman 1992, 151).
Despite the magnitude of the labor strikes, the most
salient economic goals of the workers were rather banal.
Often, heavy industrial workers and coal miners went on
strike not to demand higher wages, but to secure basic
necessities.

They had money but little to buy.

In July of

1989, over 500,000 Siberians and Ukrainians walked away
from their jobs to protest a distressing lack of food
products and soap.

The fuel miners extracted from the land

provided the Soviet economy with essential hard currency
from foreign markets.

Given this premise, protesters

argued convincingly that their basic needs should be met in
exchange for their efforts.

The miners grieved that each

worker only received one bar of soap every third month
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(Goldman 1992, 150).

Because of this predicament and many

others like it, the strikers demanded that Gorbachev find
the means by which consumer goods might be more quickly
produced and appropriately distributed.
One of the most noteworthy results of the coal-miners'
strikes was Moscow's decision to relinquish unconditional
control of mine revenues.

Many miners realized that Moscow

did not always fulfill their promises for more consumer
goods.

Therefore, some strikers demanded more than

assurances.

In May of 1991, miners won control over

approximately eighty percent of their earnings.
entailed great risk for the laborers.

This move

without state

subsidies, workers were not well protected from price
variation and the threat of mine depletion.

As miners

faced new risks, so did Moscow (Goldman 1992, 152).

With

economic ties loosened between the center and the
republics' local interests, political ties between the
center and the republics loosened as well.
Nationalities
In addition to difficulties related to economics and
labor dissension, the problem of nationalities and ethnic
uprisings became increasingly pronounced in 1989.
Traditionally, Marxist-Leninist teachings dictated that the
historical march toward communism eradicates national
hostilities.

That is, the desire for economic well-being

superseded affiliations of country or ethnicity.
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Until the

late 1980s, Soviet leaders held their theorists' doctrine
as fact.

At the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1988,

however, some leaders began to speak of a "negative
phenomenon" regarding relations among the USSR's republics
and ethnic groups— a phenomenon that had been ignored for
decades (Barry 1991, 239).

In January of 1989, Gorbachev

himself publicly admitted that relationships between
national groups constituted a major threat to the progress
of perestroika.

The friction between Armenia and

A 2erbaidzhan concerning Nagorno-Karabakh; violent riots in
Kazakhstan and Moldavia; the energetic outspokenness
demonstrated by Crimean Tartars; and the Baltic republics'
quest for sovereignty— such problems threatened stability
in the Soviet empire.

Without resolution of these

difficulties and others like them, the general secretary
hypothesized that perestroika would collapse as the Party
would be compelled to buttress its position (Nahaylo 1990,
135).
Resolving ethnic tensions would not be simple as the
roots of the problem ran deep in Soviet history.

Since its

inception, the USSR drew its borders for political purposes
and without regard for cultural and linguistic
considerations.
force.

Stability endured through the threat of

For example, after the ratification of the Nazi-

Soviet Pact of 1939, Soviet authorities brazenly asserted
influence over the Baltic region.

The display of national
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flags, public rallies, and

other demonstrations of

dissociation from Moscow were banned.

Outspoken

nationalists and critics of Soviet rule faced imprisonment
or exile.

In the stead of removed dissidents, Russian

nationals were imported by communist officials to dilute
the ethnic potency of the Baltic regions (Goldman 1992,
121 ).

The devastation of native cultures developed through
political repression, but also through the exclusion of
cultural practices.

For years, the Russo-centric Soviet

officials forced homogeneity by disallowing territorial
languages in education, science, and most forms of public
life.

Moreover, the glorification of the Bolshevik

revolution threatened to erase the cultural memory of some
ethnic groups through a "distortion of history" (Nahaylo
1990, 139).

Because of Russification, many republics and

ethnicities sought opportunities to pursue sovereignty.
Such opportunities were found in the late 1980s.
The candor invited by glasnost, the withering of
communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the sense of selfreliance gained through Gorbachev's efforts at economic
decentralization all encouraged the cauldron of
nationalistic dissent to boil over.

As late as 1987,

outcries for resistance to Soviet domination resulted in
imprisonment, and demonstrations induced police crackdowns
(Goldman 1992, 121).

But, by mid-1988, fear of retaliation
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faded and jingoistic protests called for increased
autonomy.

Such calls resulted in a number of important

occurrences.

For instance, in popular elections,

candidates who held tolerant views about issues of autonomy
were elected to legislative bodies.

Also, proclamations of

sovereignty were voiced including Lithuania's bold
announcement of independence in December of 1989.

In light

of Lithuania's proclamation, the republics' quests for
independence became a pressing issue for Gorbachev as he
planned perestroika's fate in the 1990s.
Summary

In light of the economic, labor, and nationality
problems faced by the Soviet Union, late 1989 marked a year
in which the party's prominence fell into question.

Of

course, the party was still in control, but it could not
evade open, public criticism,

citizens wondered aloud

about the worth of the 1917 October revolution.

In

November of 1989, Izvestia published a representative
article of appraisal which straightforwardly considered the
party's progress.

It read,

The Bolsheviks promised us the moon— and many believed
them. What was bound to happen happened; The social
ideal of Marxism, which was utopian but attractive to
the lumpenized masses, and what seemed to be amazingly
simple methods for realizing that ideal means of the
forcible redistributions of power and wealth according
to the well-known formula "he who has nothing will
become everything" fell upon exceptionally fertile
Russian soil. The expectation of a miracle is a
feature of our national character." In short, the
dream of Bolshevism was never meant to be as promising
as many thought (in Kiva 1989, 5).
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Here, the author suggested that the Bolshevik era was at an
end and that new visions were needed for the future.

Of

course, scrapping centralism was a dangerous proposition.
For some Soviet citizens, taking power away from Moscow
represented liberal attempts to agitate public hysteria
(Prokhanov 1990, 4-5).

Either way, the controversy moved

into an open, public venue, hurting the party's appearance
of legitimacy.
Despite the media disputation concerning party
supremacy, Gorbachev still advocated pluralism in the CPSU
and the continuance of perestroika, but in a half-hearted
fashion.

In a report the plenary session of the CPSU

Central Committee, Gorbachev made it clear,
Our [the party's] ideal is a humane, democratic
socialism. Expressing the interests of the working
class and all working people...the CPSU is creatively
developing socialist ideas as applied to present-day
realities... .In a society that is renewing itself, the
Party can exist and perform its vanguard role only as
a democratically recognized force (Pravda 6 Feb. 1990,
1-2 ).
Despite Gorbachev's faith in renewal, conditions in the
Soviet Union were worsening and he failed to respond with
decisive measures.

Yeltsin, however, sternly opposed a

standstill in the progress of perestroika.

Thus, the stage

was set for conflict between Yeltsin and the vacillating
Gorbachev and party conservatives.
THE PARTY VS. YELTSIN
Against the backdrop of perestroika's decline,
conservative elements in the party sought to reconsolidate
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power at the center.

With control of the republics

flagging, regulation of labor faltering, and regulation of
the economy failing, the USSR faced dismal prospects.
Reverting to time-tested ways, Soviet officials sought to
regulate the nation's situation from above which required
regaining their ability to direct the course of civic
affairs.

Thus, Gorbachev slowed the pace of progressive

reform programs which delegated authority to local agents.
Further, conservatives sought to neutralize the influence
of the political left's principle protagonist, Yeltsin.

To

discredit Yeltsin and, therefore, commandeer public
support, the party waged a smear campaign which centered
around two events in 1989:

Yeltsin's visit to the United

States and a rumor concerning Yeltsin's alleged
"abduction."

These two events greatly influenced Yeltsin's

future rhetorical strategies.
On the first event, Yeltsin wanted to visit the United
States to aid his reform efforts for Russia and the Soviet
Union.

Yeltsin realized that he could not forge a

democratic-style government with instincts alone.

For

reasons he labeled "common sense" and "expediency," Yeltsin
adopted the United States as a model for reform (Solovyov
and Klepikova 1992, 168).

In particular, he was interested

in the legal status of minority opposition in the American
Congress.

Thus, with the eagerness of a novice politician,

he concluded to journey to the United States for a first-
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hand investigation of what made that Western nation
prosperous.
Yeltsin organized his trip for the summer of 1989, but
his plan faced resistance from party officials.

In the

U.S., Gorbachev's popularity with the citizens was high.
Thus, party conservatives did not want Yeltsin's approval
rating to grow in the U.S. because they feared that
American approval could translate into increased domestic
popularity.

Consequently, despite Yeltsin's request for a

two-week venture, the Central Committee only approved a
one-week stay (Morrison 1991, 102).

To further

inconvenience Yeltsin, the Central Committee refused to
give him status as an official representative of the USSR.
Yeltsin was forced to travel as a lecturer sponsored by the
Esalen Institute, a California group committed to fostering
cultural exchange.

With support from the Esalen Institute

and with the media watching, the party could not hold
Yeltsin back from the visit.

They did, however, conspire

to reinterpret the trip's events with advantage.

This task

was attempted on two fronts.
First, during the trip, Yeltsin became exhausted, as
he was an inexperienced traveller.

At the time of the

trip, Yeltsin was in his late 50s, but the number of his
trips abroad could be counted on one hand.

While many

other party members were well travelled, Yeltsin worked in
a city, Sverdlovsk, that was closed to foreign visitors
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because of its involvement in Soviet military production
(Morrison 1991, 101).

Thus, his administrative duties did

not require extensive interaction with or travel to far*
away destinations.

Consequently, when Yeltsin's

opportunity to travel to the United States arose, he failed
to anticipate the rigors of a trans-Atlantic jaunt and an
eleven-cites-in-seven-days tour.

The result of his

inexperience was a public-relations debacle.
In America, Yeltsin was fatigued.

Perhaps the most

celebrated instance of his tiredness occurred in Baltimore,
Maryland.

During an early breakfast meeting at Johns

Hopkins University, he appeared groggy and, at times,
incoherent.

Of Yeltsin's behavior, one journalist wrote,

"Yeltsin came in.
champion.

He clasped his hands like a boxing

He tilted, he rocked.

careened.”

He swerved.

He

In another report, the Baltimore Sun claimed

Yeltsin was "not at his freshest” for the meeting:

"Mr.

Yeltsin's gaze was sometimes vague, his grasp listless as
the guest shook his hand." (in Morrison 1991, 104).
reporters surmised that Yeltsin was hungover.

Some

Later

reports claimed that after several sleepless nights,
Yeltsin's aids persuaded him to take sleeping pills around
four in the morning, several hours before the breakfast
meeting.
(104).

Consequently, they had difficulty waking him
Whatever the case might have been, the press

interpreted Yeltsin's public appearance pejoratively.
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Second, the American press mistook Yeltsin's easy
going, spontaneous style for buffoonery.

In the United

States, Yeltsin relished the experience of his visit and
made no attempt to hide his sense of delight.

Like a

seasoned politician, he worked the receptive American
crowds with an easy-going, "call-me-Boris" style.

Yeltsin

also used his casual demeanor in meetings with American
officials.

Some members of the press, however, interpreted

his behavior as a lack of political manners.

According to

his staff, Yeltsin's impulsiveness was a conscious ploy to
contrast him with the stiff, protocol-bound Gorbachev
(Solovyov and Klepikova 1992, 175).

However, his

spontaneity, combined with rumors of his heavy drinking,
took its toll in the media's accounts of his trip.
In the Soviet Union, the Kremlin used distasteful
information about Yeltsin against him.

As the visit came

to a close, Pravda and Izvestia republished a damaging
account of Yeltsin's travels from an Italian journal, La
Repubblica.

In this article, journalist Vittorio Zuccona

(1989) details the escapades of Yeltsin by writing, "he is
leaving behind a trail in the form of predictions of
disaster, insane spending, interviews and, especially, the
smell of the famous Jack Daniels Black Label Kentucky
Whiskey....Yeltsin has a phenomenal ability to drink and
spend money" (5).

Put differently, Zuccona accused Yeltsin

of using the profits from his lectures for merrymaking and
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extravagant spending.

This allegation carried an enormous

amount of weight, as it was leveled against a CPSU member,
one dedicated to serving the needs of a theoretically
selfless, socialist society.
While such allegations were largely fabricated and
eventually discounted, the scandal frightened Yeltsin
aides.

They worried that poor press coverage could, at

worst, severely damage Yeltsin's reputation and, at least,
confuse his supporters.
quickly.

However, retractions appeared

In America, papers recanted their accounts of

Yeltsin's extreme drunkenness (Solovyov
1992, 174-76).

and Klepikova

In the Soviet Union, Pravda printed an

unprecedented apology to Yeltsin, admitting that Zuccona
never checked his sources (21 September 1989, 7).

Thus,

after proper investigation, a different account of the trip
emerged:

Yeltsin was tired, not drunk; and Yeltsin spent

more them $100,000 of his earnings in the U.S. on
disposable syringes to battle the spread of AIDS in the
USSR, not to purchase American consumer goods (Solovyov and
Klepikova 1992, 175).
Following Yeltsin's public-relations struggle
concerning his trip to America, the Kremlin smear campaign
did not end; conservatives continued their assault.

In

October, Yeltsin fell ill with pneumonia and failed to
attend sessions of the Supreme Soviet.

His absence fueled

gossip of an attack or an assassination attempt.
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the alleged attack began with a report from two militiamen
guarding government dachas just west of Moscow.

On

September 29, the guards stated that a soaking-wet Yeltsin
approached them and declared that an attempt was made on
his life.

Allegedly, Yeltsin told the guards that two men

forcibly placed a bag over his head, pushed him into a car,
drove him to a bridge, and plunged him into the river
(Solovyov and Klepikova 1992, 178).

Yeltsin wanted the

matter kept confidential, but the story made its way
through the chain of command to the Moscow rumor mill.
Hearsay spread quickly and prompted Gorbachev to order
an investigation.

When Yeltsin was well enough to return

to the Supreme Soviet on October 16, he was met by an
unexpected surprise.

Gorbachev announced that the

abduction rumor should be addressed immediately— during the
Supreme Soviet session.

The general secretary then asked

interior minister Vadim Bakatin to read a prepared
statement. From the rostrum, Bakatin told the audience that
Yeltsin reported a kidnapping, but the story could not be
verified.

Further, he said that Yeltsin now denies any

attack or complaint, stating, "maybe I was joking."
According to Bakatin, Yeltsin claimed after the initial
report that, "there was no attack on me, I didn't make any
written statements, I didn't go to anyone for help, and I
have no complaints against the internal affairs agencies.
That's all I have to say" fIzvestia 17 October 1989, 2).
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Given the events which occurred in the previous
months, Yeltsin's reticence was not surprising.

Yeltsin

refused to give his right-wing competitors and Gorbachev
further information for them to manipulate in the statecontrolled media.

Clearly, Gorbachev wanted Yeltsin

discredited as elections to the Russia Parliament and local
soviets approached.

In Soviet political culture, personal

scandals were kept from the public's eye.

Nevertheless,

Gorbachev intentionally interrupted a session of the Soviet
Union's most prominent decision-making body to discuss
Yeltsin's private life.

Further, Gorbachev ordered

Isvestia to print the complete transcripts of the Supreme
Soviet's session the following day (Solovyov and Klepikova
1992, 178).

By doing this, General Secretary Gorbachev

hoped that Yeltsin would be so consumed with repairing his
image that Gorbachev could enhance his own political
position.
In the short term, the smear campaign against Yeltsin
worked.

He felt frustrated and blamed Gorbachev for his

political inactivity, accusing the General Secretary of
using "unprincipled moral and psychological methods to
remove opponents instead of political means" (Solovyov and
Klepikova 1992, 181).

However, travel and "assassination"

scandals later aided Yeltsin.

In the public's eye, Yeltsin

was seen favorably as a man who stood up to the party and
endured.

Further, the smear campaign served as a
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springboard upon which Yeltsin would become increasingly
conciliatory.
THE RISE AND FALL OF CONCILIATION
Following his misadventures with the Party in late
1989, Yeltsin felt and acted upon a sense of exigence
concerning conservative resistance.

Yeltsin believed that

the party's backsliding, including Gorbachev's, on reform
issues could be irreparable.

Moreover, Yeltsin also

believed that the Party's opportunities to serve the needs
of the Soviet people were rapidly diminishing.

At a plenum

in early February, 1990, he warned that the party had one
last chance to redeem itself, at the forthcoming TwentyEighth Party Congress in June (Morrison 1991, 118).
Clearly, this prognostication served as an aggressive, but
conciliatory invitation to unite all fronts to avoid future
conflict.

Evidence of his persona was illustrated by

Yeltsin's resignation from the CPSU at the Twenty-Eighth
Congress and by his call for Gorbachev's resignation, after
the Vilnius incident, in early 1991.
The Twenty-Eighth Party Congress was the stage upon
which conservative members of the Party formally sought to
thwart reforms and reconsolidate power.

In June 1990,

stalwart conservatives in Russia formed the Communist Party
of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (CP RSFSR)
as a fortification against Gorbachev's more liberal policy
decisions.

Once organized, the CP RSFSR battled Gorbachev
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at the congress on the issue of the democratic party
platform.

Because of this struggle, the party appeared

constitutionally unable to amend itself.

Thus, reform was

hindered in the Communist ranks and lagged behind public
expectations (Sakwa 1993, 7).

In short, the party became

increasingly fractured and unable to productively champion
reform.
Seeing the influence of the CP RSFSR, Yeltsin spoke
out at the congress against the lack of progressive policy
making.

In a June 6 speech summarizing the work of the

Twenty-Eighth Congress of the CPSU, Yeltsin lashed out
against the party's conservatives:
After taking the defensive in the initial
restructuring, the conservative forces have shifted to
the offensive... .As the past few years have shown, it
is not possible to neutralize the effect of the
conservative forces in the party. They have begun a
struggle against the economic reform, a struggle that,
although timid and halfhearted, created a real threat
to the party's full power... .This position has
discredited those communists who are sincere and
consistent supporters of changes (Current Digest of
the Soviet Press vol. XLII (35) 1990, 11).
As he expressed his frustration concerning the right-wing
movement in the party, he was concerned with the effect of
that backsliding on the future efforts of party-led reform
in the Soviet Union.
Obviously, Yeltsin doubted the party's ability to
continue its leading role in national affairs.

He asserted

that power was shifting away from the Party to alternative
agents of government.

Commenting on congressional debates,
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Yeltsin stated that restructuring is no longer the central
issue.

Restructuring was being negotiated by the people,

"beyond the walls of this building; it is being decided in
the Congress of People's Deputies" (Current Digest of the
Soviet Press vol. XLII (35) 1990, 12).

The Russian

congress, therefore, faced a different issue.

Yeltsin

declared,
This congress is faced first of all with the fate of
the CPSU itself... .Will it [the CPSU] apparatus find
the strength to decide on changes? Will it take
advantage of this last chance that is being offered to
it by the Congress? Either it will or it won't.
Either the Party apparatus, under the pressure of
political reality, will decide on a fundamental
restructuring of the Party, or it will cling to doomed
forms and end up in opposition to the people, in
opposition to restructuring (Current Digest of the
Soviet Press vol. XLII (35) 1990, 12).
In essence, Yeltsin issued a conciliatory warning to
the party:

soon, conservative party members would have to

decide to either play a role in reform or step aside.

He

claimed that the country could no longer be faced with
orders, intimidation, and insipid promises.
demanded results:

The nation

"It [the nation] will support only a

political organization that does not summon them to a
distant prospect of communism beyond the clouds but that,
through its daily deeds, defends the interests of everyone
and helps make them and our country advanced, rich and
happy" (Current Digest of the Soviet Press vol. XLII (35)
1990, 12).

Part of this change meant making room for

change, particularly change in the political order.
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Yeltsin noted, "In a democratic state, a changeover to a
multiparty system is inevitable" (12).

Here, Yeltsin was

rhetorically conciliatory, as conciliators do not force
change but present an audience with the sense that history
is simply following its natural course.

In short, he

provided party members with a final opportunity to work for
reform.

From Yeltsin's perspective, the time for change

approached quickly.
Almost a week after his July 6 address, Yeltsin made
an astonishing announcement.

He shocked the congressional

delegates by rejecting his membership in the communist
party.

Before the congress, the possibility of resignation

passed through his mind, but Yeltsin had not intended to
quit at the congress.

He was prompted to act, however,

because some representatives nominated him for a seat on
the Central Committee.

In light of this offer, Yeltsin

determined that accepting the seat would create a conflict
of interests between his Party affiliation and his role as
Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet.
In March of 1990, Yeltsin was elected to the
chairmanship in a highly-contested election.

The race

proved difficult for Yeltsin, as the public did not vote.
Rather, the election was decided by the Russian Parliament
in which about half of its members were Kremlin appointees.
Pressing this advantage, conservative party forces
introduced an exuberant anti-Yeltsin campaign during the
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election.

In the media, at state-sanctioned rallies, and

inside the Russian parliament proper, efforts were made by
Kremlin conservatives to promote pro-party candidates
(Solovyov and Klepikova 1992, 198).

Despite the party's

scheme, Yeltsin was elected in a close race on the third
ballot.

Many of the delegates in the Parliament eventually

supported Yeltsin, as they were sensitive to the voices of
their constituents (204).

Nonetheless, from the tone of

the election campaign, it was clear that the party
apparatus had successfully kept control of the selection of
delegates.

Further, Yeltsin's struggles to promote reform

in the party were not getting easier.

In other words,

party membership impeded Yeltsin's efforts for reform.
At the congress, on July 12, the nomination of
candidates for membership in to the Central Committee
served as an impetus for his decision to resign.

In his

speech, Yeltsin expressed his stance simply and without
bluster.

His election to the chairmanship of the Russian

SFSR; his tremendous obligation to the people of Russia;
and the Soviet Union's struggle to initiate a multi-party
system— Yeltsin used all of these considerations to justify
his departure from the party.

In closing, he stated,

As head of the republic's supreme legislative
authority, I must submit to the will of the people and
their authorized representatives. Therefore, in
accordance with the comments I made in the preelection
period, I announce my withdrawal from the CPSU, so as
to have a greater opportunity to exert an effective
influence on the Soviets' activity. I am prepared to
cooperate with all parties and public-political
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organizations in the republic" (Current Digest of the
Soviet Press vol. XLII (35) 1990, 20).
After these renarks, he quietly gathered his notes and
descended from the rostrum.
Yeltsin's resignation address was conciliatory, as
there were sound reasons for him to temper his anti-party
rhetoric.

Yeltsin did not want to antagonize the

influential communist bloc in the Russian parliament, whose
participation was indispensable to elect a functioning
government.

According to Morrison (1991), n[L]ike many

other radicals, he [Yeltsin] chose to keep his lines of
communication open to those who were still in the ranks"
(123).

Indeed, Yeltsin needed to handle carefully moderate

members of the party, some of whom were still sheepish
about reform.

For instance, at the February 5, 1990

plenum, Yeltsin proposed a number of drastic reforms.
These reforms included the abolition of Article Six of the
Soviet constitution, a text that ensured the CPSU's
monopoly on political power.

In the end, Yeltsin cast a

lone vote in opposition the leadership's draft platform for
the congress.

Some participants at the plenum sympathized

with Yeltsin, but they lacked the fortitude to follow his
lead.

About this situation at the plenum, Yeltsin told a

Danish interviewer:
The fact that there were no others who followed my
lead does not mean that I was alone in being opposed
to the platform. But it is not easy to raise your
hand and vote again, when the whole Politburo is
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sitting there staring at you. Fear still sits deep in
your stomach (in Morrison 1991, 118).
In light of this statement, Yeltsin still believed he could
work with some factions inside the party.

Thus, he wanted

to break with the CPSU as cleanly as possible.
After his speech, Yeltsin exited immediately from the
Kremlin Palace of Congresses without confronting audience
members.

Isolated claps and whistles of disapproval

escorted the stoic Yeltsin to the door.

An Izvestia

correspondent described Yeltsin's departure as gentlemanly,
leaving "without slamming the door or giving vent to his
emotions.
spirit:

Therefore, you start to think something in this
He has a better view of things, he probably knows

something we don't" (Gonzalez 1990, 20).

While the

specific thoughts in Yeltsin's mind at the time were
unclear, the guiet manner in which he departed was clearly
strategic.
While the rhetorically conciliatory Yeltsin wanted to
keep doors open for possible alliances with some party
members, working with Gorbachev became increasingly
difficult and, eventually, impossible.

Yeltsin's growing

ire with Gorbachev's reactionary disposition erupted into
revolutionary rage after the Vilnius incident in early
1991.
During the first month of 1991, Soviet paratroopers
and tanks attacked the city's television tower to quiet the
broadcasts advocating Lithuanian independence.
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Unarmed

civilians protected the tower by placing their bodies in
front of oncoming, Soviet tanks.

The tanks did not stop.

Thirteen civilians died, and 120 others were injured during
the evening which came to be known as Lithuania's "Bloody
Sunday" (Coleman 1996, 332).

Gorbachev's explanation of

the incident was a public relations debacle.

While he

regretted the loss of life, Gorbachev failed to take any
responsibility.

Further, no disciplinary action was taken

against any miliary officers in command of the Soviet
Union's troops.

Seemingly, Gorbachev engineered a cover-up

(333).
From Yeltsin's perspective, Gorbachev's explanation
was a lie, and the attack in Vilnius, represented an attack
against the progress of democracy.

Never before was

Gorbachev's contempt for perestroika's repercussions so
blatant.

Prior to the Vilnius incident, Gorbachev

frequently vacillated on key principles concerning
democratization.

For instance, in 1990, he abandoned

Article Six of the Soviet constitution, a text which
ensured the CPSU's monopoly on power.

In that same year,

he also sent troops to Moscow to intimidate pro-Yeltsin
demonstrators.

However, for Yeltsin, the Vilnius incident

was a defining moment for Gorbachev.
In a February 22 speech broadcast on Soviet
television, Yeltsin spelled out his criticism of Gorbachev
in two parts.

First, he began by reviewing his past
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relationship with the Soviet leader.

Yeltsin claimed

Gorbachev gave people hope for reform in the first two
years after 1985, but "he didn't have a very good idea
about how to fulfill those promises..." (Current Digest of
the Soviet Press vol XLIII (7) 1991, 1).

Thus, Yeltsin

claimed that Gorbachev's recent reform efforts bore the
name of perestroika, but the associated policies were
reactionary, not reformist, in nature.

After citing

supporting evidence for this claim, Yeltsin expressed
frustration concerning his relationship with the Soviet
leader, stating, "I will say frankly, with God as my
witness, that I made many attempts to really cooperate"
(1).

However, in light of the Vilnius massacre, Yeltsin

implied that cooperation was a thing of the past.
Second, Yeltsin then called for Gorbachev to step
aside as the USSR's top executive.

After lamenting the

fact that he put faith in Gorbachev, Yeltsin said,
...I consider the excessive trust I put in the
President to be my personal mistake.... I dissociate
myself from the position and policy of president [of
the USSR], and I call for his immediate resignation
and the transfer of power to a collective body— the
Council of the Federation. I have faith in Russia,
and I urge you, esteemed fellow citizens and esteemed
residents of the Russian Republic, to have faith in
our Russia. I have made my choice. Everyone must
make his choice and define his position. I want you
to hear and understand me. This is the choice I have
made, and I will not turn off this road (Current
Digest of the Soviet Press vol XLIII (7) 1991, 1).
This moment marked the end of Yeltsin's use of the
conciliatory persona.

For Yeltsin, the lines were drawn
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and he would not reconsider his position.

From this moment

forward, Yeltsin developed a new rhetorical strategy— a
revolutionary persona.
CONCLUSION
As perestroika ended, Yeltsin's conciliatory persona
began.

Gorbachev failed to address decisively important

issues facing the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.
Economic, labor, and nationality problems were met with
half-measures and backsliding.

Consequently, Yeltsin moved

to encourage reform by predicting monumental changes in the
Soviet Union's near future.

While his speeches and actions

were aggressive, he sought to include moderates in the
party.

By taking this tempered approach to his rhetoric of

reform, Yeltsin hoped to consolidate power with which
decisions about the Soviet Union's future could be made.
Unfortunately, the Vilnius incident persuaded Yeltsin that
Gorbachev and the party could not be swayed.

Thus, the

foundation was built on which Yeltsin would develop a
revolutionary persona.

The coming chapter examines

Yeltsin's new persona in relation to a landmark event in
Russian history, the popular election of a president.
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CHAPTER 5
THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENCY
INTRODUCTION
The months following the Vilnius incident were a
pivotal time for Yeltsin's relationship with Gorbachev.
Yeltsin alienated himself almost completely from Soviet
President Gorbachev and the communist party.

After his

heated condemnation of Gorbachev's handling of the massacre
in Lithuania, many questioned Yeltsin's risky decision to
demand a resignation from Gorbachev.

Fearing conservative

backlash, the editors of Izvestia (20 February 1991) wrote
that Yeltsin's speech may have "added yet another dangerous
mistake...one that could have dangerous consequences not
only for Russia, but the entire country" (1).

However,

Yeltsin believed that the time for cooperation had passed.
In his autobiographical work, The Struggle for Russia
(1994), he remarked, "By late winter and early spring of
1991, Gorbachev was sick of perestroika.

He clearly saw

the dead end into which the country had run" (16).

Yeltsin

sensed Gorbachev engaged in reactionary power grabbing
rather than pursuing progressive political and economic
reform.

In light of Gorbachev's change of course away from

perestroika, Yeltsin shifted his rhetorical stance to that
of a revolutionary.
Yeltsin's revolutionary persona was observable in his
quest for the new Russian presidency in 1991.
122
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During the

campaign, he insisted that a large portion of Soviet power
should be meted out to the republics.

In particular,

Yeltsin argued for increased decentralization by advocating
a new kind of Russian nationalism.

This chapter traces the

exigency created by the Russian presidential election and
Yeltsin's corresponding development and utilization of a
revolutionary persona.

Specifically, this chapter will

examine the circumstances surrounding the development of
the Russian presidential office, the presidential campaign,
and the election's immediate aftermath.
PRELUDE TO THE PRESIDENCY
Following the Vilnius incident, Gorbachev was in a
precarious situation.

He emerged from the episode with his

political image badly damaged.

Even though Gorbachev did

not accept the blame for the incident, he defended those
individuals directly responsible for the bloodshed.
Consequently, during the month after the massacre, his
approval rating in popular-opinion polls tumbled to 13
percent.

Yeltsin, however, enjoyed a 59-percent approval

rating (Coleman 1996, 334).

To heighten his popularity and

to bolster the image of the party, Gorbachev scheduled an
unprecedented referendum.
For the first time in the USSR's history, a Soviet
leader placed a significant policy decision in the hands of
his people.

In March, 1991, the question on the referendum

ballot involved the future of the Soviet Union:
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union remain together rather than separate in to sovereign
republics?

If the empire's collective reply was yes,

Gorbachev would show the world that the USSR endured
because of consensus, not because of force.
referendum was a clever tactical maneuver.

Gorbachev's
Despite the

rebellious mood of many republics, the idea of "union" was
still popular among many Soviet citizens (Coleman 1996,
335).

Therefore, the Soviet president's plebiscite

promised the possibility of capturing a public-relations
boon.
After the votes were tallied, the answer was "yes" to
Gorbachev's question.

In all, 112 million people out of

147 million voters, or 76 percent of those who
participated, cast their ballots in favor of preserving the
union (Stepovoi and chugayev 1991, 3).

Moreover, in a

number of prominent republics, citizens supported the
referendum question:

70 percent responded affirmatively to

Gorbachev's inquiry in the Ukraine; 70 percent in
Belorussia; 94 percent in Kazakhstan; and 93 percent in
Azerbaidzhan.

In these regions, approximately 80 percent

of register voters participated in referendum balloting
(3).
Such a seemingly fruitful response, however, was
arguably inconsequential for two reasons.

First, the

authors of the question worded it strategically.

The

referendum question read, "Do you consider it necessary to
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preserve the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics as a
renewed federation of equal, sovereign republics...?"
(Parkhomenko 1991, 1).

In examining this question, it

seemed apparent that its authors assumed that the political
center intended to mete out power to the fringes freely.
With this assumption manifest in the question (i.e.,
"sovereign republics"), the question's authors steered the
respondents toward the answer of "yes."

Thus, the authors,

who modestly hid behind an obscure notarization, "a group
of lawyers," worked to downplay the possible political
consequences of the plebiscite— further fragmentation.
Second, Gorbachev's "victory" seemed all the more
shallow when considered in conjunction with a second
question affixed to the Russian ballot by Yeltsin.

His

inquiry dealt with assessing people's attitudes toward the
creation of a Russian presidency.

By attaching this

question, Yeltsin accomplished two tasks.

First, by

introducing a referendum question on the same ballot with
Gorbachev, Yeltsin suggested that he was his rival's equal.
Second, Yeltsin set the stage for direct competition with
the Soviet power structure.

If Yeltsin's referendum won

favor with the public, he planned to run in the campaign.
Moreover, if Yeltsin won the presidential election, he
could boast that he held more legitimacy than Gorbachev, a
politician who refrained from participating in popular
elections.

When the referendum results returned, Yeltsin's
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question was approved by 70 percent of voters (Coleman
1996, 335).
In the fanfare surrounding the referendum's
proceedings, the tension between Gorbachev's reverence for
the Soviet dream and reform became increasingly evident.
When garnering support for his referendum question,
Gorbachev contradicted himself.

On the one hand, he

advocated pluralism and innovation.

On the other, he

criticized what he dubbed "so-called democrats" for their
appropriation of Western ideas.

According to Gorbachev,

democrats used Western concepts like "marketization" as
tools to break apart the Soviet Union.

Rather than left-

wing politicians, the "so-called democrats" were, in fact,
betrayers who were allying themselves with separatists and
fascists.

Moreover, Gorbachev claimed that Western ideas

served only as tools for a kind of psychological warfare
against the political coherence of the nation (Morrison
1992, 236).

In short, Gorbachev was trying to slow the

process of democratization and to keep reforms under his
control.
Of Gorbachev's inconsistencies, Yeltsin grew weary and
donned a revolutionary persona in response.

On March 9,

Yeltsin addressed a meeting of the Democratic Russian bloc
and delivered a blunt message:

democrats were to organize

an opposition party against the CPSU, as the time for
cooperation with Gorbachev was over.

During his invective,
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Yeltsin cast aside his prepared notes and labeled
conservative communist party members "traitors" and
"enemies."

Furthermore, he ordered his supporters to "take

the offensive" (Morrison 1992, 237).

For these remarks,

Yeltsin's aides chastised him for his impromptu
performance.

Consequently, he later regretted using words

including "enemies" and "war" in his address.

Several days

after the speech, Yeltsin remarked, "I wrote it [the
prepared speech] at night, and when I mounted the rostrum,
I realized that I couldn't just read out a speech in that
auditorium.

I said what I felt" (237).

What Yeltsin

"felt" was an undeniable feeling of frustration with the
Soviet order.

Like any revolutionary, Yeltsin knew that a

break with the past must occur to make way for the future.
Russia's citizens, too, felt frustration with
Gorbachev and the Kremlin.

In support of Yeltsin's

militant speech, crowds of people heeded his call for
opposition and poured into the streets of the Soviet Union.
On March 10, 200,000 paraded in Moscow, 70,000 in
Leningrad, and 50,000 in Sverdlovsk.

The demonstrators

cheered for Yeltsin and chanted slogans including,
"Gorbachev, get out!" (Morrison 1991, 238).

After this

demonstration, a month of rallies ensued which culminated
after the referendum vote on March 28.
Most directly, the March 28 protests occurred in
response to a March 25 resolution by the USSR's Cabinet of
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Ministers.

This resolution introduced a state of emergency

in Moscow from March 26 through April 15 which banned all
public demonstrations.

The Russian congress responded

quickly to the Soviet government's proclamation by issuing
a statement of protest signed by 220 RSFSR deputies.

In

this statement, the deputies affirmed their responsibility
to their constituents.

Further, they claimed that the

Soviet's law impinged on citizens' constitutional right of
free expression and served to pressure the Russian congress
to take a more conservative stance (Demchenko and Shipitko
1991, 3).

In conjunction with this statement, the Russian

congress urged citizens to march in the streets to protest
conservativism in the Kremlin and the Ministers' resolution
on temporarily suspending the holding of rallies, street
processions, and demonstrations in Moscow.
Despite Gorbachev's deployment of 50,000 troops in
Moscow, defiant citizens took to the streets on March 28.
As if to diminish the gravity of the protests, official
news agencies downplayed the turnout by reporting spurious
information. The Beacon radio station broadcasted that
about 900 gathered in one square in Moscow; police measured
protest participation in the tens of thousands.

However,

the rally's organizers, the Democratic Russia Movement,
reported that by 7 p.m., about 700,000 demonstrators had
gathered in Mayakovsky, Arbart, and Pushkin squares
(Ardayev, Andreyev, et. al. 1991, 1).

Fortunately, no

i
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noteworthy violence occurred and, in the end, Gorbachev
recalled the troops.
The events surrounding the demonstrations and the
plenum constituted a major blow against Gorbachev's
credibility.

By placing 50,000 troops in his own capital,

the result was widely seen as a self-inflicted political
defeat.

As such, the Soviet president's intended show of

strength turned into a display of weakness (Morrison 1991,
242). Thus, Gorbachev's inability to work with political
opposition developed into an unexpected gift for Yeltsin.
Upon Gorbachev's shortcomings, Yeltsin furthered his use of
a revolutionary persona.
During the week following the March 28 demonstrations
in Moscow, Yeltsin sternly denounced Gorbachev and
advocated revolutionary change.
time of heated arguments.

For the congress, it was a

In a one-and-a-half-hour speech,

Yeltsin told the deputies that Russia faced a decision
between distinct political lines— further fundamental
reform or the perpetuation of an outmoded system disguised
by the word perestroika.

Arguing for revolutionary change,

Yeltsin proclaimed:
The objective outcome of the past six years has shown
that we were dealing not with perestroika, but with
the last phase of stagnation. However, there are
positive results. The country is now longer where it
was. The main thing that has changed is the people;
they have recognized the truth about the society in
which they live, about its history, about life in
other countries. Millions have awakened (in Morrison
1991, 242).
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Yeltsin's revolutionary tone was evident in this address.
By reinterpreting events of the past six years as
nstagnation," he set the stage for his crusade to
decentralize political power in the Soviet Union.

To

promote the notion of an increasingly sovereign Russia,
Yeltsin employed a revolutionary persona during the
campaign for the Russian presidency.
THE RACE
June 12, 1991, was a monumental moment in Russia.

On

this day, the people of the republic elected a president,
Boris Yeltsin, for the first time in its thousand-year
history.

The presidential post was created in late May,

1991 by Russia's Supreme Soviet, and the legislation gained
quick approval by the Russian Congress of Peoples'
Deputies.

This law was particularly noteworthy because of

its emphasis on a separation of powers among a legislature,
an executive, and a constitutional court (Morrison 1991,
259-60).

In short, the Russian presidency marked an

important point in the republic's progress toward a
Western-style government and its struggle for greater
autonomy.
The creation of the Russian presidency occurred within
the context of the republic's pursuit of increased
independence from the Soviet Union.

Under Yeltsin's

chairmanship, the Russian parliament formally declared the
republic's sovereignty in June, 1990.

While the meaning of
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"sovereignty" was ambiguous to most delegates, the
declaration's implication was clear:

Russia endeavored to

distance itself from the Kremlin's authority.

During 1990,

the Russian parliament straightforwardly passed laws at
odds with Soviet law.

Some of the parliament's laws

ensured that tax money collected in Russia went directly to
the Russian government rather than to Soviet authorities.
Of course, the Kremlin countered by claiming its laws took
precedence (Coleman 1996, 335).

The result of such clashes

was a constitutional crisis in which the Russian republic's
leadership attempted to prod Gorbachev toward more
enterprising and faster reform.
Russia's separatist bearing was evident when the
Yeltsin-led congress formulated its law on the Russian
presidency.

The executive position's basic specifications

were rather orthodox.

For instance, to be president in

Russia, one was required to be a citizen of the RSFSR and
be no younger than 35, but no older than 65.

Once in

office, the law dictated than an individual's term included
five years, and an individual could not serve more than two
consecutive terms.

The law on the presidency, however, was

unusually stringent regarding specific affiliations.

Those

holding office as a Peoples' Deputy, those holding posts in
any state organizations, and those who belong to any
political party were restricted from holding office as
Russia's president (Sorokin 1991, 2).

By eliminating the
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direct influence of political parties, one may speculate
that the congress actively attempted to curtail the
activity of the communist party in Russian presidential
politics.
Despite precautions against CPSU influence in the
election, conservative opposition was encountered during
the campaign for Russia's first president.

Of course,

Yeltsin ran as the chief radical in the pack of contenders.
His most formidable resistance came from Nikolai Ryzhkov,
the prime minister and a man rooted in the past of Soviet
tradition.

Ryzhkov was supported by the CPSU and the

state-sanctioned media.

Even further to the right stood

General Albert Makashov, an old-fashioned military
conservative who gained notoriety in 1990 for his austere
criticism of Gorbachev's foreign policy.

Vadim Bakatin,

the liberal interior minister, was perceived as the
candidate backed by Gorbachev.
candidates included:

Other, lesser known

Aman Tuleyev, a local politician from

the Kemerovo province in Siberia; and Vladimir Zhirinovsky,
a maverick right-winger who based his blustery campaign on
appeals to Russian imperialism (Morrison 1991, 260).

To

help in his quest against these competitors, Yeltsin made
an astute choice for a running mate.
Yeltsin selected Alexander Rutskoi as his vicepresidential contender.

Rutskoi was well liked by many

Russians, as he had earned a miliary hero's reputation

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

133
during the Soviet Union's Afghan conflict.

Further, he

stood in opposition to Gorbachev on social issues and
denounced the Soviet President furiously for dodging
accountability for the bloodshed at the Vilinus television
tower (Morrison 1991, 261).

As a running mate, Rutskoi

suited Yeltsin's needs well because he appealed to a wide
range of voters, including miliary personnel, and he
clashed with Gorbachev on a number of important campaign
issues.
With all the candidates in place, the presidential
race transpired at a vigorous pace.

By American standards,

the political contest was brief, lasting only three weeks.
Nevertheless, Yeltsin made the most of his time.

While his

competitors griped about the campaign's brevity, Yeltsin
took the path of an incumbent.

Yeltsin made a number of

"working visits" to not only evaluate the circumstances in
Russia's furthest reaches, but to promote his radical
ideas.

He journeyed inside the Arctic Circle to Murmansk

and to Severomorsk, a base for the navy's Northern Fleet.
Yeltsin's path then led to Petrozavodsk in Karelia, to the
heartland cities of Tula and Voronezh, and then to
industrial cities in the Urals, including Perm,
Chelyabinsk, Orenburg, and Sverdlovsk (Morrison 1992, 263).
By campaigning extensively in these regions, Yeltsin added
to his allure as a "man of the people" and garnered grass
roots support.
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During his campaign travels, according to Morrison
(1992), Yeltsin focused primarily on four issues:

the fall

of the Soviet dream; economic reform; the promise of a
better life; and Russian nationalism.

Concerning the first

issue, Yeltsin portayed the goals of Leninist-Marxism as an
experiment gone awry.

Abstracting his views on the Soviet

aspirations, Yeltsin said:
The myths that oppressed millions over many decades
have lost their illusionary attraction. The dynamic
process of removing ideology from public awareness has
been going on throughout this time. Sometimes, this
is called a moral disaster. I disagree categorically.
Renunciation of the false signposts that have led
people into an impasse, ruined the lives of
multitudes, and destroyed the centuries-old traditions
of a great nation is not a disaster but the first step
toward moral rebirth. It is founded not upon the
ideology of a superclass to which all is permitted but
on universal human values and norms of life (in
Morrison 1991, 264).
By stating that the legacy of Lenin "led people into an
impasse," Yeltsin insinuated that the road to communism was
at an end.

Consequently, Yeltsin provided his audience

with a basis for a revolutionary break with the past,
giving his audience a reason to embrace a new kind of
Russian political future— one based on equality, not on
party membership.
To further justify abandoning the ways of Communism,
Yeltsin expounded his views on economics during the
Presidential campaign.

Yeltsin claimed that the Soviet

economy teetered on the edge of disaster; thus, a move to a
market-style economy was necessary.

Anticipating
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resistance from those leery of capitalism, Yeltsin
attempted to circumvent controversy by promoting a
utilitarian view of economics.

He refused to debate the

merits of capitalism over socialism:
I sun asked during my trips, 'Are you for socialism or
capitalism?' I say: I am in favor of Russians living
better— materially, spiritually, and culturally....A
healthier society is determined by how people live,
how they work, and how they are provided for
materially, culturally, and intellectually. As for a
name [for the new economic policy], people will
think one up (in Morrison 1991, 265).
Yeltsin presented his views of economics by tactfully
eschewing clashing with voters on sensitive, Marxist
principles.

Nevertheless, Yeltsin clearly promoted the

abandonment of socialism and central economic planning,
central planks in the CPSU's platform.
appealed to crowds' sense of suffering.

Often, Yeltsin
In one speech, he

held up a ration card used to purchase consumer goods and
declared, "This is a constant humiliation, a reminder that
every hour you are a slave in this country" (265).

In

short, Yeltsin argued in favor of finding innovative and
ideology-free economic policies that "worked.”
On the promise of a better life, Yeltsin declared that
his presidency would stimulate improved living conditions
for Russian citizens.

During his travels, he made sweeping

promises to audiences concerning swift economic reforms
like privatization and land reform.

Yeltsin guaranteed a

number improvements including better wages, a shorter work
week, and lower fares for rail travel.

Further, he gave
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special attention to the welfare grievances of the armed
forces, promising some form of "social protection” for
handicapped and homeless veterans.

To afford these social

programs, Yeltsin argued that Russia could reduce its
contributions to the central budget of the Soviet Union and
spend more money internally.

Yeltsin acknowledged the

necessity of the Soviet Union's role in defense, railways,
and power generation, as the republics were closely bound
by infrastructure,

nevertheless, he contended that

decentralized republics could better provide for its
citizens with local use of tax revenues than the Soviet
Union as an all-encompassing, administrative giant.

Here

again, as with his views on economics, Yeltsin justified
decentralization by appealing to practicality, not partyendorsed theory.
Finally, Yeltsin's most revolutionary theme promoted
the "rebuilding" of Russia.

Appealing to patriotism rather

than ideological principles, Yeltsin promised devolution of
the Soviet state, radical reform, and protection for Russia
diaspora scattered throughout the USSR (Morrison 1991, 2634).

In light of events during the late 1980s and early

1990s, Yeltsin deduced that the Soviet Union's size
encumbered efficient administration.
advisable.

Thus, downsizing was

In the Soviet Union's place, Yeltsin believed a

new Russia would rise— a Russia built on national pride and
history:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

It had become perfectly clear that patriotism lies not
only in words about love of the Russian past, not only
in empty admiration of the uniqueness of our national
character, and not only in fencing ourselves off from
the rest of humanity. Today the highest form of
patriotism is to serve the cause of Russia's progress,
to participate actively in the deep transformations of
its life, giving the Russians a real right to be proud
of their motherland (in Morrison 1991, 264).
Clearly, Yeltsin's stance was revolutionary.

As noted

previously, Cohen (1985) argued that the central feature of
revolutions is "newness."

Cohen further explained that

revolutions might be "links of transformation between the
old and the new" (8).

Thus, it made sense that Yeltsin

believed that building Russian future meant borrowing from
the nation's pre-Soviet past.
With these four issues at the forefront of his
campaign, Yeltsin won by an impressive margin against his
five rivals.

He needed at least 50 percent of the vote to

avoid a runoff.

However, Yeltsin captured just under 57.4

percent on the first ballot.

As expected by pollsters,

Yeltsin performed well in industrial cities, winning 72
percent in Moscow and 90 percent in Sverdlovsk.

In all,

Ryzhkov placed second with 17.3 percent, excelling in the
conservative countryside.

Zhirinovsky finished in a

surprising third place with 7.9 percent of the ballot,
demonstrating that his ultra-nationalistic message appealed
to a significant number of Russians.
race were:

Finishing last in the

Tuleyev with 6.1 percent of the vote; Makashov
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with 3.8 percent; and Bakatin, the candidate supported by
Gorbachev, with 3.5 percent (Morrison 1991, 267).
Yeltsin's victory was decisive, but the public was
still uncertain about Russia's move away from the security
afforded by Soviet government.

Between June 14-15, a post

election survey of 1,500 voters measured attitudes toward
campaign issues including economic and social concerns.
The survey revealed reluctant outlooks about revolutionary
reform.

About 36 percent of the respondents backed an

"endeavor to reform the republic's economy by patterning it
after developed countries of the west," but another 36
percent backed an "endeavor to reform the republics
economy, but without allowing it to become capitalist..."
(Kuvaldin 1991, 3).

On social concerns, 49.9 percent of

respondents expressed a desire to preserve the state's
responsibility for solving housing and other social
problems.

Concurrently, only 16.7 percent expressed a

desire to move the responsibility of housing and other
social problems to the private sector (3).

From the

results, it seemed that Russian citizens were apprehensive
about moving away from the familiar Soviet system of
government.
The survey's results also indicated public anxiety
about political change.

Twenty percent of respondents

considered themselves supporters of the communist Party,
seven to nine percent supported the Democratic Russia
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Movement, and four to seven percent supported various
diminutive parties.

The majority of voters, 60 to 70

percent, did not support any one party (Kuvaldin 1991, 3).
Even after Yeltsin won the election, slightly more that 51
percent of those surveyed indicated a "readiness to
cooperate with all parties and movements,” and only 11.8
percent refused to support cooperation with the CPSU (3).
In light of the perceived need for political change, people
recognized no clear allegiance to a party.

The collapse of

the old regime progressed faster than the rise of a new
one.

Nevertheless, on June 12, Russia passed the point of

no return.

There was no going back, as socio-political

conditions required radical change and Yeltsin escalated
his revolutionary rhetoric.
ELECTION AFTERMATH
After the election, Yeltsin continued the use of his
revolutionary persona during his second trip to America and
during his inaugural address.

Yeltsin again ventured to

the United States immediately after his election.

As if to

erase the embarrassing memories of his first venture to
America, Yeltsin returned for two reasons.

First, he

wanted to establish good relations with President Bush.
Unlike his first trip, in which he was shunned by the
American president, Yeltsin wanted to discuss the future of
U.S.-Russian relations as equals.

Second, Yeltsin wanted

to use his post-election journey as a pulpit from which he
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could state his position on the progress of Russian
domestic policy.
In America, Yeltsin's stance against Gorbachev was
revolutionary.

During an address at Andrews Air Force

Base, Yeltsin attacked Gorbachev for his lack of commitment
to steady reform.

Yeltsin asserted that he did not want

"halfhearted measures, halfhearted reform, semidemocracy"
(Morrison 1991, 269).

Instead, he claimed that the Russian

people had voted for a market economy and privatization so
that they might keep up with and join "all civilized
countries of the world" (269).

In an interview with

American journalist Ted Koppel, Yeltsin warned, "If he
[Gorbachev] holds up reform, if he makes halfhearted
decisions, if he pressures the republics, including
military pressure, I am his opponent" (269).

Certainly,

Yeltsin welcomed Gorbachev's cooperation in an effort to
bring democracy and marketization to Russia.

At the same

time, however, Yeltsin professed that the days of Soviet
socialism and international isolation were at an end.
Gorbachev, Yeltsin declared,

Of

"There is no way for one man

to preserve the Soviet Union....Slow, halfhearted change
would be fatal" (270).
Yeltsin further expounded his views with a
revolutionary persona, during his inaugural address.

In

this address, he asserted that Russia's near future
included a new history, a reborn economy, and a new spirit.
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The introduction of the speech included an exclamation of
wonderment and an explanation of Russia's newest
aspirations:
It is impossible to convey in words my mental state at
this moment... .The first President in the thousandyear history of Russia has taken a solemn oath to his
fellow citizens. There is no higher honor that a
people renders to an individual....For centuries in
our country, power and the people were at opposite
poles. Not finding the truth in life, people tried to
find it in the skies and in dreams of a radiant
future. For centuries the state's interest, as a
rule, was placed above the individual, his needs and
aspirations (2).
Here, Yeltsin quickly established for his audience the idea
that Soviet aspirations were, in fact, myths.

A new

political future was at hand which integrated the needs of
the people with government.

In Yeltsin's own words, he

announced a "rebirth of human dignity" (3).
Part of such rebirth included the uneasiness of
change.

Concerning radical reform, Yeltsin claimed that it

would not come easily.

Nevertheless, change was something

the Russian people chose when they elected him to the
presidential post.

Commenting on his role as chief

executive, Yeltsin stated:
Radical reforms are the essence of the President's
course. We have all made a choice in favor of
peaceful, legal, and democratic methods of
transformation. The purport of our policy is not mass
self-sacrifice but the good of each individual and his
interest. A worthy life is not granted from on high
and does not come by itself. It is impossible to
arrive at it drawn up in columns and blindly following
orders from above. It will be based on the freedom of
enterprises and geographic areas, on initiative and
enterprise (in Current Digest of the Soviet Press vol.
XLIII (28) 1991, 3).
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Yeltsin's explanation of his presidential role signified
that he was a mandated agent of change.

Accordingly,

Yeltsin intended to be responsive to his constituents as he
battled to ensure the rights of individuals rather than the
communistic pursuit of mass utopianism.
Also in his inaugural address, Yeltsin explained the
kind of character which would distinguish the new Russia.
Yeltsin's Russia would be one concerned with its own
affairs, relying on its own traditions to define its path.
According to Yeltsin, apart from the USSR, Russia would no
longer pursue imperial ambitions.

Yeltsin claimed that the

idea of "empire" was "profoundly alien to the political
course chosen by the people" (3).

Yeltsin's Russia

intended to gain allies, not enemies, in the world
community, thereby affirming "creative human principles-*
freedom, property, legality, openness..." (3).

Part of

this process meant a return to traditional Russian values,
including religion.

Commenting briefly on the subject of

Christianity, Yeltsin stated, "Russian Republic citizens
will no longer renounce their past, present and future to
suit dogma....The rebirth of our state will be based on the
spiritual emancipation of people, true freedom of
conscience, and complete rejection of any ideological
diktat" (3).

This statement was a truly revolutionary

change, as the Soviet Union's official policies discouraged
religious practices.
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Concluding, he encouraged his listeners to overcome
present trials to rekindle the Russian spirit.

Yeltsin

invoked the glory of Russia's past to inspire his
listeners:
The creative potential of the republic's peoples and
of the Russian people is great. They have borne, with
pain and honor, all the trials sent to them by fate,
and they have managed, under very inhuman conditions,
to retain a moral sense of faith in their Russia. The
very rich and distinctive Russian culture, that
tireless advocate of good, humanism and justice, is
alive (3).
With his faith in the nature of his audience, Yeltsin
believed that, "Great Russia is rising from her knees!”
(4).

The rule of oppression was to be replaced by

democracy and the rule of law.

With these words, Yeltsin

stood at the juncture between Soviet rule and the dawn of a
new beginning.
CONCLUSION
After the Vilnius incident, Yeltsin promoted a
reinterpretation of the Soviet experience to rhetorically
create Russia's future.

He concluded that working within

the Soviet government's institutional framework was
impossible.

For over seventy years, the USSR's politics

operated with the hope that a Marxist utopia was possible.
Thus, people were to abandon self-centered desires and work
toward the common goals of society.

Concurrently,

government Marxist-based theory predicted that forms of
government would wither away as society would regulate
itself.

However, rather than utopia, an avaricious system
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of bureaucracy developed.

In this arrangement, the

nomenklatura held the levers of power in a stratified
society supported by the labors of the masses.

Yeltsin

spoke for the abandonment of such practices in his quest
for the Russian presidency.
In the name of a "new Russia," Yeltsin sought sweeping
changes.

Yeltsin demonstrated the signs of revolution in

his discourse during his handling of the CPSU's ban on
street demonstrations, during his presidential campaign,
and during the election's aftermath.

By subordinating the

USSR's authority to that of Russia, he provoked radical
institutional change.

Further, among Russia's citizens, he

wanted to encourage grass-roots efficiency and individual
initiative.

Certainly, Yeltsin gave opportunities to

Gorbachev for participation in innovations.

Nevertheless,

Yeltsin abandoned hope in the CPSU's ability to manage
Russia's future.

In reaction to the progress of Yeltsin's

assault, the party reacted with a startling coup in August,
1991, that would precipitate the end of the Soviet Union.
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CHAPTER 6
THE END OF AN EMPIRE
INTRODUCTION
The aftermath of Yeltsin's Russian presidential
victory marked a dire moment for Soviet conservatives.

In

the months following the election, it became clear that the
USSR was involved in a vigorous process of transformation.
Citizens gained an awareness of the importance of their
participation in elections and of their ability to guide
civic affairs.

Gorbachev became increasingly liberal, as

he meted out political power to the republics.

And

Yeltsin, in his new position, outwardly advocated the
diminished prominence of the central government in
political decision making.

If conservatives intended to

maintain their status in the Soviet Union, drastic measures
were necessary.
Conservatives took such measures by launching a
reactionary coup.

This situation was strikingly similar to

another predicament that occurred about 20 years earlier in
Prague.

When Soviet tanks entered the Czechoslovakian

capital, Brezhnev's military aimed to beat back the reforms
that threatened communism.

On August 19, 1991, Soviet

tanks rolled once again to maintain the legacy of Lenin.
This time, however, the tanks were not driven to another
country.

This time, the tanks moved through Moscow in a

desperate mission to save some semblance of the status quo.
145
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This chapter traces the coup and Yeltsin's rhetorical
management of the reactionary coup.

Specifically, coverage

will include reasons underlying the coup, Yeltsin's
response to the uprising itself, and his struggle to
extinguish the dying, smoldering embers of Soviet authority
in Russia after the coup plotters' failure.

Further,

Yeltsin's utilization of a revolutionary persona will be
examined.
CONCEPTION OF A COUP
Events during the first half of 1991 gave conservative
forces in the communist party good reasons to fear for
their political lives.

Democratization and

decentralization threatened the status quo to which many
had grown accustomed.

Primarily, three reasons provoked

the conservative backlash which incited the August, 1991
coup.
The Yeltsin Factor
First, Yeltsin's success in promoting Russia's
sovereignty created an air of anxiety among hardline
conservatives.

During and immediately after his

presidential campaign, Yeltsin beamed with confidence and
was frank in presenting his desires for Russian self*
sufficiency.

On Russian soil, Yeltsin desired the ability

to direct the republic's affairs according to the "will" of
the voting public.

Thus, he demanded the transfer of a

number of Soviet powers into Russia's hands:

management of
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economic reform; command of nuclear arms; and authority to
negotiate relations with foreign countries (Coleman 1996,
338).

Yeltsin also wanted to cut defence spending, openly

admitting that Russia no longer wanted to be a world
superpower (Morrison 1991, 278).

In essence, Yeltsin

pursued the idea of Soviet decentralization with
unprecedented verve.
To encourage such a process of increasing republic
power, Yeltsin badgered communist party activity in Russia.
On June 20, Yeltsin ordered a ban on party operations in
the administration of the Russian state.

In his decree,

Yeltsin expressed his commitment to ensure the equal rights
of all political parties and mass, public movements.

To

accomplish the goal, he believed that the hegemony of party
influence needed to be broken.

Thus, he suspended the

participation of parties— including the communist party— in
Russian government.

Yeltsin proclaimed that the

"indication...of membership in a political party or mass
public movements in official documents presented to state
agencies, institutions, and organizations is forbidden"
fSovetskava Rossia 23 July 1991, 1).

Put succinctly,

Yeltsin stopped short of completely prohibiting party
activity in Russia, but it was banned within the workings
of Russian government.

This extraordinary decree

represented a monumental hindrance for the communist party;
however, the worst was yet to come.

i
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Several days after the Russian president's decree,
Vice-President Rutskoi called for the total eradication of
the Russian communist party.

At a Communists for Democracy

meeting, Rutskoi announced that communist politics had no
role in the Russian Republic:
We are building a new republic party that is not
an alternative Russian Communist Party, and we call
for the abolishment of the Russian Communist
Party... .We must draw dividing lines on the basis of
ideological convictions, and my ideology is simple—
the ideology of an ordinary person (Izvestia 24 July,
1 ).
Rutskoi wanted to focus the Russian government's efforts on
reform, not on settling quibbles in the party.
Clearly, Yeltsin and his camp were committed to
rooting out Communist authority.

While Russia was not yet

an independent country, it was well on its way to being out
from under CPSU influence.

From the Communists'

perspective, the potential loss stood as a great threat.
Russia composed two-thirds of the USSR's land mass, held
half of its population, and most of its mineral resources
(Coleman 1996, 337-8).

Without Russia under its control,

communism faced ruinous future prospects.

Ttie_g7— P.Ian
Second, Gorbachev's negotiations with the "Group of
Seven" (G7) provided conservatives with serious concerns.
In July, Gorbachev was invited to London to participate in
an economic summit between the world's seven richest
nations— the United States, Britain, France, Germany,
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Italy, Japan, and Canada.

Gorbachev's participation was an

honor, as he was the first Soviet leader to participate at
this exclusive event.

The event, however, provided

Gorbachev with more than distinction; it provided him with
opportunity.

Gorbachev saw the meeting as a chance to

encourage foreign investment in the Soviet Union to
revitalize its staggering economy.

Realizing that many

nations would be reluctant to finance a cold-war
antagonist, the Soviet president concocted an inventive
plan.
In a confidential document distributed to G7 leaders,
Gorbachev proposed the exchange of investment in the USSR
for Soviet military secrets.

He suggested that the G7

nations contribute business expertise and investment
capital for a $30-40 billion program to convert the Soviet
Union's miliary machine into profitable enterprises.

In

return, Gorbachev intended to give participants in his
strategy access to elite defense and manufacturing
facilities.

Further, Gorbachev was also prepared to offer

generous tax incentives and licensing agreements (Coleman
1996, 339).

This plan was extreme, and Gorbachev realized

the likelihood of opposition.

Nevertheless, he also

realized his nation could not survive by continuing to
subsidize unprofitable industries and failing to provide
its citizens an adequate supply of essential consumer
goods.
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Not surprisingly, the few military and political
leaders aware of Gorbachev's plan reacted to it with
resentment.

To them, the entire idea was inconceivable.

The Soviet Union toiled for decades to create one of the
world's most potent military forces.

Soviet defense plants

were guarded with such secrecy that workers were forbidden
to reveal factory sites.

Frequently, friends and family of

factory workers knew only a loved one's post office box,
never their exact location.

After all of the secrecy and

effort invested in creating the Soviet miliary machine,
Gorbachev wanted to give everything away.

He proposed

allowing "spies" to enter miliary facilities and "steal"
their secrets.

To this, leading conservatives said "no,"

though they could not formally persuade Gorbachev
otherwise.
A New Union Treaty
Third, the negotiation of a new Union Treaty stoked
further the fire of Gorbachev's impending demise.

As with

the G7 negotiations, the Union Treaty threatened to take
power away from the USSR's guiding institutions.

The

defining objective of the Union Treaty was to move
important decision making power from the Kremlin and give
it to the Soviet Union's 15 republics.

The final draft of

the treaty recognized each republic as a sovereign state
with the ability to resolve "all questions of their
development, guaranteeing equal political rights and
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opportunities for social, economic, and cultural
development to all peoples living on their territories"
(12vestia 15 August 1991, 1).

With increased authority in

the hands of those guiding the republics, the USSR would be
reduced to an emasculated coordinating body (Coleman 1996,
335).

In light of the proposed transfer of power, Kremlin

politicians and constituents of the USSR's nomenklatura
understood they would become increasingly irrelevant.
Gorbachev realized that the terms of the treaty would
infuriate the nomenklatura, but his hand was forced.

The

republics openly demonstrated in favor of increased
sovereignty.

In early March, a nation-wide miners'

walkout crippled the country.

The protesters' demands were

economic and political in nature, including calls for the
resignation of Gorbachev; the resignation of Pavlov, a
former minister of finance who maimed the economy by
printing excessive amounts of currency to keep pace with
inflation; and the disbanding of the USSR's Supreme Soviet
(Sakwa 1993, 9).

To appease the miners' demands and the

public's sentiments, Gorbachev turned to the democratic
forces for support, which was earned by drafting a new
Union Treaty.

Gorbachev made concessions reluctantly, but,

regardless of the political sacrifice involved, he intended
to ensure the preservation of the union.

Initial outlines

of the treaty were penned in April, but the definitive
draft was scheduled for formal ratification on August 20, a
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date coup plotters considered when planning for their
insurgence.
Obviously, Kremlin conservatives felt threatened by
the liberal activities during early-to-mid 1991.

The

impending signing of the Union Treaty, Gorbachev's G7
negotiations, and Yeltsin's forthright advocacy of
decentralization all marked the USSR's advance toward a new
era— an era in which the Kremlin and the nomenklatura would
hold only a cursory role.

Increasingly, conservatives

realized that the old rivalry between Yeltsin and Gorbachev
was a bogus confrontation, as the two shared similar,
liberal visions.

The actual battle raged between old

institutions of power, including the KGB, the communist
party, and the military, and the emerging, nascent forces
of democracy and capitalism (Morrison 1991, 275).

In light

of this struggle, some reactionary members of the USSR's
old guard decided to create an opportunity to check the
nation's progressive course.

The -gsw
Conservative putschists took control of the Soviet
Union with an ill-prepared, short-lived coup on August 19.
The principal conspirators in the scheme included Pavlov,
the Prime Minister; Vladimir Kryuchkov, head of the KGB;
Dmitrii Yazov, the Minister of Defence; and Yanaev, the
Soviet Vice President.

Their immediate goal was to

obstruct the signing of the Union Treaty which was
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scheduled for the following day, August 20.

Moreover, they

sought to take back lost political ground, as the coup
embodied an effort to settle the crisis of power and the
conflict of opposed ideologies (Sakwa 1993, 11).

To

accomplish their goals, the coup plotters needed to
neutralize Gorbachev.
On the day prior to the takeover, August 18, the
conspirators directed a delegation of representatives to
detain Gorbachev in his holiday home in the Crimea.

The

delegation's task was to present the vacationing Soviet
President Gorbachev with an ultimatum: support a
reactionary state of emergency or step aside as leader of
the USSR.

By agreeing to a state of emergency, Gorbachev

would have participated in a revolt against progressive
reform and a return to authoritarianism.

By stepping

aside, Gorbachev would have willingly allowed a return to
authoritarianism.
demand.

Gorbachev refused to accept either

Consequently, the plotters' delegation and

Gorbachev's treasonous security staff confined the Soviet
Union's chief executive and his family to the vacation
home's grounds, cutting them off from communication with
friends, the USSR, and the rest of the world.
With the Soviet president sequestered, the plotters
moved to take formal control of the country.
end, a series of decrees were issued.

Toward this

Vice-President

Yanaev printed a brief proclamation in Soviet newspapers
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which claimed that Gorbachev was "ill."

Accordingly,

Yanaev assumed the duties of acting president of the USSR,
citing relevant passages of the Soviet constitution fPravda
and Izvestia 20 August 1991a, l).

Simultaneously, a newly-

formed State Committee for the State of Emergency asserted
its authority.

The committee was comprised of the four

original plotters, plus Pugo, Baklanov, Alexander Tizyakov,
and Vasilii Starodubtsev.

They claimed the USSR's

stability was threatened by Gorbachev's absence.
Therefore, a state of emergency was declared to "prevent
society from sliding toward a nationwide catastrophe and to
safeguard legality and order...for a period of six months"
fPravda and Izvestia 20 August 1991b, 1).

However, it

would soon become apparent that the committee planned to do
more than simply appropriate control in Gorbachev's
absence.

They took this opportunity to promote their

reactionary movement.
The emergency committee made its views about the
Soviet President's leadership quite clear.

They claimed

that the reforms initiated by Gorbachev led the USSR to the
brink of disaster and that corrections must occur.

On

August 20, the committee published an "Appeal to the Soviet
People" in newspapers.

The article reflected reactionary

views, stating that "[f]or a number of reasons, the policy
reforms begun at the initiative of M. S. Gorbachev.. .has
reached an impasse.

The initial enthusiasm and hopes have
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given way to unbelief, apathy, and despair" fPravda and
izvestia 20 August 1991c, 1).

Thus, the committee assumed

leadership to reestablish expedient political conditions
and to restore the "pride and honor of Soviet people" (1).
Realizing that such a reactionary transition might be
disputed, the committee ordered the military into the
streets of Moscow and other key cities.

Officially, the

justification for this decision was the protection of the
citizens.

They claimed that, in the nation's current

condition, "people's basic personal safety is increasingly
under threat.

Crime is growing at a rapid rate and is

becoming organized and politicized" fPravda and Izvestia 20
August 1991c, l).

Because of this "threat," the committee

argued that a temporary deployment of troops was necessary
for the citizens' protection.

"Protection," however, also

included curbing potential democratic opposition.

As

miliary forces entered Moscow, a detachment of 50 tanks
surrounded the Russian "White House," the headguarters of
the Russian SFSR Supreme Soviet.
leaders faced intimidation:

Also, key democratic

Priest Gleb Yakunin and RSFSR

People's Deputy Bella Denisenko were threatened with
arrests (Malash 1991, 1); and a team of commandos stalked
Yeltsin.
Given the circumstances surrounding the committee's
takeover, it soon became evident that the situation was not
temporary.

Conservatives aimed to take back control of the
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Soviet Union.

Though the coup was poorly planned and

poorly managed, it presented a serious threat to the
progress of reform.

Thus, Yeltsin moved quickly to ensure

the advancement of progressive policy.
YELTSIN'S REACTION
Yeltsin's response to the coup favored the return of
the Soviet president to office, as Gorbachev was, at this
point, part of the Russian president's revolution.

In

light of past problems between the two leaders, one might
have assumed that Yeltsin wanted to be rid of Gorbachev.
Events during mid-1991, however, modified Yeltsin's view of
the Soviet president.

Yeltsin expressed a positive opinion

of Gorbachev's work on the new Union Treaty in a late-July
interview.

He commented, "I personally feel certain that

now Gorbachev is finally going to stop dashing from one
side to the other, that he is now irrevocably set on
reform" (Alimov 1991, 2).

If Gorbachev stood as an ally of

revolutionary change against conservatives, the Russian
president was to gain a tactical advantage by having him
restored to office.

To hasten Gorbachev's return, Yeltsin

utilized an interesting variation of the revolutionary
persona.
Against the coup and for Gorbachev's return, Yeltsin
grounded his arguments in an appeal to the rule of law.
a printed statement issued on August 19, he called the
emergency committee's actions illegal.

Yeltsin claimed,
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"Whatever reasons are used to justify this removal, what we
are dealing with is a right-wing, reactionary,
unconstitutional coup" fMeaapolis-Express 19 August 1991,
1).

On the surface, this statement failed to reflect the

use of a revolutionary persona, as he appealed to order and
law.

Nevertheless, Yeltsin's rhetorical approach satisfied

the needs of a revolutionary's purpose.

If the goal of his

revolution was, to use Cohen's term, "conversion," and if
development of Soviet law supported the process of
conversion, it made sense for Yeltsin to invoke
constitutionality.
Yeltsin's legalistic condemnation of the coup
indicated that he believed the USSR was in the process of
conversion.

In the previously mentioned newspaper

statement, Yeltsin implied that the law favored the
development of change, as he cited the liberal Union Treaty
as a leading cause for the putschists' rebellion.

Yeltsin

charged, "This development of events [the events leading up
to the signing of the Union Treaty] aroused the animosity
of reactionary forces and drove them to irresponsible,
adventurist attempts to solve very complicated political
and economic problems by methods of force" fMeaapolisExpress 19 August 1991, 1).

Yeltsin believed the changes

in the USSR were natural and mandated by the public when he
stated "We call on the citizens of Russia to give the
putschists the response they deserve and to demand that the
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country be returned to normal constitutional development"

(1 ).
Yeltsin's persona here, while grounded in the realm of
"constitutionality,” was, nevertheless, revolutionary.

In

condemning the coup, he summoned words like
"unconstitutional," "illegal," and "return to normalcy."
Still, these terms were utilized in a way to condemn
defenders of the old status quo and to ensure the progress
of conversion— the end goal of a revolution.

However, the

success of Yeltsin's appeal to constitutionality was
threatened by the fact that the putschists believed they
maintained a firm handhold on legality.

As they took

control of the USSR, the plotters, too, invoked the Soviet
constitution.

Thus, Yeltsin discerned the necessity to

separate further from the remnants of the previous
political paradigm.
In smother decree issued on August 19, Yeltsin broke
allegiance with the Soviet government.

He commandeered

absolute control over all Soviet power and resources on
Russian soil.

Again, Yeltsin intoned the illegality of the

emergency committee's actions.

The Russian president then

went on to announce his sweeping appropriation of power:
Until an extraordinary Congress of USSR Peoples'
Deputies is convened, all USSR bodies of executive
power, including the USSR State Security Committee,
the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the USSR
Ministry of Defense, that operated on RSFSR territory
are to be shifted to direct subordination to the
popularly elected President of RSFSR....The RSFSR
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State Security Committee, ...Ministry of Internal
Affairs, and the...State Committee on Defense
Questions are to temporarily exercise the functions of
the corresponding USSR bodies... .All RSFSR agencies,
officials, and citizens are to take immediate measures
to rule out the implementation of all decisions and
orders of the unconstitutional Committee for the State
of Emergency... (Kuranty 19 August 1991, 2).
Yeltsin's decision to issue this decree was a prudent risk.
By asserting control of defense, of internal affairs, and
of government in general, Yeltsin attempted to undermine
the authority of the plotters, and, therefore, he defended
against further threats from the emergency committee.
Despite the centrality of the committee in the coup,
perhaps the most immediate threat was posed by the armed
soldiers choking the streets of Moscow.
Yeltsin appealed directly to military personnel in his
famous "tank speech."

As long as armed soldiers lined the

streets and were oath-bound to the Soviet state, the
potential for violence existed.

Yeltsin took action to

placate this volatile predicament.

At noon on the 19th,

Yeltsin mounted a T-52 tank to address a small crowd in
front of the Russian White Mouse.

Despite the relatively

meager size of the gathering, enough reporters were present
to cover Yeltsin's address and to help make it an enduring
symbol of the revolution.

Yeltsin's objective was to

persuade soldiers to ignore orders from their right-wing
superiors.

Further, he wanted the troops to abstain from

any brutality against their fellow citizens.

Toward these

goals, Yeltsin subverted the Soviet military commanders'
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authority and asserted his own republic's control over
USSR's military forces.
To discredit the putschists, Yeltsin called their
activities treasonist and deceptive.

He claimed:

The Vice President of the USSR, the Prime Minister of
the USSR, the Chairman...have become members of as
unconstitutional body, thereby committing high
treason— a very grave crime against the state. The
country is threatened with terror. The 'order' that
the latter-day saviors of the fatherland are promising
us will end in tragedy— the suppression of dissent,
concentration camps, nighttime arrests.
'A better
life' will remain a propaganda fraud fKuranty 20
August 1991, 1).
Here, Yeltsin asserted again the illegality of the coup.
Further, he stressed the counterproductiveness of the
conservatives' goals.

To accept the plotters' perspective

was tantamount to accepting the false hopes promoted by
party dogma in the Soviet past.
Upon such a foundation, Yeltsin built his appeal to
the soldiers to curb violence.

The Russian president

feared that the putschists might resort to violence to
advance their objectives.

Thus, he directed the soldiers

to keep the peace and to do what was "right":
Soldiers and officers of Russia!
...Do not let
yourselves get caught in a web of false promises and
demagogic talk about your military duty! Do not
become a blind instrument of the criminal will of a
group of adventurists....
Soldiers! I appeal to you. Think of your loved
ones, your friends, your people. At the difficult
moment of choice, do not forget that you have taken an
oath of loyalty to the people. The people against
whom they are trying to turn your weapons.... There is
no return to the past, nor will there be. The
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conspirators' days are numbered (Kuranty 20 August
1991, 1).
Here, Yeltsin argued that the putschists' actions were
driven by archaic, self-serving doctrine and not by concern
for the nation's citizens.

Therefore, Yeltsin encouraged

the soldiers to think for themselves during this pivotal
crisis rather them to take orders without adequate
contemplation.
To strengthen his appeal for temperance, Yeltsin
asserted his government's supreme control over Russia.

He

proclaimed that General Konstantin Korbets, a chairperson
of the RSFSR Committee on Defense Questions, was now
commander of all military forces in Russia.

Rather than

listen to "conspirators," Yeltsin claimed that soldiers
should listen only to Korbets.

To influence further the

soldiers, Yeltsin concluded his address by stating that,
"Dark clouds of terror and dictatorship have gathered over
Russia and over the whole country."

However, he predicted

these clouds would not become "an eternal night” ;

The

soldiers would decide against staining the "honor and glory
of Russian arms” with the blood of the nation's own people
(Kurantv 20 August

1991, 1).

Yeltsin's revolutionary persona during his speech in
front of the White House was essential in framing the issue
of legitimacy during the turbulent days of the coup.

Of

course, Yeltsin's vocabulary was critical of the
putschists, as he assigned vilifying labels, calling them
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"conspirators" and "traitors."

The truly prominent force

of his appeal, however, stemmed from his ability to argue
for his own government's legitimacy, even as he called for
revolutionary change.

Yeltsin's supplication rested on the

premise that reforms in the Soviet Union (i.e., the Union
Treaty) was part of a natural course of voter-mandated
transformation.

To return to the ways of the outmoded

Soviet system was an invitation for catastrophe,
characterized by "dissent," "concentration camps," and
"arrests.”

Therefore, Yeltsin concluded that the soldiers

had little choice but to revoke their allegiance to the
Kremlin's conservatives and to become vanguards of a new
era.
THE END
In a few days, the reactionary coup sputtered to a
halt.

The successful counter coup inspired by Yeltsin not

only disparaged the putschists, it also heralded the fall
of the Soviet power system.

At Yeltsin's urging, anti

communist demonstrations ravaged the USSR.

After his

speech atop the T-52 tank, over 100,000 demonstrators
flocked to the White House to defend it against Soviet
troops.

Elsewhere in Moscow, thousands of people

threatened to storm the CPSU's headquarters.

One after

smother, republics throughout the Soviet Union declared
their independence (Sakwa 1993, 13).

By August 22, less

than a week after the coup began, the reactionary crusade
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collapsed.

The Soviet era ended with a number of

monumental events, including Gorbachev's resignation as
party general secretary on August 24 and the disbanding of
the communist party in early November.

During these

proceedings, Yeltsin's rhetoric seemed largely ceremonial,
as the death of the communist party's Soviet Union appeared
to be a foregone conclusion.

Nevertheless, his statements

and orations served

to ensure the passing of the old Soviet

paradigm and marked

the birth of a new Russia.

Soon after his

return to Moscow, Gorbachev

relinquished position as chief of the communistparty.

His

resignation was precipitated by a special session of the
Russian parliament on August 23.

At this meeting, Yeltsin

humiliated Gorbachev by forcing him to read aloud a
transcript of the gathering at which the coup was planned.
On this transcript, two of those expressing support for the
plan were government ministers appointed by Gorbachev
himself.

By requiring Gorbachev to read the statement,

Yeltsin suggested that the soviet president was responsible
for allowing the coup to occur.

As he was disgraced by

Yeltsin and his party was in shambles, Gorbachev knew what
had to be done.
Gorbachev presented his resignation address on August
24.

In light of his underlings' roles in the coup, he

recommended that "the CPSU Central Committee must make the
difficult but honorable decision to dissolve itself"
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(izvestia 26 August 1991, 2).

Despite the effects of the

coup on the Party's credibility, he believed that Communism
still had a future in the Soviet Union.

He stated,

I believe that the democratically-minded communists
who remained true to constitutional legality and the
course aimed at the renewal of society will call for
the creation, on a new basis, of a party that will be
capable of actively joining, together with all
progressive forces, in the continuation of fundamental
democratic transformations in the interests of the
working people (Izvestia 26 August 1991, 2).
Despite his imminent resignation as general secretary,
Gorbachev believed that some semblance of the party would
survive and continue making contributions to Soviet
government.

In other words, Gorbachev was aware of his

party's present failure, but he floundered to discern the
pending collapse of the Leninist-Marxist paradigm.

He did

not realize his party's fate.
On November 6, after months of deliberation, Yeltsin
banned the communist party.

In his decree, he argued that

the CPSU should not continue to exist, as it was never
actually a party.

Yeltsin stated that the communist

organization served to shape political power by "fusing
with state structures or making them subordinate to the
CPSU” (Rossiiskaya Gazeta 9 November 1991, 2).

By

commandeering government influence, the party functioned
only as a self-serving body for hoarding power and wealth.
On this premise, Yeltsin asserted that the CPSU was never a
legitimate institution.

He supported his claim by

explaining:
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The activity of these structures was clearly
antipopular and unconstitutional in nature and was
directly linked to the incitement of religious, social
and nationally-based strife among the country's
peoples and to the infringement of basic human and
civil rights and liberties that sure recognized by the
entire international community (Rossiiskava Gazeta 9
November 1991, 2).
Yeltsin interpreted the past from a new, paradigmatic
perspective.

That is, the once "acceptable" events of the

past were now obsolete and reprehensible.
In light of the party's avaricious and underhanded
nature, Yeltsin feared the possibility of lingering
problems.

Yeltsin noted that since the coup's end, the

CPSU continued resisting participation in the USSR's
democratic transformation, as the nomenklatura persisted in
grasping to preserve influence and wealth.

Thus, Yeltsin

outlawed the party by stating, "It has become obvious that
as long as the CPSU structures continue to exist there can
be no guarantees against another putsch or coup..."
(Rossiiskava Gazeta 9 November 1991, 2).
Yeltsin's revolutionary persona in this address was
uncompromising, as he reinterpreted past history from a new
perspective.

Throughout over 70 years of existence, he

claimed that the Communists accomplished no more than the
"infringement of basic human rights."

Yeltsin's rhetorical

stance was indicative of the revolutionary persona, as
revolutionaries frequently assert the existence of natural
and self-evident principles.

By taking such an unequivocal

perspective, he emphasized the CPSU's shortcomings and
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provided an argumentative foundation for the acceptance of
a new political paradigm.
Shortly after Yeltsin's address concerning the CPSU's
discontinuation, the Soviet state fell.

The end of the

USSR was more in the Ukraine's hands than Yeltsin's.

On

December 1, the Ukraine scheduled a referendum to
substantiate its declaration of independence during the
August coup.

This referendum was a pivotal moment.

If the

Soviet Union's most massive, most wealthy, non-Russian
republic withdrew from the union, little would be left to
hold the USSR together (Coleman 1996, 353).

Hopes for

support of the union in the Ukraine, however, were
negligible and the vote led to the republic's final
decision to cede.
The Ukraine's decision then encouraged Gorbachev to
resign as the President of the USSR.

On December 25, 1991,

the Soviet President spoke to disagree with the
dismemberment of the union but also to recognize the
progress of events.

He stated lamentfully, "A policy line

aimed at dismembering the country and disuniting the state
has prevailed, something that I cannot agree with"
(Rossiiskaya Gazeta 26 December 1991, 1).

Nevertheless, he

admitted that he could not turn the tide of circumstance.
Thus, as he was uncertain about the future, Gorbachev bid a
nervous farewell to his role as Soviet president:
leaving my post with a feeling of anxiety.

"I am

But also with
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hope and with faith in you, in your wisdom and strength of
spirit....I wish all of you the very best" (2).
The era of the Soviet Union was over.

With the fall

of the Party and the fall of the union, the old system's
institutions lacked a firm base of power.

Of course,

conservative remnants of the Party, the KGB, and the
miliary were still able to exert influence on the events
subsequent to Gorbachev's resignation.

Nevertheless, the

Soviet manner of thinking was bankrupt.

In the public's

eyes, and as Yeltsin made it clear, there was no way that
the communists' oppressive ideology and discredited model
of economics could compare with the promise of a more
Western style of government (Coleman 1996, 355).
faced the decision between reform and revolt.

Communism

It chose

revolt and suffered with the results.
With the death of Soviet communism, Yeltsin began the
work of building Russia's future.

In Cohen's (1985) terms,

Yeltsin reached the "post-revolutionary" stage, with its
own assortment of rhetorical problems.

Thus, the events

following Gorbachev's resignation were many and lie beyond
the scope of this study.

Nevertheless, Yeltsin's January,

1992, speech to the United Nations provided the world with
a representative glance of his vision of Russia's postSoviet future.
In his speech, Yeltsin proclaimed the beginning of a
new epoch in world history.

With the fall of the Soviet
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Union and communism, he asserted that a global "opportunity
has appeared to finally put an end to despotism and to
dismantle the totalitarian system, in whatever form it may
exist" fRossiiskava Gazeta 3 February 1992, 1).

Thus,

Yeltsin acknowledged the supremacy of democracy in Russia
and the world:

"Democracy is a highly important gain of

human civilization" (1).

With the era of communism in the

past, Yeltsin believed that Russia could viably enter into
productive relations with the rest of the world.

As he put

it:
Russia sees the US, the West, and the countries of the
East not merely as partners but as allies. This is a
highly important prerequisite for, and, I would say, a
revolution in, peaceful cooperation among the states
of the civilized world. We rule, out any subordination
of foreign policy to ideological doctrines or a selfsufficient policy. Our principles are simple and
understandable: the supremacy of democracy, human
rights and liberties, legality and morality
fRossiiskava Gazeta 3 February 1992, 1).
In this statement, Yeltsin echoed appeals found in other
revolutionary declarations throughout his rise to
prominence.

The idea that human rights were more important

than doctrine was a common theme in his revolutionary
rhetoric.
His recommendations for Russia's foreign policy
highlighted the comprehensiveness of Russia's
transformation.

For decades, the Soviet Union pursued a

Stalinist policy of isolation aimed at developing communism
within the nation's boarders.

In spite of this history,

Yeltsin advocated a bold and innovative direction.
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announced Russia's participation in the world community as
an ally of democracy and a confederate in the global
economy.
CONCLUSION
The events surrounding the end of the Soviet era
transpired at a dizzying pace.

Prompted by Gorbachev's

liberal transformation and Yeltsin's unflagging progress
toward empowering the republics, reactionary forces
responded quickly but ineptly.

Leaders of the coup had no

substantial plan for seizing control; they simply assumed
that the masses would be swooned by patriotic invocations
and a show of miliary might.

However, Yeltsin's actions

provided a convincing counter to the putschists' awkward
plea for a return to the Kremlin's conservative values.
Yeltsin's use of a revolutionary persona was essential
to his endeavor to fend off the coup.

Frequently,

revolutionaries utilize a vocabulary of blatant criticism
and appeals to loosely-defined, natural human rights.
Indeed, Yeltsin's rhetorical approach fit roughly these
criteria.

His pleas for the return to the rule of law was

a seemingly conservative approach.

However, Yeltsin

fashioned these arguments for order on the assumption that
the Soviet constitution was not a static document.

That

is, he believed that Soviet law could reflect change and
the will of the people.

When it became clear that Soviet

conservatives might also invoke the constitution for their
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purposes, Yeltsin quickly circumvented their authority by
snatching power away from them by decree.

Yeltsin's daring

risk paid dividends, as the coup plotters were too
unorganized to respond convincingly to the Russian
president's strategy.

i
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
REVIEW OF STUDY
Boris Yeltsin's rise to power during the Soviet
Union's decline was an extraordinary happening.

In 1991,

after decades of repressive political conditions, one man
finally emerged to facilitate the USSR's break from the
communist path.

Yeltsin's role was undeniably instrumental

in expediting the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise
of a more Westem-style government in Russia.

One might

call Yeltsin's achievement unlikely, as his demeanor was
often termed brash, impertinent, and ungraceful.

However,

as a revolutionary leader, he honed a remarkable rhetorical
sense of timing and savvy.

It was this sense that aided

the advancement of his reformist and revolutionary agendas.
This study promotes a rhetorical approach to the
analysis of revolution to explain Yeltsin's influence as a
revolutionary leader.

Existing theories of revolution

freguently feature the examination of antecedent conditions
for confrontation or of predicted outcomes.

Certainly,

these perspectives are important, as they explore the
social, economic, and political variables that constitute
conditions for insurgence.

However, complementary

explanations need to be produced which illustrate how these
variables are interpreted for persuasive affect by the
leadership of a revolutionary movement.

What rhetorical
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strategies do revolutionaries use to advocate change?

How

do some leaders succeed in gaining the support necessary to
guide a revolutionary movement?

To produce answers to such

questions, the rhetorical study of revolutionary discourse
is beneficial.
To illustrate the development and effect of Yeltsin's
public discourse between 1985 and 1991, this study utilizes
concepts borrowed from the investigation of revolutions in
science.

Keith and Zagacki (1992) posit that scientists

use one of three rhetorical personae to advocate claims in
a scientific community.

First, a scientist using a

revolutionary persona openly seeks change. While the
degree of zeal may vary, the use of this persona is
exercised to champion an immediate modification in the way
scientists conduct experiments and theorize about research
findings.

Second, a scientist using a conciliatory persona

realizes that a paradigm shift may not occur immediately.
Anticipating resistance from the status quo, the
conciliator seeks to foster gradual reform, rather than to
promote radical transformation.

Third, a scientist using a

conservative persona supports the preservation of the
status quo.

When a scientific community's interests—

intellectual, social, and economic— are firmly rooted,
change may not be welcomed.

Thus, researchers may employ a

conservative persona to encourage critical rigor and to
defend against the influence of "second-rate" advances in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

173
theory and practice.

The present study argues that these

three personae can be adapted for analysis in the political
context.
Keith and Zagacki's conceptualizations explain the
personae in a general sense but do not expound the forms
these rhetorical strategies may take.

However,

complimentary ideas about form may be garnered from
political theory.

Based on the writings and theories of

Robespierre, Brinton, and others, this study suggests that
the use of various rhetorical personae in the revolutionary
context may work in conjunction with certain appeals.
Plausibly, the revolutionary persona relies on appeals
which support the idea of "natural" public liberties.
Further, revolutionaries tend to frame the accomplishments
and conduct of the reigning paradigm in pejorative terms.
Use of the conciliatory persona hinges on the use of
appeals to order and continuity to foster reform.

By

encouraging inventive adaptation of an established
paradigm's laws and institutions, the conciliator hopes to
include members of the status quo in the process of paced,
yet certain, transformation.
used to avoid change.

The conservative persona is

Its use entails a lack of

inferential leaps and support of a paradigm's reigning
leaders and practices.

With these adaptations to Keith and

Zagacki's concepts, this study examines Yeltsin's
revolutionary discourse.

j
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RESEARCH FINDINGS
This study endeavored to address two research
questions:

What were the personae utilized by Yeltsin for

the establishment of himself as a principal revolutionary
leader?

How was Yeltsin's strategic use of personae

essential to the revolutionary process?
To answer the first question, this study isolated and
examined four exigencies to which Yeltsin responded.

The

first exigence was created by the commencement of
perestroika.

As conceived by Gorbachev, perestroika was an

attempt to correct shortcomings of the Soviet economic and
political system with glasnost, democratization, and
tightly regulated marketization.

With these innovations,

Gorbachev hoped to decentralize Soviet bureaucracy, making
it more efficient.

However, the success of perestroika

required that members of the USSR's elite class, the
nomenklatura, relinquish much of their authority and
affluence.

Because they refused to give up power, Yeltsin

encountered stern resistance as a principal agent of
Gorbachev's reform effort.
This study found that Yeltsin attempted two rhetorical
approaches during perestroika, between 1985 and 1987.
First, Yeltsin used a revolutionary persona in his initial
endeavor to root out corruption and misuse of party power.
With his radical persona, Yeltsin failed, as the
nomenklatura's hold on power was exceptionally steadfast.
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Thus, Yeltsin faced censure and demotion in the Soviet
political ranks.

Second, following his reproachment, he

developed a conservative persona to safeguard his political
well-being.

Accordingly, Yeltsin fell in line with

Gorbachev's moderate approach to reform, a strategy more
palatable to conservative forces in the CPSU than his
confrontive style demonstrated in 1986.

In short, during

the initial years of perestroika, Yeltsin performed his
duties in an environment that was not conducive to change.
Therefore, he ventured to utilize and then abandoned a
revolutionary persona in favor of a conservative persona.
The second exigence faced by Yeltsin concerned
perestroika's breakdown, which altered the rhetorical
situation in which he functioned.

In 1989, Gorbachev's

reform initiative encountered significant impediments.

The

nation's financial health continued to degenerate at a
rapid pace.

Because of an unfavorable economy, labor

strikes erupted to protest the decline of the standard of
living and the severe shortage of consumer goods.

Further,

as a result of glasnost and the freedom of speech promoted
by the newly-formed Congress of People's Deputies, the
number of protests in fringe republics escalated.
Estranged nationalities openly demonstrated against their
subordinate status and for greater autonomy.

In light of

these deteriorating circumstances, the public expected
meaningful changes.

However, Gorbachev protected the
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eminence of the party.

He avoided progressive policy

decisions which entailed further decentralization and
adopted more restrained measures.

With this strategy, the

Soviet president merely exacerbated tensions between
political hardliners and an increasingly outspoken and
reform-minded Soviet public.
In response to the demise of progressive perestroika,
this study found that Yeltsin adopted a conciliatory
persona.

Because he was an elected representative in the

Congress of People's Deputies in 1989, he enjoyed increased
freedom to express his opinions.

Thus, Yeltsin was

contentious in his rhetorical attacks against the status
quo.

He resigned from the communist party and pursued

reform not within the party, but within the Russian
parliament.

Despite his aggressiveness, he was cautious in

conducting his affairs, as the CPD had little real power,
and he wanted to maintain a working relationship with
progressive members of the party.

Therefore, Yeltsin

publicly claimed that reform could occur within the party
and the Soviet system.

However, he warned that reform must

occur quickly, as the condition of the USSR was dire.
Thus, he prodded dogmatic communists with predictions of
impending danger and coaxed them to correct their course of
action while they still had the opportunity.
The third exigence examined deals with Yeltsin's quest
for the Russian presidency in 1991, which provided him with
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heightened, rhetorical license.

After the bloodshed in

Vilnius, Lithuania, the rhetorical situation changed;
Gorbachev came under increasing scrutiny for his inability
to take a decisive policy line.

Evidence of his

floundering included failure to accept responsibility for
the Vilnius incident and continued vacillation about reform
issues.

Concurrently, the public became increasingly

outspoken against the party's activities.

For instance,

protestors willfully ignored a March, 1991, ban on street
demonstrations to march in support of Yeltsin.

Several

months later, the Russian presidential election gave its
citizens a significant means with which to express their
outrage.
Yeltsin responded to the troubled situation with a
revolutionary persona, as the election provided him with an
influential stage from which to voice his arguments.
Frustrated with Gorbachev's continued reluctance to embrace
change, Yeltsin lashed out.

He campaigned on a radical

platform which included promises of immediate economic
reform, of improved living conditions for ordinary
citizens, and of promoting Russian nationalism.

Also,

during his campaign, Yeltsin advocated taking decision
making power out of the Soviet government's hands and
placing it in the hands of the Russian parliament.

He

proclaimed that the era of communism's false hopes and
dreams was over.

Through increased sovereignty, Yeltsin
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argued that the republic of Russia could champion the needs
and aspirations of individual citizens with representative
government.
Finally, the fourth exigence examined was created by
the August coup of 1991.

Plotters of the takeover felt

threatened by Yeltsin's success in the presidential
election, by the possibility of Western incursion via
Gorbachev's G7 negotiations, and by the impending loss of
power outlined in the new Union Treaty.

In response to

these threats, the reactionaries apprehended Gorbachev,
seized control of the Soviet government, and lined the
streets of key cities with troops.

However, the plotters

bungled the coup's management, allowing Yeltsin to
intercede.

His rhetoric during this time of crisis was

influential in ending the uprising and in administering the
end of the Soviet era.
Yeltsin reacted to the coup with an unequivocally
revolutionary persona.

He denounced the coup by grounding

his contentions in the "rule of law."

This law, however,

was not the same legality that guided the Soviet Union for
decades.

It was grounded in what Yeltsin called the

rightful and citizen-supported development of the Soviet
constitution.

In Yeltsin's estimation, the constitution's

development allowed for a revolution in political thought:
the endorsement of decentralization and the abandonment of
key Marxist-Leninist principles.

Yeltsin eschewed
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communist thinking by claiming that state interests would
no longer outweigh the rights and interests of individual
citizens.

In addition to this radical change in thinking,

Yeltsin banned the communist party after the coup's
collapse.

He believed that eliminating this remnant of the

past was necessary because he feared its continued
influence.

Further, Yeltsin argued that all authoritarian

traditions must end to make way for the future of democracy
in Russia.
The second research question posed at the beginning of
this study was:

How was Yeltsin's use of rhetorical

personae essential to the revolutionary process in Russia?
Yeltsin's use of personae was essential for two reasons.
First, Yeltsin's utilization of personae helped him
preserve his political career by sensing and adapting to
the limitations imposed by Russia's evolving rhetorical
situation.

Rhetoric is situational.

In Bitzer's (1968)

words, "...a particular discourse comes into existence
because of some specific condition or situation which
invites utterance" (4).

Put differently, a rhetorical

situation is a moment of crisis which requires a rhetor to
sway an audience to accept one resolution over others.

To

be successful, the rhetor must tailor contentions to suit
the disposition of the audience.

In relation an audience's

needs, desires, and inclinations, the rhetor must know his
or her limitations.
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Yeltsin was able to sense his limitations; thus he was
able to remain an influential factor in the republic's
transformation.

During the mid-1980s, Yeltsin's audience

was not receptive to his radical messages, as those in
power were in a comfortable position.

Very few people

openly challenged their power, and the process of
democratization had not yet spawned avenues of formal
dissent like the Congress of Peoples' Deputies.

Put

differently, for conservatives, no pressing reasons
constituted a "crisis" in the same way Yeltsin was defining
the situation.

Consequently, Yeltsin's revolutionary

arguments fell on unsympathetic and spiteful ears.

To

avoid reproach, he soon learned to anticipate audience
response before fashioning a presentation style for his
discourse.

Thus, when faced with party hardliners as a

reluctant, primary audience, his discourse was
conservative.

However, the scope of his audience grew

after the 1989 parliamentary elections to include a more
progressive voting population rather than the party.

This

population included common citizens who longed for reforms
and for improvements in their standard of living.

Thus,

Yeltsin's discourse became increasingly conciliatory, as
his constituency was receptive to moderate change.

By

adapting his rhetoric to the nature of the audience and the
situational context, Yeltsin avoided detrimental
confrontation to keep himself in a position of political
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influence.

If he had not accomplished this task, the

second Russian revolution might not have occurred the way
it did or at all.
Second, in addition to the perpetuation of his
political career, the use of personae helps explain how
Yeltsin successfully fashioned his claims.

Theoretically,

each persona features a different rhetorical approach to
negotiating a rhetorical situation.

When a paradigm's

power structure is firmly entrenched, the conservative
persona is used to argue for the preservation of the status
quo.

However, when a need for reform is perceived, and

when an audience is receptive to a mitigated criticism of
the status quo, the conciliatory persona is appropriate.
This persona is used to press for moderate change with
premises grounded in reigning rules, laws, and practices.
And when an audience discerns that a paradigm is on or near
the brink of collapse, the rhetor stands in a position to
use a revolutionary persona.

This persona features

inductive reasoning, as the rhetor seeks new principles by
which a community conducts its affairs.
In practice, Yeltsin used each one of these
argumentative approaches successfully.

For instance, after

his 1987 speech which invited party censure, he spoke
within parameters set for him.

Yeltsin repressed his views

and used a conservative persona.

In 1989, however, he had

a new audience which was receptive to the idea of change at
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the Congress of Peoples' Deputies.
were deductive in nature.

Yeltsin's arguments

That is, against the backdrop of

his perception of Soviet laws development, he scrutinized
the progress of reform.

Whatever the circumstances were,

Yeltsin seemingly figured out an appropriate manner to
frame his arguments in such a way as to appeal to the needs
and dispositions of his given audience.
IMPLICATIONS
By using rhetorical theory to help explain the
successes and failures of Yeltsin in late-Soviet Russia,
revolutionary theory is supplemented.

This study suggests

that patterns of rhetorical strategies exist which help a
leader manage the process of revolutionary uprising.

If

Yeltsin had not used rhetorical personae in his promotion
of change, he might have been neutralized and the
revolutionary movement suppressed.

In light of this

study's perspective on the importance of rhetorical
personae in negotiating crisis situations, a number of
significant ideas may be gleaned.
First, this study suggests that scholars may speculate
more clearly than before about how revolutionary leaders
acquire command and influence.

Many students of revolution

have hypothesized about the levers of power leaders must
pull to guide revolutionary movement but little about how
leaders put themselves in position to pull those levers.
For instance, Hook (1967) contends that successful
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revolutionaries come to power by securing control over
military forces, by positioning various social and
political factions against each other, by pursuing control
of social functions, and by eliminating opposition (16768).

Hook's observations are insightful, but they do not

tell us a great deal about how revolutionary leaders
maneuver themselves into stations of authority and perform
their functions.
The study of rhetoric allows us to examine how leaders
construct their public images.

From this study's

theoretical perspective, Yeltsin's use of rhetorical
strategies for his rise to power was somewhat predictable.
Like revolutionaries in science, Yeltsin presented his
contentions shrewdly to avoid deunaging beneficial relations
with his audience.

When possible, Yeltsin invoked the

status guo's own ideas, especially Gorbachev's, to frame
controversial issues.

At the same time, he gathered public

support via press coverage to protect himself from party
reprimands.

Because he survived politically and built a

popular base of support, Yeltsin was in a position to lead
the revolution when the Soviet empire could no longer
sustain itself.

In short, Yeltsin's use of rhetorical

personae was essential in stabilizing his position as an
effectual leader.
With its rhetorical perspective, this study suggests a
pattern of successful revolutionary behavior.
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there is no way to predict a leader's specific actions.
However, the examination of personae may help scholars
anticipate the tactics used by a successful revolutionary
to manage his or her circumstances and to argue for change.
A second implication of this study is that the
examination of Yeltsin's rhetoric leads to the
conceptualization of a new revolutionary role, the role of
"rhetorical chameleon."

In previous studies, scholars have

suggested a number of perspectives for examining the
behavior of revolutionaries.

From studies of

psychoanalysis, scholars hypothesize that revolutionaries
are driven by repressed desires and consequential appetites
for power.

From studies of social, movements, scholars

suggest that revolutionaries serve a number of functions,
including ideologist, agitator, administrator.

From

studies of charisma, scholars contend that revolutionaries
possess a kind of divine charm which derives power from
outside of legitimate, established institutions.
Successful revolutionaries are also skillful managers
of presentation.
adaptation.

Yeltsin possessed a remarkable sense of

When faced with censure by the Politburo in

1987, Yeltsin bowed in defeat by publicly supporting the
party.

Despite his words of favor, his true feelings were

probably different.

Nevertheless, he played a partisan

role with a rhetorically conservative persona.

When the

rhetorical situation changed, however, Yeltsin adjusted.
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Gorbachev's advent of the Congress of Peoples' Deputies and
of increased media coverage of state functions changed the
rules by which Yeltsin played the Soviet political game.
In popular opinion, Yeltsin was able to find a handhold of
power.

In short, Yeltsin was a survivor who endured a wide

range of changing circumstances.

If Yeltsin's

revolutionary behavior is telling, it is reasonable to
believe that other revolutionary leaders might also play
the role of rhetorical chameleon.
Third, this study offers scholars a fuller
appreciation of the revolutionary process as "ordered
chaos."

Political theories recognize that revolution is

more than mere revolt.

For instance, in The Anatomy of A

Revolution, Brinton (1952) argues that countergovernments
can be "better organized, better staffed, better obeyed
than that of moderates" (147).

Nevertheless, a substantial

element of uncertainty is associated with any form of
transformation when old institutions have faltered, and new
structures have not yet solidified.

In this period of

transition, Hagopian (1974) claims that radicals possess
more freedom to fulfill their promises than conservatives
and some moderates who wish to console as many interest
groups as possible (199).

Put differently, Hagopian

believes that radicals are willing to play favorites to
promote change.

This idea of playing favorites may appear

frenzied, but it might actually be represented as a
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revolutionary leadership's utilization of a complex of
rhetorical strategies.
In the Russian revolution, Yeltsin used a different
set of persuasive approaches to solicit support from
various groups.

Yeltsin walked a fine line between

placater and antagonist to promote his agenda.

For

instance, he freguently accosted conservative Politburo
member Yegor Ligachev for his efforts to curtail reform.
Confronting Ligachev and other high-ranking, orthodox party
members was a risky undertaking, but after 1987, Yeltsin
sought protection.

He shielded himself against party

censure with stratagems including publicly-staged
"alliances" with Gorbachev and other public-relations
exploits.

Yeltsin's rhetorical feats kept issues in the

media's eye and away from the closed doors of Politburo
meetings.

In short, Yeltsin knew how, when, and where to

present information so as to heighten his message's effect
and to diminish the possibility of detrimental
consequences.
With a rhetorical perspective on revolution, perhaps
one can discern a certain kind of order in chaotic,
political change.

In all of the instability associated

with the rise and collapse of institutions, a
distinguishable endeavor is present— a pursuit to
controversies in civic affairs.

Of course, not all

factions in the multitudes may agree on individual

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

settle

I

187
policies, resolutions, or future plans.

However, whatever

the questions and answers might be, rhetoric is at the
center of negotiation.

Its use seeks to adapt possible

resolution to meet the dispositions of those involved in
conflict.

Thus, rhetoric may help provide some semblance

of continuity in the process of transition and change.
FUTURE RESEARCH
The events surrounding perestroika and the ensuing
revolution surprised many Western observers.

Prior to the

1980s, Russian history was largely viewed as fully
authoritarian.

Notions including Rigby's concept of Russia

as a "mono-organizational society" and the perceived
tradition of "oriental despotism" led many to believe that
the communist regime was somehow legitimate, and that
Russians openly embraced oppression.
were not entirely true.

These assumptions

Russia witnessed a number of

instances of dissent in the twentieth century, including
the fateful march led by Georgy Gapon in 1905 which became
known as St. Petersburg's "Bloody Sunday"; the great
literary protests of Andrei Sinyavsky, Yuli Daniel, and
Boris Pasternak; and, after 1987, the striking wave of
civic activism which involved over 60,000 independent
associations and 15 million people (Petro 1994, 1).

In

light of these facts and others like them, perhaps the
coercive power of Soviet communism was not as powerful as
many once thought.
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Like the Bolshevik uprising, revolutions are not
complete upheavals which witness immediate change.

Rather,

they are contingent periods of transformation which require
negotiation and appeals for support.

On the prospects of

change in scientific revolutions, Max Planck once noted
that conversion requires time.

He states that a new

paradigm does not "triumph by convincing its opponents and
making them see the light, but rather because its opponents
eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is
familiar with it" (in Cohen 1985, 468).
occurs slowly.

Radical change

The same is true in the political realm,

as, for example, Robespierre and Saint-Just were removed
from power for overexerting revolutionary tensions in
France; and Lenin eased the pace of progress toward
communism by introducing limited capitalism (i.e., NEP)
during the early 1920s to avoid dissension in the Soviet
Union's populace.

If revolutionary change requires

moderation and careful presentation to the public, we must
assume that rhetoric plays a vital role in paradigm shifts.
To more fully understand the role of rhetoric in
revolutions, further research must be accomplished to
supplement this study.

First, comparative investigations

must be conducted to test the utility of rhetorical
personae in different revolutionary movements.

The method

utilized in this study worked well to describe the events
surrounding a relatively bloodless revolution.
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one must ask if thoughts concerning the rhetorical personae
are applicable in settings that include noteworthy
violence.

Perhaps future studies could investigate

Robespirre in the French revolution, Castro in the January,
1959, Cuban uprising, or Lenin in the Bolshevik revolution.
Second, the results of this study may be used to
temper existing and future models of revolution.

As noted

previously, scholars in the field of political science
offer a number of serviceable explanations for the progress
of revolutions.

However, these interpretations may benefit

from a consideration of the rhetorical perspective.

By

understanding the significance of rhetoric in revolutions
more fully, researchers might be able to better comprehend
and to anticipate what occurs during political
transformation.
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